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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
ESSAYS ON EVASION AND ENFORCEMENT IN VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT) 
Value added tax (VAT) based on credit invoice system is the most common 
consumption tax in the world. Despite its self-regulating nature, VAT faces challenges in 
developing countries who have limited state capacity to check evasion and enforce tax on 
informal sectors of the economy. The tax authorities introduce policy interventions that can 
target the evasive behavior of firms interacting with informal sectors. My dissertation seeks 
to provide insight into three such policy reforms in Pakistan’s VAT regime. Therefore, this 
dissertation is composed of three essays. 
In first essay of my dissertation, titled “Using Computerization to enforce VAT: 
Evidence from Pakistan”, I study a policy intervention which empowered a computerized 
system to check invoices and reject input tax claims based on risk-based criteria. I use 
administrative tax data for the universe of VAT returns filed in Pakistan from tax year 2009 
to 2016 to estimate the impact of this reform on the firms operating domestically. Using 
the exporters not subject to the reform as a control group, I find that the input tax claims 
fell by 2.36 million Pak Rs. per treated firm, representing a decline in input tax claims to 
the tune of Pak Rs. 86 billion. Firm heterogeneity analysis by business activity and firm 
structure shows a decline ranging from 30% to 90%. Surprisingly, the corporations and 
partnerships also show significant reduction in input tax claims from 50-70%. Contrary to 
the expectations, the huge volume of evasion shows that VAT implementation in limited 
tax capacity regimes may not yield the expected revenue efficiency gains. 
Second essay of my dissertation titled, “Is Minimum the Maximum? Tax Burden 
on Informal Sector in VAT: Evidence from Pakistan”, analyzes another policy reform. In 
developing countries, a substantial amount of revenue at import stage is now collected from 
VAT instead of traditional import tariffs. This modern approach assumes negligible VAT 
evasion at post-importation stage. I test this assumption through universe of monthly VAT 
returns filed in Pakistan for tax years 2009 to 2016 to estimate evasion by firms exclusively 
engaged in imports. I utilize kinks produced by minimum value addition thresholds to 
estimate evasion of VAT post-importation. I estimate an average evasion rate of nearly
78%. Using changes in thresholds over years, I provide evidence that this minimum tax 
collection is the best-case scenario for revenue efficiency. The firms show strong bunching 
at or below threshold with about 40-60% of the firms showing bunching behavior. My 
results support the view that, absent deviations from standard, replacing high import tariffs 
with VAT would decrease welfare. 
Third essay of my dissertation titled, “The Deterrence Value of Tax Audits: 
Estimates from a Randomized Audit Program”, analyzes a randomized audit program. It is 
a joint project with Michael Best and Mazhar Waseem. In modern tax systems audit is the 
sole instrument through which the tax authority can detect noncompliance and create 
deterrence. We exploit a national program of randomized audits covering the entire 
population of VAT filers from Pakistan to study how much evasion audit uncovers and 
how much evasion it prevents by changing behavior. While audit uncovers a substantial 
amount of evasion (the evasion rate among firms in the bottom three size quartiles is more 
than 100%), it does not deter future cheating. Examining more than ten intensive and 
extensive margin outcomes, we detect no effect of audit on proximate or distant firm 
behavior. Our results suggest audits are sub optimally utilized in checking mechanical 
violations of law instead of creating deterrence against evasion. 
Keywords: Value Added Tax, Tax Evasion, Enforcement, Firm Behavior, Informal 
Economy, Bunching 
Syed Jawad Ali Shah 
Date: June 21, 2021 
ESSAYS ON EVASION AND ENFORCEMENT IN VALUE ADDED TAX 
(VAT) 
By 
Syed Jawad Ali Shah 
Dr. David R. Agrawal 
Co-Director of Dissertation 
Dr. William H. Hoyt 
Co-Director of Dissertation 
Dr. Rajeev Darolia 
Director of Graduate Studies 
Date: June 21, 2021 
Dedicated to my mother Fouzia Amin and my father Amin Shah, for always 
supporting me in my academic and professional endeavors. I also dedicate this 
dissertation to my wife Sidra and our beloved son Maarij. 
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to my advisors David Agrawal, William Hoyt, Carlos Lamarche and
Ron Zimmer for their excellent support and encouragement throughout dissertation
research. Dr. David Agrawal has shown great commitment to mentoring me and I
would be forever indebted to him for this. The faculty at Martin school contributed
in my development in so many ways. I am thankful to Mazhar Waseem for his helpful
insights and comments. I also thank Michael Best, Jennifer Bird-Pollan, John Butler,
Wei Cui, Andrew Goodman-Bacon, David Hulse, Henrik Kleven, Kaisa Kotakorpi,
Benjamin Lockwood, Olga Malkova, David Wildasin, and Owen Zidar for their helpful
comments and advice. I am grateful to the participants of conferences, workshops and
seminars held by National Tax Association, Said Business School at Oxford University,
Association of Budgeting and Financial Management and University of Kentucky for
providing important feedback. I also thank Amanda McCullough, Himawan Saputro,
Kenneth Tester, Quinton White and participants of various workshops and seminars
at University of Kentucky for their helpful advice and comments.
Chapter 3 of my dissertation is a joint collaboration with Michael Best and Mazhar




Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Table of contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  vii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
1 Using Computerized Information to Enforce VAT: Evidence from Pakistan 1
1.1 Institutional Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1.1 Legal Framework and the CREST Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Theoretical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5.1 Overall Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5.2 Firm Heterogeneity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5.3 Robustness of the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.6 Conclusion and Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2 Is Minimum the Maximum? Tax Burden on Informal Sector in VAT: Evi-
dence from Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.1 Institutional Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.1.1 MVA on Non-Manufacturer Importer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2.1 Implications of a Kinked Output Tax Function . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3 Identification Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.4 Data and Empirical Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4.1 Graphical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.4.2 Estimating Counterfactual Density . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.4.3 Bunching Response by Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4.4 Bunching Behavior by Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4.5 Heterogeneity by Volume of Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4.6 Elasticity of VAT at Post-import stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
iv
2.4.7 Robustness of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3 The Deterrence Value of Tax Audit: Estimates from a
Randomized Audit Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.2.1 Firm Behavior to Taxation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2.2 Audit and Belief Updating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2.3 Audit Rate and Detection Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.3 Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.3.1 Randomized Audit Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.3.2 Pakistani VAT System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.5 Tax Evasion at the Baseline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.6 Audit and Firm Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.6.1 ITT Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.6.2 LATE Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.6.3 ATE Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.6.4 Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.7 Why Audit has No Effect on Behavior? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
A Appendix to Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A.1 Additional Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A.1.1 Legal Definitions & Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . 128
A.1.1.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
A.1.1.2 Invoice Summary Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
A.1.1.3 Missing Trader Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
A.1.1.4 CREST and Reform in July 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
A.1.2 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
B Appendix to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
B.1 Additional Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
B.1.1 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
C Appendix to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
C.1 Definition of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
v
C.2 Marginal Treatment Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Vita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
vi
List of Tables
1.1 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.2 Revenue Impact of CREST Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.3 Revenue Impact on Manufacturers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.4 Revenue Impact on Non-Manufacturers . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.5 Revenue Impact on Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.6 Revenue Impact on Sole Proprietorships . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.7 Revenue Impact on Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.1 Bunching Response by Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.2 Bunching Response by Threshold Period . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.3 Bunching Response by Quartile for 3rd Period . . . . . . 73
3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Audit I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Audit II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.3 Randomization Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.4 Audit Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.5 Impact of Audit on Firm Behavior – First Wave . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.6 Impact of Audit on Firm Behavior – Second Wave . . . . . . . . . 114
3.7 Impacts of Random Audits Assigned in the First Wave – Other Out-
comes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.8 Extensive Margin Impact of Random Audits . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.9 Selection in Compliance? Audited Vs. Non-Audited Firms . . . . . 117
3.10 Selection in Compliance? Audited Vs. Non-Audited Firms (Within
Zi = 1 Group) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.11 Selection in Compliance? Audited Vs. Non-Audited Firms (Within
Zi = 0 Group) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
A.1 Descriptive Statistics for Sales, Purchases and Tax Credits125
A.2 Robustness to Monthly Time Periods (July 2008- Septem-
ber 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
vii
A.3 Robustness of the Results in Tables 2-7 to Full Period
(July 2008- September 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
A.4 Data Variables and Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
B.1.1 Data Variables and Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
C.2.1 Breakdown of the Detected Amount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
C.2.2 Evasion Rate and Firm Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
C.2.3 Selection in Sequencing of Audits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
C.2.4 Preexisting Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
C.2.5 Impacts of Random Audits Assigned in the First Wave . . . . . . . 177
C.2.6 Audit Impacts – First Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
C.2.7 Impacts of Random Audits Assigned in the Third Wave . . . . . . 179
C.2.8 Preexisting Trends – Audited vs. Not Audited . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
C.2.9 Heterogeneity in Response With Respect To Amount Detected . . . 181
C.2.10 Heterogeneity in Amount Detected by Share Final Sales . . . . . . 182
viii
List of Figures
1.1 Missing Trader Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.2 Raw Data- Domestic Input Tax Credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.3 Domestic and Import Input Credits’ Ratio to Total Credits . . . . 28
1.4 Aggregate Effect of CREST on Domestic Input Tax Claims . . . . 29
1.5 Effect on Domestic Input Tax Claims of Manufacturers . . . . . . . 30
1.6 Effect on Domestic Input Tax Claims of Non-Manufacturers . . . . 31
1.7 Effect on Domestic Input Tax Claims of Sole Proprietorships . . . . 32
1.8 Effect on Domestic Input Tax Claims of Partnerships . . . . . . . . 33
1.9 Effect on Domestic Input Tax Claims of Companies . . . . . . . . . 34
2.1 Changes in Minimum Value Addition Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.2 Bunching Incentive at MVA Threshold Kink . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.3 Histograms showing yearly bunching at MVA Thresholds . . . . . . 66
2.4 Histograms showing bunching at each MVA Threshold . . . . . . . 67
2.5 Bunching Estimates for yearly response at MVA Thresholds . . . . 68
2.6 Period wise Bunching Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.7 Quartile Wise wise Bunching Estimates for Third Period . . . . . . 70
3.1 Evasion Rate By Firm Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.2 Evasion Rate By Firm Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.3 Intention to Treat Effects of Audit – First Wave . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.4 Intention to Treat Effects of Audit – First Wave . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.5 Intention to Treat Effects of Audit – Second Wave . . . . . . . . . 102
3.6 Intention to Treat Effects of Audit – Second Wave . . . . . . . . . 103
3.7 Audited Vs. Unaudited Firms – First Audit Wave . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.8 Audited Vs. Unaudited Firms – Second Audit Wave . . . . . . . . 105
3.9 Marginal Treatment Effects – First Audit Wave . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.10 Marginal Treatment Effects – Second Audit Wave . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.11 Probability of Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
ix
A.1 Impact on Manufacturers vs. Non-Manufacturers by Business Type 122
A.2 Heterogeneity by Business Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A.3 CREST Output showing Supply Chain Discrepancies . . . . . . . . 133
A.4 CREST Output Showing Other Discrepancies . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
A.5 Sales Tax Return and Annexures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
B.1.1 Quartile Wise Bunching Estimates for First Period . . . . . . . . . 142
B.1.2 Quartile Wise Bunching Estimates for Second Period . . . . . . . . 144
C.2.1 Amount Detected by Timing of Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
C.2.2 Intention to Treat Effects of Third Audit Wave . . . . . . . . . . . 152
C.2.3 Intention to Treat Effects of Third Audit Wave . . . . . . . . . . . 153
C.2.4 Heterogeneity in Response by Firm Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
C.2.5 Heterogeneity in Response by Firm Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
C.2.6 Heterogeneity in Response by Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
C.2.7 Heterogeneity in Response by Tax Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
C.2.8 Heterogeneity in Response by Tax Office Type . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
C.2.9 Heterogeneity in Response by Production Stage . . . . . . . . . . . 159
C.2.10 Heterogeneity in Response by Business Organization . . . . . . . . 160
C.2.11 Heterogeneity in Response by Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
C.2.12 Heterogeneity in Response by Timing of Audit . . . . . . . . . . . 162
C.2.13 Heterogeneity in Response by Firm Size (First Wave) . . . . . . . . 163
C.2.14 Heterogeneity in Response by Firm Size (Second Wave) . . . . . . . 164
C.2.15 Heterogeneity in Response by Firm Age (First Wave) . . . . . . . . 165
C.2.16 Heterogeneity in Response by Firm Age (Second Wave) . . . . . . . 166
C.2.17 Heterogeneity in Response by Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
C.2.18 Heterogeneity in Response by Tax Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
C.2.19 Heterogeneity in Response by Tax Office Type . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
C.2.20 Heterogeneity in Response by Production Stage . . . . . . . . . . . 170
C.2.21 Heterogeneity in Response by Business Organization . . . . . . . . 171
C.2.22 Heterogeneity in Response by Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
x
Chapter 1
Using Computerized Information to Enforce VAT: Evidence from Pakistan
Developing countries have a very low tax to GDP ratio compared to developed
countries. A key explanation is the low enforcement capacity of tax administrations in
developing countries (IMF 2011). For this reason, in tax policy debates, enhancement
of administration and enforcement capacity of developing countries with large infor-
mal sectors, is considered pivotal to collecting adequate taxes (Slemrod 2019; Waseem
2018; Slemrod and Gillitzer 2014). In the last several decades, over 160 countries --
including many developing countries -- have introduced value added tax (VAT). The
prime motivation is the supposedly superior tax enforcement properties of VAT due
to cross-checking of information across various stages of production. Each stage of
production reports the value of outputs and inputs, which means that the output of
an early stage of production acts as an input for the next stage of production. As
these inputs and outputs are reported by unrelated firms, they create a paper trail
that the tax authority can exploit for enforcement.
Contrary to the popular belief that VAT immediately provides a way of enhancing
revenue efficiency, these enforcement advantages of VAT may not work in low state
capacity countries. The conventional wisdom is that information flows created by
arm-length transactions between unrelated parties make it easier for the government
to enforce the tax. This argument ignores the ability to process the information flow
and assumes that governments have the administrative capacity to utilize it. If the
tax administration does not have the capacity to cross-match information and/or to
enforce recovery, the enforcement-facilitating mechanism built into VAT would not be
effective. Therefore, developing countries may have adopted VAT without adequate
enforcement capacity to collect more revenue through VAT. In this view, and in
contrast to the conventional wisdom, enforcement improvements are minimal which,
in turn, implies that VAT may not be the appropriate tax for these countries to adopt
(Emran and Stiglitz 2005). I study VAT in both low enforcement capacity and high
enforcement capacity environments in Pakistan to answer one of the most important
1
questions in public finance: what is the effect of third party information reporting on
tax systems vis-à-vis the enforcement capacity? To preview the results: information
flows alone are not sufficient to secure firm compliance.
Recent empirical evidence shows that firms report their sales accurately when they
are more likely to be scrutinized or cross-matched (Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singhal
2017; Pomeranz 2015). However, this enhanced probability of detection of sales may
not necessarily translate to increased revenue when low enforcement capacity and
legal loopholes can let firms inflate their purchases and effectively pay the same net
tax.1 Despite substantial evidence that third party reporting increases declared sales
in VAT, we have little to no evidence on evasion through manipulation of purchases
because, without the administrative tax records, the linkage between input claims
and revenues is difficult to establish in VAT.2 This gap in literature is very significant
for VAT, which relies strongly on value addition and suffers from potential fraudulent
schemes involving fake invoices which are not found in other taxes. VAT regimes
can have bogus traders who only register to serve as “invoice-mill” and generate fake
invoices (Waseem 2020). Tax evading firms use these fake invoices as input tax
credit to lower their tax liability. Even in the developed countries such as those in
EU, Missing Trader Intra Community (MTIC) or “Carousel” fraud, is rampant. EU
almost gave up the destination based taxation principle as it could not cope with
large volume of revenue leakage through carousel fraud (Crawford, Keen, and Smith
2010; Keen and Smith 2006). These sophisticated and unique VAT only frauds can
only be tracked through a real time system which can audit and recover tax in a fast
and efficient manner.3
In this paper, I exploit quasi experimental setting created by a Pakistani reform
which authorized a software based risk analysis system named CREST4 to deny sus-
picious input tax claims in real time. This reform discretely raised the ability of the
government to utilize information flows. CREST has access to data other than VAT
1Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singhal (2017) provide an interesting case of this phenomenon using
the firms in Ecuador who reported increased sales when faced with the prospect of detection but
they also increased costs 96 cents to a dollar to effectively wipe out any revenue impact.
2Waseem (2018)provides evidence on increased sales in response to enforcement but also shows
that there is little to no effect on informal sectors who remain insular to the VAT. Fan et al. (2018)
show that invoice summary cross-matching increases revenue.
3Annually, more than hundred billion Euros worth of taxes are lost in EU. Therefore, it’s not
hard to imagine the scope of difficulties faced by the revenue administrations in the countries with
large informal economies in curbing fraudulent practices. Interestingly, in the countries with large
informal economies these frauds become more easier to execute because of lax enforcement.
4CREST stands for Computerized Risk-Based Evaluation of sales tax. In Pakistan, VAT is legally
called sales tax because this law was introduced as an amendment to existing statute of sales tax
and not as a new law to comply with the constitutional requirements.
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returns, can go few steps back in chain5 and uses in-built risk parameters to estab-
lish the authenticity of each and every invoice. It reduces the role of the “taxman”
(auditors) and replaces these traditional enforcement mechanisms-- plagued with in-
efficiency, corruption (Davoodi and Tanzi 2000; Khan, Khwaja, and Olken 2016) and
delays-- with an efficient, transparent and real time enforcement system. In par-
ticular, starting July 2013, CREST software rejects input credits automatically by
performing an invoice wise scrutiny. The reform eliminated the need to adopt a long
and tedious process starting from audit selection, completion, framing a case based
on audit, ensuring “over the years” that the case reaches its logical end and, critically,
the tax is recovered from the defaulting unit. It took away the opportunity from the
tax evaders to use various loopholes in this process.
I develop a general conceptual framework for input tax evasion in VAT in the
spirit of model of tax evasion introduced by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). In this
standard model, the probability of detection is represented in a reduced form way as
a single parameter. However, the probability of detection depends on the product of
the probability of audit and the probability of recovery conditional on being audited.
The CREST reform raised the expected cost of evasion by substantially increasing the
probability of recovery. I, therefore, use two different probabilities in my theoretical
model to capture this effect of the reform. From theoretical model, I conclude that
unless governments invest in improving the probability of recovery, increasing the
number of audits would not deter evasion.
Turning to the empirical analysis, critically, the reform affected non-exporting
firms only as exporting firms were already subject to virtually identical scrutiny prior
to the reform, thereby facilitating a generalized difference-in-differences identification
strategy. I use administrative data6 for the universe of monthly VAT returns (9.9
million in total) filed in financial years 2009 to 20167 to study the input tax based
evasion. Using exporting firms as the comparison group and domestically operating
firms as the treatment group, I find that the input tax claims fell by 2.36 million
Pakistani Rupees per treated firms, which represents a decline of 50% on average
for the treated firms. Using a generalized difference-in-differences design, I provide
5It means the software can cross check invoices and then checks suppliers of the supplier and so
on which enables it to crunch data and raise a red flag immediately. It can also cross check import
and export records, Income tax returns and excise tax etc.
6See also Waseem (2020), Slemrod, Ur Rehman, and Waseem (2020), Waseem (2019), Waseem
(2018), Best et al. (2015) and H. Kleven and Waseem (2013) for recent empirical evidence using
administrative data from Pakistan.
7In Pakistan financial year starts on July 1st and ends on June 30th, accordingly the tax year
2009 means the financial year starting on July 1, 2018 and ending on June 30, 2009.
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evidence to support the parallel trends assumption by finding that exporting and
domestic firms show nearly perfect parallel trends in the pre-reform period . These
large post-reform effects are not limited to or driven by individually operated firms.
I find that corporations and partnership firms also show similar decline in input
tax claims ranging from 30-50%. My results provide evidence of significant VAT
evasion under the regime with traditional (“by hand”) audits. It implies that the self-
enforcing advantages of VAT do not hold in absence of effective enforcement which can
utilize third party reporting. Although, introducing digitization and computerization
– and thus increasing enforcement capacity – to cross-check available third-party
information and build a risk profile for every credit invoice substantially reduces
tax evasion but it also poses a larger question about efficacy of VAT in developing
countries. Absent a comprehensive real time enforcement mechanism which can utilize
these information flows and automatically deny credit up front, the volume of evasion
would remain very high. Returning to the big picture public finance question, my
evidence suggests that advocating VAT adoption in low-tax capacity environments
may have been premature. In particular, using all the available information trails to
enforce VAT is not possible unless the government has high tax capacity.
I divide my analysis into three parts. First, I determine the extent of evasion
through manipulation of input tax credits by estimating the drop in total input tax
credits which is approximately 50%. Second, I estimate the impact by business type
(company, sole proprietorship or partnership) which shows that the companies, who
would otherwise be expected to refrain from outright fraud, show behavior similar to
partnership and sole proprietorship firms. Third, I measure the effect across business
categories (manufacturers vs. non-manufacturers) which ranges from 30% for the
manufacturers to 70% for the non-manufacturers.
This paper adds to three different strands of literature. First, it adds to the liter-
ature on enforcement capacity of the developing countries which have large informal
sectors and its implications for welfare effects of VAT.8 Main focus of this litera-
ture is sales and output tax with very less emphasis on purchases (Naritomi 2019;
Pomeranz 2015; Slemrod and Gillitzer 2014; Crawford, Keen, and Smith 2010; Paula
and Scheinkman 2010; Piggott and Whalley 2001). Best et al. (2015) use Pakistani
8Emran and Stiglitz (2005) had argued that a revenue neutral VAT would actually decrease
welfare in developing countries with large informal sectors. This view relies on an expectation that
evasion in developing countries would remain high. Keen (2008) countered this argument partially
by arguing that an increased collection of VAT on import stage ensures that the informal sector is
sharing the tax burden. My paper provides further evidence for the former argument by showing
that the tendency of formal sector to profit from fake invoices against purchases made in informal
sector can be high.
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income tax data to show that corporate revenues increase from a turnover tax com-
pared to standard profit and loss based income tax because, in the latter case, firms
can manipulate their purchase figures to lower their liability substantially. Similarly,
Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singhal (2017) use Ecuadorian data to show that the firms
inflate their purchases to effectively offset any gains received from truthful sales re-
porting. I add to this purchase inflation strand of the literature by providing evidence
of purchase manipulation and the efficacy of third party information in enforcement
using administrative data.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of invoice
summaries using administrative data and examines effect of second stage verification
of invoices.9 This literature only focuses on first stage verification in which effect
of invoices verification through cross checking only is estimated. Waseem (2020)
studies the self-regulating nature of VAT using Pakistani tax returns data but the
major period covered in the paper is before the introduction of invoice summaries
in Pakistan and does not deal with the impact of invoice summaries. Fan et al.
(2018) study the impact of invoice summaries in China but they do not use actual
returns data and Chinese VAT is not a standard VAT implemented in Pakistan and
elsewhere.10 However, my paper not only provides the evidence of effectiveness of
invoice summaries using actual return data but also examines the impact of building
a risk analysis system which integrates invoice summaries with other information
available to the tax authorities to preempt evasion and fraud.
Third, the paper adds to the literature concerning destination versus origin based
commodity taxation and their impact on evasion (D. Agrawal and Mardan 2019).11
The standard VAT which relies on destination based taxation, provides opportunities
for evasion and frauds where presence of multiple jurisdictions can be used to circum-
vent the ability of tax administration to detect evasion and recover the tax. I also
add to a wide literature on missing trader fraud which, however, lacks in empirical
9First stage verification means that invoices are only cross checked to ensure that any credit claim
is based on an actual invoice. This verification is analogous to verification of income tax withholding
certificate issued by employers and contractors in which only the amount of withholding is cross
checked. Second stage verification of VAT credit invoices deals with ascertaining that the transaction
reported to tax authorities by buyer and seller actually took place or it was only part of a potential
fraudulent activity. I explain this mechanism in detail in Appendix A.1.1.
10Fan et al. (2018) study the impact of computerized invoices on Chinese manufacturing firms for
the period 1998-2007. They find that computerization explains 14.38% of cumulative VAT revenues
and they also find a 4.7-14% increase in the average effective tax rate for seven subsequent years of
the reform.
11D. Agrawal and Mardan (2019) provide the simplest understanding of the issues involved in
destination versus origin based commodity taxation using the tax avoidance and evasion behavior
in sale and use taxes levied by sub-national jurisdictions in USA.
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studies. I provide empirical evidence on the prevalence, dynamics and working of
missing trader fraud in VAT on an otherwise vast literature on carousel fraud. The
problem of VAT evasion through fake invoices is so widespread and voluminous that
it has often prompted EU to move away from a standard destination based VAT
(see Fath, Goulder, and Williams 2015; Keen and Smith 2006; Bickley 2003).12 The
reform worked and can be modified to any other country or setting facing rampant
missing trader fraud. Many variants of VAT such as a compensating VAT (CVAT)
and Viable Integrated VAT (VIVAT) to deal with intra community and sub-national
implementations, have been proposed (Bird and Gendron 2000). The paper shows
that a standard destination based VAT can utilize computerization for real time ver-
ification to improve compliance and prevent fraud.
This paper calls into question proliferation of VAT in developing countries based
on the premise that self-enforcing nature of VAT would automatically translate to
revenue gains in these limited enforcement capacity regimes. In the absence of an
end-to-end automated system, risk based analysis and enforcement in real time, the
magnitude of evasion would remain very large and the expected gains in revenue
efficiency would not materialize. Therefore, there is a reason to believe that VAT
implementation in developing countries happened at least a couple of decades earlier
and without building the necessary institutional capacity.
1.1 Institutional Setting
To understand the context of Pakistani reform, I first elaborate fake invoice phe-
nomenon in VAT. Typically, fake firms register with VAT administration and without
actually carrying out any business activity, they issue invoices which can be later
claimed by the operating units. These fake firms then disappear without remitting
the tax due to the government. Therefore, this type of fraud is often called “missing”
trader fraud. The operation and extent of the MTIC fraud varies from one VAT
regime to another but the central idea is same. A group of traders purchases and
sells goods between themselves in a manner that one or several of them vanish with-
out remitting the tax collected, thereby forcing tax authority to allow credit for the
12Keen and Smith (2006) elaborate this phenomenon. Annually, more than hundred billion Euros
worth of taxes are lost in EU. Therefore, it’s not hard to imagine the scope of difficulties faced by
the revenue administrations in the countries with large informal economies in curbing fraudulent
practices. Interestingly, in the countries with large informal economies these frauds become easier
to execute because of lax enforcement (see also Bickley 2003; Bird and Gendron 2007).
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amount which was never deposited in the first place.13
In European countries, the carousel fraud relies on trade within EU because the
tax administrations do not collect tax at import stage on imports originating from
member countries (see Figure 1.1).14 But in most developing countries, who charge
tax on every import without any exception to a particular origin, domestic variants of
carousel fraud may exist (Keen and Smith 2006). Consequently, the tax authorities
come up with a variety of enforcement and legal measures to curb this phenomenon
(Crawford, Keen, and Smith 2010). I refer to this type of fraud as “Domestic Missing
Trader” or DMT fraud. Pakistan has a large informal sector providing significant
incentive to claim input tax credit against purchases, which are actually made in
informal sector. Fake invoices have a readily available market which wants to show
purchases from informal sector as purchases from VAT registered firms to claim ex-
cess credit. I explain this phenomenon in the context of Pakistani VAT regime (see
Appendix A.1.1 for details).
1.1.1 Legal Framework and the CREST Reform
VAT is the principal source of revenue for the Federal Government in Pakistan and
FBR administers VAT. The governing legislation is an Act of Parliament hereinafter
referred as“the Act”. The Act allows executive branch to make rules which provide the
administrative framework to implement VAT. These rules lay out the administrative
procedures such as the registration rules which govern registration and deregistration
of firms. The “Refund” rules are also part of this statute and outline the mechanism
for filing, processing and sanctioning of refund claims against zero rated (mainly ex-
port) supplies. The bulk of refund claims, more than 97% in value, relate to exports.
Under these “Refund” rules, firms file their monthly claim electronically and provide
supporting documentation to the concerned refund processing division. CREST cross
matches the information provided with refund claim including purchase and sale in-
voices with the data available in the system. It generates risk based assessment on
each purchase invoice pointing out the type and nature of discrepancy. It explicitly
states whether an invoice is “valid” or “invalid” along with the reason (see Appendix
A.1.1 for more details on CREST).
13The VAT invoice is similar to an income tax deduction certificate for a buyer. The invoice shows
that tax has been collected by seller and buyer is now entitled to deduct this amount from any sales
made during the same tax period. If the tax deducted at purchases is more than the tax required
to be deposited on sales then firms can either carry it forward to the next period or seek refund.
14Keen and Smith (2006) elaborate the operation of carousel fraud in EU. Figure 1.1 is adapted
from the discussion in their article.
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Ironically, no provision was available in any law to apply information obtained
from CREST to check the firms who are not claiming refund prior to financial year
2014. This implied that as long as the firms did not claim refund, tax authorities
had little room to check proactively whether the tax against which input is being
claimed had actually been deposited in treasury by the supply chain of domestic
supplier. Furthermore, there was no legal cover because the rules applied only to
refund claimants and any proceeding against domestic units based solely on CREST
would be legally void. The usual mechanism of selection of audit and the pace on
which the audit proceeds meant that the network of fraudsters could go unchecked
for years causing staggering losses to the exchequer. The absence of a legal cover and
the lack of administrative impetus to check this phenomenon in real time meant that
the refund claimants and non-claimants were essentially operating under two different
audit and enforcement regimes. The revenue cost of a fake invoice is same for the tax
authority in either case but the firms who did not file refund claims could only be
caught through an audit. FBR had the information since 2008 through CREST but
it had no meaningful way of using this third party information to prevent evasion in
the domestic cases as it did in the cases related to exports. Selection for audit is a
very low probability outcome compared to the compulsory transaction level scrutiny
required for a refund claimant.
From 1st July 2013, through a change in the Act, the legislature made objection
raised by CREST a valid criterion to reject input claim.15 This implied that tax
administration could reject the input tax credit of non-refund claimants proactively
and initiate proceedings using the information obtained from CREST. Instead of the
low probability selection for audit, the domestic suppliers relying on fake invoices now
faced a real time challenge. The long and tedious process of audit selection and recov-
ery which took years previously could now be done instantaneously. Suspicious supply
chain became a valid ground of rejection through CREST and domestic firms as well
as exporting firms faced identical scrutiny post reform should they choose to evade.
FBR forcefully implemented the reform by introducing instructions to administrative
units to check input invoices on monthly basis and point out the discrepancies. Tax
authorities could now generate an automatic notice of rejection of input tax credit
and contest the case legally because the Act now provided cover to this real time
rejection. FBR could check the networks of fake suppliers and input tax credit could
15The law does not require a further proof from the tax authority. If CREST terms an invoice
“invalid” then the onus shifts to the firm to satisfy the objections raised. Most importantly, CREST
can raise objection based on suspicious supply chain against an individual invoice or transaction and
reject input tax credit involved therein
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be denied by the software without the involvement of the taxman.
In short, the reform discretely increased the enforcement capacity from low to
high. Prior to the reform, FBR could detect the fraud but statutory limitations on
audits and the traditional“by hand”audit approach which is plagued with inefficiency,
corruption, lack of resources and legal loopholes, failed to translate in meaningful
recovery conditional on detection. The reform substantially increased the probability
of recovery conditional on detection. It transformed a low enforcement capacity VAT
regime into high enforcement capacity regime for the domestically operating firms.
The reform also affected the cost of obtaining fake input tax invoices, albeit indirectly,
by shortening the period within which detection takes place.16
1.2 Theoretical Model
I develop a model of input tax evasion based on model of Allingham and Sandmo
(1972), hereinafter referred simply as A-S model. Although this model is based on
income tax evasion, but the intuition employed in A-S model is applicable to the
present case of input tax evasion in VAT. The tax evasion literature on developing
countries has widely used A-S model (for example-Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singhal
2017), but only for output tax evasion. I use the basic intuition in this model and
modify it to input tax evasion. A-S model uses only one parameter for the probability
of detection, which includes the probability of recovery conditional on detection. In
VAT, however, probability of detection and the probability of recovery conditional on
detection can vary differently. The reform only changed the probability of recovery
conditional on audit. Therefore, I use separate parameters to capture the effect of
detection and recovery, conditional on audit. This change would not only decrease
input tax claimed by manufacturing units who were using fake input tax credit but
also substantially reduce both input and output tax of the fake units which were
previously churning out fake invoices with impunity. Consequently, my model predicts
large effect of the reform on input tax evasion. The net tax gain to the government,
though substantial, would be less than the total fall in input tax credit claimed because
a good chunk of this observed drop would be driven by fake units.17
16This requires an understanding of the black market where these invoices are sold on a cost
proportional to the fake credit involved which is discussed in detail later. However, in short, the
suppliers of fake invoices had a greater risk that their invoices would be caught before an input tax
is claimed by the beneficiary which meant that the suppliers of these invoices would receive zero
payment (and even retribution!) plus loose whatever they have already invested.
17Keen and Slemrod (2017) suggest an alternate way to model the response by using the elasticity
of tax revenue with respect to an intervention. It would be empirically difficult to determine this
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Firm’s choice to evade relies on a simple decision. If the expected benefit of
claiming excess input tax exceeds the expected cost then the firm has an economic
motivation to evade. Consider a firm which has taxable output y, and a taxable input
x. For simplicity, I assume that both input and output are taxed at uniform rate τ .
Input tax can be divided into two parts based on whether a legitimate VAT invoice
is available for that or not. Therefore, x is composed of two components x1 and x2
which represent the real taxable input and the fake taxable input respectively. Then
firm’s VAT liability for a certain tax period is given by: Z = (y− x1− x2)τ . I denote
the firm’s actual tax liability, (y − x1)τ by Y and fake input x2τ by F . In case there
was no restriction or cost to evasion then each firm shall report Y = F so that its
VAT liability Z = 0. If the firm is generating an income,W , then any fake input tax
claim adds to its income.
A-S model of evasion is based on probability of detection, p, through an investi-
gation. In income tax, if the tax authority detects undeclared income then you have
to pay tax on undeclared income. In limited state capacity regimes, relation between
detection and recovery is not straight forward. The firm which relies on fake invoices
often gets away with fraud because the “shady” link between buyer and seller is diffi-
cult to prove in courts. Tax authorities have to credit the input claimed in fraudulent
manner because they are unable to trace or prove the case against fake suppliers.
Therefore, detection does not automatically translate to recovery. I, therefore, use
two different probabilities to capture this effect of the reform. Firms are aware of the
loopholes and would take into account probability of detection, p1, as well as recovery,
p2.
The expected cost of evasion is composed of three components: a) cost of obtaining
fake input tax invoices (b) the recovery in case of detection which includes penalty
(c) legal fees associated with audit and litigation incurred by the firm whether the
revenue authorities make or fail to make any recovery. I use separate parameters for
the cost components associated with traditional legal fees and the cost of obtaining
a fake invoice. The penalty,π, is proportional to the tax evaded.18 Similarly the cost
of obtaining fake invoices, θ, and the legal expenses incurred, l, are also assumed
proportional to the tax evaded.
elasticity in this case because of this missing trader response.
18The modification of A-S model given byYithzaki (1974) uses a penalty rate proportional to the
tax evaded, and in most countries including Pakistan, this is a standard practice.
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The firm will choose F to maximize the expected utility given by:
E(U) = (1− p1)U(W + F − θF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
No detection
+ (p1 − p1p2)U(W + F − θF − lF − lπF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Detected but not recovered
+ p1p2U(W + F − θF − lF − lπF − πF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Full recovery including penalty
(1.1)
where 0 ≤ θ, l, p1, p2 ≤ 1. The limits on probabilities are obvious. Value of θ greater
than 1, shall imply that the cost of obtaining input invoices, before a return is filed,
is more than the tax involved in those invoices. Similarly, legal fees cannot be more
than the actual tax plus penalty demanded because the firm would then simply pay
the amount detected. For notational convenience, I denote functional terms other
than W in (1) by Ga, Gband Gc where
Ga = F − θF,Gb = F − θF − lF − lπF,Gc = F − θF − lF − lπF − πF (1.2)
so that
E(U) = (1− p1)U(W +Ga) + (p1 − p1p2)U(W +Gb) + p1p2U(W +Gc)
and the first and second order conditions are then
(1− p1)(1− θ)U ′(W +Ga) + (p1 − p1p2)(1− θ − l − lπ)U ′(W +Gb)
+ p1p2(1− θ − l − lπ − π)U ′(W +Gc) = 0 (1.3)
(1− p1)(1− θ)2U ′′(W +Ga) + (p1 − p1p2)(1− θ − l − lπ)2U ′′(W +Gb)
+ p1p2(1− θ − l − lπ − π)2U ′′(W +Gc) = 0 (1.4)
The second order conditions are satisfied because the utility function is concave.
The interior maxima shall exist between F = 0 and F = Y but only subject to
θ = l = 0.19Since As expected marginal utility is increasing in F , evaluating eq.1.3 at
19In VAT, a firm can “theoretically” claim as much fake input in a tax period as it wants because
the excess will be refunded. But the finite limit on a long term horizon is imposed by the positive
value addition factor, therefore Y=F is a justified upper limit on F with θ = l = 0.
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these two points result in following two relationships.
∂E(U)
∂F
|F=0= (1− p1)(1− θ)U ′(W ) + (p1 − p1p2)(1− θ − l − lπ)U ′(W )
+ p1p2(1− θ − l − lπ − π)U ′(W ) < 0 (1.5)
∂E(U)
∂F
|F=Y = (1−p1)(1−θ)U ′(W+(1−θ)Y )+(p1−p1p2)(1−θ−l−lπ)U ′(W+(1−θ−l−lπ)Y )
+ p1p2(1− θ − l − lπ − π)U ′(W + (1− θ − l − lπ − π)Y ) > 0 (1.6)










> lp1 + πp1p2 + lπp1p2 + lπp1 (1.8)
πp1p2 < p1p2 + (1− p1p2)
U ′(W + Y )
U ′(W + (1− π)Y ) (1.9)
The term on the right side of 1.9 and 1.8 are positive and less than one. Therefore,
1.7 and 1.9 together give positive parameter values which are sufficient for an interior
solution. I use the equations derived above to model the response of a firm to DMT.
The revenue authority wants to increase the cost component or θ. If they increase the
cost of registering a new bogus firm, it can impact the fraud but at the same time it
is very difficult to deny registration to a business on the basis of a presumption. This
would create more difficulties for genuine businesses and hence should be ruled out
as a possibility. However, the converse may be true here. The tax authority would
minimize the cost of registration. The “invoice mills” would charge the beneficiary
units, a fixed percentage of the tax involved in fake invoices. The legal fees are
determined by the market and the government has no control over it, but for the firm
they also come at a cost which is proportional to the tax and penalty demanded in
audit observations. Theoretically, tax rate τ , penalty rate π, increasing p1 through
more audits, and ensuring recovery after detection thereby increasing p2, are the only
options available to revenue authorities. As tax rate τ decreases, benefit of evasion also
decreases and cost component dominates but small tax rate cannot generate adequate
revenue. This rules out major decrease in tax rate. In Pakistan, penalty for tax fraud
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is 100% of the tax evaded which means π = 1. This scenario implies that the product
p1p2 should be sufficiently small for evasion to occur, which means that if either p1or
p2 is small the missing trader fraud becomes economically feasible. Because it is
easier for the government to detect fraud after a certain interval of time, the p1 factor
remains relatively high. In fact it is the inability of an enforcement regime to recover
tax post detection (low p2), which provides an environment conducive to this type
of fraud. Missing trader fraud in Europe exploits the lack of sufficient inter country
coordination or low p2. Similarly, DMT in Pakistani case relies on legal loopholes
and complexity of territorial jurisdictions which make the post detection recovery, a
very low probability event. CREST reform has only raised p2, or the probability of
recovery conditional on detection. The department had all the information to conduct
audit and frame the case before the reform. The cost of generating fake invoices θ,
the legal fees l and the penalty on fraud π also stayed the same.20 In Pakistan, the









is the minimum condition for input tax evasion to occur. In other
words, this condition can be expressed as:
Probability of detection, p1 <
Net benefit per unit fake input tax
Gross benefit plus legal cost per unit fake input tax
and by rewriting 1.10,
Probability of recovery, p2 <
Net benefit per unit fake input tax
(Gross benefit plus legal cost per unit fake input tax)*p1
− 1
The behavior of the businesses would differ based on their particular characteristics
because of the factors discussed above.
1.3 Data
A major contribution of this paper is to analyze fake invoices and VAT fraud using
rich administrative return data. To the best of my knowledge, no paper has studied
20The cost of generating invoice remained the same. The real time cross verification and audit
makes it difficult for the chain of suppliers to operate because CREST detects suspicious chain before
the beneficiary unit claims fake invoice. But, CREST itself does not impact cost of registering a
new unit and supplying invoices.
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missing trader or other VAT frauds using administrative data. I use the administrative
return data for full universe of VAT returns filed for financial years 2009 to 2016.
Because returns are filed on monthly basis, data provides a rich number of pre and
post periods and a total set of 9.69 million observations. The data covers each field in
the return which gives more than hundred variables (see Appendix A.1.2 ).21 Return
columns capture all possible purchase and sales transactions and clearly separate zero
rated, reduced rate, special and exempt transactions etc. I can use this information
to observe a firm’s response by disentangling possible confounding transactions which
is not possible in absence of returns data.
The variable of interest here is the domestic input tax credit claimed by firms.
Domestic input tax credit arises from domestic taxable purchases only and does not
include input tax credit from direct imports. Total input tax is a sum of domestic
and imported input tax credit. In case, monthly input tax credit exceeds output
tax then firm can either claim refund or carry forward this input tax to the next
period.22 Table A.1 presents descriptive statistics for VAT returns on a financial
yearly basis. Number of returns filed increases each year which represents the entry
of firms in VAT regime. Exit of firms cannot be inferred from the data as firms that
apply for deregistration have to file nil returns for six months and should complete
a deregistration audit with the department which renders official deregistration a
costly business for both the firm and the tax administration without much benefits.
Therefore, firms who are no longer in business either stop filing returns or keep filing
nil returns long after they have gone out of business. The non-active or dormant units
should not be part of my analysis but the return data includes such units because
many businesses obtain registration and then fail to translate into an actual operative
firm. The long time and costs associated with deregistration can force these firms to
file returns without actually showing any activity. Furthermore, I focus in this paper
on input tax credit, therefore, I drop the firms which claim total domestic input tax
credit of less than PKR 10,000 (which equals $100) over the course of five years before
the reform. This criterion automatically drops inactive firms, commercial importers
and any other firms which never claimed any substantial domestic input tax credit
from both comparison and treatment groups. Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics
for the three categories along with their mean domestic monthly input tax credit and
21For the importance of administrative data in measuring compliance and enforcement, see Slem-
rod (2016).
22Although there’s a bar on adjusting more than 90% of input tax against the output tax but this
restriction does not apply to the wholesalers, wholesalers-cum-retailers and distributors vide S.R.O.
647(I)/2007 dated 27th June, 2007.
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the firms excluded from the analysis, clearly have a negligible domestic input tax
credit.
Some firms file returns on quarterly basis, therefore, I use quarter as my time pe-
riod of analysis because the data does not differentiate between quarterly and monthly
returns and tags it to the month for which return is filed. The quarterly returns are
filed for the quarters ending in March, June, September and December. Therefore,
monthly time periods would inaccurately inflate the figures for months of March,
June, September and December. After converting to quarters and dropping obser-
vations as explained above, I perform main analysis on 2.35 million observations in
terms of quarters, but the results are robust to alternate specifications (see Table A.2,
and Table A.3).
1.4 Empirical Strategy
I use difference-in-differences (DID) design to study impact of the reform. It requires
two key assumptions. First, a suitable comparison group is available to study the
change. Second, the reform is exogenous such that the only change affecting treatment
group is the policy intervention itself and neither treatment group nor comparison
group changes its behavior in anticipation of the reform. The reform is a law change
introduced by the legislature in budget23 and plausibly exogenous keeping in view how
the budget process works in Pakistan. FBR prepares revenue budget under secrecy
and finance bill is only unveiled when Finance Minister introduces it in legislature,
in the first or second week of June. Legislature passes finance bill before 30th June
because it is applicable from the first day of July. In present case, this process
effectively rules out any behavioral change after the reform is announced and before
it is implemented. Moreover, the reform does not restrict CREST’s scrutiny to a
particular cut-off date. Limitation clause restricts show cause notice to five years,
therefore, FBR can raise objections to anything which is not more than five years
old. Firms would not get any benefit from changing behavior in anticipation of the
change. FBR can raise a demand on invoices claimed earlier because the statutory
period of limitation is five years. Therefore, there is no benefit for any firm to claim
more input tax credit in anticipation of the reform. CREST was operational for five
years and FBR was already using invoice data to raise audit observations against the
fraudulent units, to blacklist and suspend registrations etc. but the recovery of evaded
tax was a low probability outcome. Additionally, CREST was applicable to refund
23The budget for financial year 2014 was presented on 12th June, 2013 and the reform was appli-
cable from 1st day of July 2013.
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claimants for at least five years prior to the reform, which makes refund claimants an
appropriate comparison group for DID design. An ideal DID design also assumes that
the reform does not affect comparison group and only treatment group experiences
effect of the reform. As CREST was already applicable to refund claimants, there is
little chance that they shall be affected by the reform.
It is pertinent to note here that a firm is in comparison group if they claimed a
total refund of input tax credit for the period July 2008 to June 2013 in excess of
one million PKR24 . I select this threshold because I do not expect a firm to claim
refund through CREST if the total amount claimed over a period of five years is
less than 10,000 US$.25 This threshold also helps exclude the refunds which do not
arise on account of exports or any zero rated supplies. Although some of these non-
export refund claims, such as the refund arising out of input tax not adjusted in the
relevant tax period, are processed through CREST but they do not require normal
cross matching done for zero rated supplies.
I address three possible concerns over suitability of refund claimants as compari-
son group. First, Can the exporters be a good comparison group for domestic firms?
There is an important difference between a refund claimant on account of exports
and a totally exporting enterprise. The refund claimants can be firms who carry out
most of their sales to domestic firms but still claim refund on the portion related to
their exports. Moreover, even if the exports increase or decrease disproportionately,
it would result in a corresponding increase or decrease of sales to these exporting
firms by domestically operating suppliers, thereby inducing a similar economic trend
in the treatment group. Second, Can the exporting firms which are larger in size
with higher mean input tax credits have different attributes which materially con-
found identification? The exporting firms are definitely bigger firms on average but
this in fact makes them better comparison group for manufacturers which also have
larger size. Moreover, as discussed above, there is no reason for a larger firm not to
take advantage of loopholes in enforcement differently in a VAT regime (See Waseem
2018; Pomeranz 2015). Third, Can an already treated group be a good comparison?
Kotchen and Grant (2011) use a natural experiment in Indiana to study the effect of
Daylight Saving Time (DST) on electricity consumption by difference in differences
method. They use DID approach when some counties were always treated (had DST)
24The exchange rate for Pakistani Rupees to US Dollars was approximately 100:1 on 1st July
2013, therefore for ease of reference PKR 1 million translates to 10,000 US $.
25Although some firms may not be present for all eight years and more importantly in the years
prior to reform but still it is realistic to assume that they would not venture to go through CREST
voluntarily if the benefit is economically low to negligible compared to a high compliance cost.
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to the counties which were compulsorily switched to DST by the state in 2006. They
argue that once a group that was treated way back in time period such that it can
be assumed to be always treated then DID can measure the causal effect of policy
change by making it a comparison group. Same analogy fits here because CREST
was applicable to refund claimants at least 20 quarters before this reform. I plot all
the graphs with raw data and lead of 19 quarters to show that the trends are parallel
(see figure 1.2 and figures in Appendix A.1, A.2) . Thus, in absence of the reform,
trends should stay parallel. Figure 1.2 also shows that after a dip attributed to the
reform, trends again become parallel albeit with a higher differential. This after trend
substantiates the common shock assumptions for treatment and comparison groups.
An additional concern could be that the firms are switching from domestic pur-
chases to imports during the aforesaid period. To rule out this possibility, I plot ratios
of domestic input tax credit and imported input tax credit to the total input credit
claimed and also the ratio between two types of credits in figure 1.3 to show that
the trend is solely driven by the reduction in input tax without a change in imported
input tax credit claims. I also control for imported input tax in all the regressions
and they all have statistically non significant coefficients for imported input tax with
point estimates which are also close to zero.
My analysis follows a simple difference-in-difference design at firm level with time
and firm fixed effects. The equation of interest can be written as:
Yit = α0 +
∑
j 6=k
δj(treated ∗ I(t = j)) + φi + ψt +X ′γ + εit (1.11)
The dependent variable Yit denotes domestic input tax credit for a firm in a given
quarter; δjs are the coefficients on the interaction dummy for all the quarters excluding
the first quarter before the change and they track evolution of trend over time; φi and
ψt are firm and quarter fixed effects respectively and γs are the coefficients on control
variables26. The above equation is a generalized form of difference-in-differences and
δj for allj < k(last quarter before the reform) capture the placebo effect for all pre
time periods included in the analysis. Similarly, all j > k would capture the evolution
of trend over time in post reform period.




Prior to the reform, FBR had all the information but could only proceed against sus-
pected firms if they were randomly selected for audit, a very low probability outcome
as no more than 1-5% firms are audited by the department in a given fiscal year.
Moreover, FBR publishes this audit schedule on its website which can easily forewarn
these suppliers and they can just go missing or become non-compliant thereby deny-
ing the department any meaningful audit. The other option is to institute a criminal
proceeding through an investigation but the criteria for obtaining this approval and
finalizing the proceedings are also strict and time consuming. In practical terms, even
with a high p1, p2 remains very low which keeps the term on left side of 1.10 very
small. The reform increases p2 substantially by authorizing a software to accept or
reject the tax credit.
I restrict my main regression based analysis to four pre and post quarters to guard
against the firm behavioral changes over time as I take firm fixed effects with standard
errors clustered at firm level. To address the concerns on parallel trend assumption, I
plot the interaction dummies with their 95% confidence intervals in figures 1.4 to 1.9.
I omit the reform quarter dummy to avoid perfect collinearity. The lead coefficients
are statistically and economically zero but there is a significant change post reform.
The results are similar for both balanced and unbalanced panel. Tables 1.2 to 1.7
show the regression results for overall regression estimates and firm heterogeneity
by manufacturing and business type. All regressions discussed below control for the
imported input tax. The increased probability of recovery results in a sudden and
lasting drop in input tax claims across the board.
1.5.1 Overall Impact
The reform decreased input tax claims by PKR 2.22 million on average for the unbal-
anced and PKR 2.36 million for the balanced panel. This amounts to a decline of 50%
compared to pre reform levels for the balanced panel. Figure 1.4 plots the coefficients
of interaction dummies (post June-2013*domestic suppliers) for the specification at
equation (8) for all the firms. All interaction coefficients are close to zero and statis-
tically non-significant pre reform but are significant post reform. It shows that the
comparison and treatment groups had parallel trends prior to the reform. After the
reform, input tax credit claims fall significantly for both balanced and unbalanced
panels. Coefficient for the balanced panel is slightly higher (approximately 5%) than
the unbalanced panel. The balanced panel comprises of firms who filed returns in
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all the nine quarters starting from April-June 2012 to April-June 2014. Therefore,
balanced panel has only those firms which operated both before and after the reform.
On the other hand, unbalanced panel has all the firms before and after the reform
whether they filed returns in all quarters or not. As discussed above, entry is always
more than exit which implies that more firms enter in the unbalanced panel after the
reform when compared to number of firms who exit before the reform. Hence, coef-
ficients on unbalanced panels are slightly lower than the balanced panel coefficients
but they do not differ much in magnitude.
I observe two effects here, a “sudden” drop and a large change in magnitude of
domestic input tax claims. These results show that the reform was effective in blocking
fake input tax claims immediately and the pre-reform volume of evasion was huge.
The sudden impact means that the reform acted as a big shock to large number of
units involved in fraudulent practices. CREST reform only gives an express legal cover
to an already existing administrative tool in real time.27 The denial of input tax is
no longer dependent upon costly and time consuming audits which could only cover
small fraction of these units and even when these audits materialized in establishing
something concrete against one supplier they would have no legal effect for the units
down in the chain. But after the reform, a fake supplier cannot easily circumvent
the system because, unlike the pre-reform state, the tax authorities can declare its
purchases invalid without any need of a formal audit. If this supplier now issues sales
invoices to another supplier in next months, then these sales would also be invalid
immediately. In this way, the network of fake suppliers collapses because the legal
act of invalidating the invoices would already have occurred prior to the purchase by
beneficiary units down in the chain. This explains the“sudden”drop in domestic input
tax credit claims. It shows that firms were buying inputs from unregistered sectors
and were using fake invoices to claim input tax credits to lower their tax liability. The
reform had increased the probability of recovery substantially. Assuming that the cost
of obtaining a fake invoice remained the same, the specification at 1.10 experienced
a jump on the left side of inequality without affecting the right side. A rise in p2 was
enough to make evasion non-feasible.
A natural question arises as to why such action was not taken earlier. But it should
be noted here that the success of reform depended on three crucial factors. First,
Pakistan had switched to compulsory electronic filing of returns and annexures few
years before the reform. Prior to that both manual and electronic filings were allowed.
27The concept of real time here means that a firm is legally denied input tax claim as soon as the
deadline to file return for a particular month is over.
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Data entry of monthly returns and its annexures took a while before they could be fed
in the system. Second, the tax machinery had gained the necessary expertise over the
years through steady roll out of computerized information solutions. This made the
task of whole scale implementation easier by providing the human resource necessary
on the ground. Third, Pakistan had up to date IT infrastructure at all tax offices
owing to a decade long tax reform program supported by the World Bank.
The implications of these results also extend in two other directions. First, the
unregistered sector does not feel the pressure to get registered because their buyers
can manage invoices. An indirect implication of the reform is a pressure on informal
sector to get registered as they can face stronger competition from the registered
sector when they fail to give an invoice to their buyers who can no longer buy the
invoice via DMT. Second, the tax machinery could focus on other enforcement tasks
instead of fruitless and incomplete audits, investigations and litigation. Obviously,
the results of this paper cannot measure these positive spillovers.
Firms differ from each other in many respects. Firm’s structure and business type,
affect the firm behavior. I analyze effect of the reform based on firm heterogeneity
on account of these factors. I divide firms into manufacturers and non-manufacturers
by their structure and also study firm behavior by business type (partnership, sole
proprietorship or company).
1.5.2 Firm Heterogeneity Analysis
Firms can be further subdivided into different categories based on the structure of
firms, nature of their businesses and principal business product they sell. The firms
have three options for their business type: i) Sole proprietorship (ii) AOP (Association
of Persons or partnership) or a (iii) Company. These categories arise from income tax
statutes because three different types are taxed at different brackets. Sole proprietor-
ship is not required to register as a firm and is taxed on the individual’s income tax
return. AOP has a different income tax rate bracket and companies are taxed at the
corporate tax rates. Companies are governed by the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and
regulated through Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). A firm
files for VAT registration under one or many of the following categories determined
by the nature of its business; 1) Manufacturer (2) Wholesaler (3) Distributor (4) Ex-
porter (5) Importer (6) Retailer (7) Service provider (8) Others. However, registration
as manufacturer requires physical visit by tax inspector to verify the address, machin-
ery installed, utilities connections and numbers etc. Although, the law does not bar
tax authorities from visiting premises of non-manufacturers but the physical visit as
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a registration requirement is rare. VAT registration requires additional information
regarding nature of the business and general classification of the products which the
business shall sell.28 Therefore, the businesses will also differ according to the goods
they manufacture or trade. These heterogeneous characteristics of firms give rise to
different possibilities.
Proposition 1: All fake suppliers would be registered as Sole Proprietors.
Proof: Sole proprietorship has the lowest cost of registration because it has fewer
documentation and regulatory requirements compared to AOPs and companies. From
(1) & (2) above and for a given p1, p2, π and l, we have θsole < θAOP < θcompany which
implies that Ga, Gb and Gc are higher and hence from (2), the expected utility would
be higher if a sole proprietorship is used as fake invoice supplier. Hence the proof.
Intuitively, it also makes sense to use lowest cost registration category to issue fake
invoices.
Proposition 2: No manufacturing unit shall be a fake supplier.
Proof: VAT registration as manufacturer requires physical visit and verification
by the tax authorities, therefore, for a fake supplier θnon−manufacturer << θmanufacturer.
Similar to the logic used for the proof of proposition 1, supplier of fake invoices would
not register as manufacturer.
Proposition 3: The magnitude of fake input tax to the output tax would be
higher for larger firms.
Proof: The larger firms already have tax consultants or lawyers on their panel.
Therefore the additional legal fee for audit and defending cases in courts determined
by l is reduced. By (2), this increases Gb and Gc and the term on the right side of 1.10
also increases which implies the evasion window becomes larger and the maximum
expected utility increases more compared to smaller firms who face higher l.
28The Act does not place any restriction on selling the goods other than the products mentioned
in your registration documents and the information is only meant for statistical purposes but the
firms may loose on some incentives if they relate to a particular industry and distributed through
VAT return/status. However, the firm can always add or subtract products by simply filing an online
request.
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(Manufacturer vs. Non-manufacturer): The behavior of the manufacturing
firms differs from non-manufacturers. In the context of missing trader fraud, fake
suppliers are non-manufacturing units whereas final beneficiary of the fraud is of-
ten a manufacturing unit.29 However, the possibility of using these networks of fake
suppliers by non-manufacturing entities cannot be ruled out ab-initio, especially for
retailers, service providers, exporters and distributors. Figures 1.5 & 1.6 together with
Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 show the balanced and unbalanced panel results for manufac-
turers and non-manufacturers respectively. The comparison group remains the same
i.e. all exporting firms. Coefficients on interaction dummies for four pre-quarters
show parallel trend. Domestic input tax claims for both categories drop immediately
after the reform. Manufacturers are on average twice the size of a non-manufacturer
in the treated group and if the behaviors were identical, the drop in manufacturer’s
input tax claims should be twice as large compared to the non-manufacturers. But
manufacturer’s input tax fell by 2.15 million PKR for the balanced panel whereas it
dropped by 2.47 million PKR for the non-manufacturers. This result also indirectly
supports proposition 2. The higher drop by non-manufacturing units can only be
explained by the underlying missing trader fraud as described in preceding sections.
Non-manufacturers in the treatment group can have many missing traders who are
generating fake input tax so that they can show a corresponding output tax in their
returns which can be utilized by their buyers as input tax. Figure A.1 shows a drop
in input tax claims for both manufacturers and non-manufacturers. The drop for
non-manufacturers based on heterogeneity by business types ranges from 40 to 90
percent with an average effect of approximately 70 percent.
(Heterogeneity by Business Type): Business types allowed in the law are“AOP”
(Association of Persons), “Company” (any incorporated entity), “Individual” (Sole
proprietorship) and “FTN” (Free Tax Number or Government Agencies) (see Ap-
pendix A.1.1 for definitions). FTNs are omitted in the plots as they are special
numbers issued to governments such as provincial and local governments for purchas-
ing goods for their own use.30 Input tax claims drop across each category which
shows that fraud is rampant across all business types. Traditional models for devel-
oped countries predict that companies being larger organizations would not commit
outright frauds. Figure A.2 plots the trends for these business types. In the present
29The definition of manufacturer in the law is very broad and thus even a very small processing
or repackaging activity etc. changes firm’s category to manufacturer.
30Government agencies do not have an incentive to evade tax and they are also required to withhold
VAT at the time of purchase which ensures deposit of true input tax at the time of purchase.
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case, Panel A shows trends for the comparison (or control) group. These firms re-
main largely unaffected with a small increase in mean logged input tax for companies
and a very small drop in domestic input tax claims of sole proprietorships and AOPs.
Panel B shows that domestic input claims for companies in the treated group declined
significantly.
The estimates of empirical specification at (8) are listed at Tables 1.5, 1.6, 1.7 and
coefficients are plotted in figures 1.7 to 1.9. Figures 1.7 and 1.8 plot the evolution of
trend for sole proprietorships and partnerships through interaction dummies of four
pre and post quarters. In case of sole proprietorships and AOPs the drop is 60-70%
compared to their pre-reform levels. These two categories show fairly similar decline
in tax credit claims. This result runs counter to proposition 1, which suggested that
only sole proprietors would be indulging in missing trader fraud as invoice mills.
Massive drop in the claims of sole proprietors partially supports proposition 1. The
results do not fully support proposition 1 because the decline in domestic input tax
credits of partnerships is also very large and points to existence of invoice mills in
these firms. Compared to pre-reform base levels, some categories (distributors and
wholesalers) within these firms show drops as high as 90% on average.
Results also support proposition 3 which points to the involvement of bigger firms
such as companies in fraudulent behavior. Traditional models for developed countries
do not predict fraudulent behavior by companies. But my results show that the
same may not be true in developing countries. The incorporated entities were not
immune from the market pressure exerted by the evasion across the sectors. Their
input claims fell by a massive PKR 4.6 million per entity on average within the
first quarter of the reform which is approximately 30% of pre-reform levels. These
results support findings in Best et al. (2015) who found that companies paid 70%
less tax when they switched from turnover based income tax to profit and loss based
income tax. Their results showed that the companies are inflating purchases to reduce
profits. My results show that they are also using fake input tax invoices to lower their
VAT liability. Together these results, point to a very high evasion in the formal
private sector. These companies include many large public sector entities such as the
government owned energy sector firms who have no incentive to evade which implies
that the overall figure of 30% decline may be very large if the government owned
enterprises can be separated.
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1.5.3 Robustness of the Results
The results are robust to alternate specifications which can be of concern here. Most
importantly, I check whether the results change materially by changing the time
period to months instead of quarters and extending the regressions to full eight years
of data instead of using one year pre and post reform. Table A.2 lists the results for
unbalanced panels by using monthly tax periods. The results are similar to quarterly
specifications in Table A.3 and approximately one third of the quarterly values. Table
A.3 lists the robustness test of the results at Tables 1.2 to 1.7 for the full time period
from the year 2009 to the first quarter of year 2017. These checks show that the
results are robust to a very long time period and the change to months from quarters
would have no meaningful impact on the results.
My results show that CREST reform curbed DMT fraud. Response of the affected
firms is immediate and lasting. The fraud was prevalent across various business
categories and types. Real time checking greatly enhanced the chances of recovery
which forced this rampant evasion to decline significantly. But this also raises an
important question on extent of VAT evasion in developing countries with limited
state capacity.
1.6 Conclusion and Extensions
The analysis in this paper shows that VAT in developing countries does not achieve
revenue efficiency automatically. Third party reporting in itself does not guarantee
that evasion would be curtailed. As long as the enforcement capacity is not high
enough, the evasion would be substantial and across the board. In such an environ-
ment, VAT imposes tough documentation and compliance requirements on businesses
as well as the tax administration without a corresponding benefit. This also lends
credence to Emran and Stiglitz (2005) argument that VAT may not be a good choice
for developing countries with a limited state capacity.
The fact that Pakistan curbed this evasion after nearly two decades of VAT intro-
duction merits greater introspection and should not be considered a natural outcome
for other developing countries with VAT regimes. The system used in Pakistan is
successful because it is unique in three material respects. First, Pakistani tax ad-
ministration has been carrying out reforms with significant technical and financial
support from the World Bank which greatly enhances its ability to install, operate
and execute innovative, latest and advanced computational infrastructure across the
tax machinery. Many developing countries greatly lack this institutional expertise.
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Second, Pakistan’s constitution gives unprecedented powers to Federal Government
in tax recovery matters as long as it does not interfere with fundamental human
rights. For example, the provisions enacted in Pakistani law can easily be declared
unconstitutional in other countries as it practically shifts the burden of proof to the
accused. Pakistani courts do provide relief to individual firms in taxation matters
but seldom strike down taxation provisions altogether. The constitution also limits
the power of stay granted by the superior courts to six months against a tax recovery
but not against audit. To the best of my knowledge, this reform and similar other
laws were never challenged in any court except for individual relief. Third, Pakistan
also operates an extensive zero rating and exemption regime which greatly reduces
the workload on tax machinery from refunds and audits thereby freeing resources and
reducing compliance costs, in absence of which, these reforms cannot be implemented
successfully.
The results are also important in the context of European Carousel Fraud because
a system of real time checking at the domestic level can guard against the MTIC fraud
without involving support from other countries or other innovations such as origin
based taxation, CVAT and VIVAT. As developed nations, EU countries can easily
replicate Pakistani model subject to the constitutional limitations discussed above.
These results support the theoretical predictions and provide impetus for an ex-
tended analysis of input tax evasion. The emphasis in the tax debate on VAT should
not only relate to sales suppression but also to purchase inflation and plugging the
loopholes which result in revenue leakage at large scale. This paper does not cover
sectoral, geographical and network based dynamics of the missing trader fraud which
needs further exploration.
Copyright © Syed Jawad Ali Shah 2021
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Figure 1.1: Missing Trader Fraud
A- European Carousel Fraud
Explanation: This figure is adapted from Keen & Smith (2006). The European carousel fraud
operates in a chain and principally relies on one or more suppliers going “missing” after issuing
invoices without depositing the tax collected. For example, firm A exports goods to U.K. from an
EU member country and gets the VAT refund of tax paid on its purchase. Firm B imports the goods
without paying any tax at import and supplies it to firm C (multiple firms can exist at this level).
Firm B now goes missing without remitting the tax to government but is invoice issued to firm C
is a valid instrument to claim input tax credit. Firm D buys the goods from firm C and exports it
back to the same member country and claims refund on strength of the invoice issued by C. U.K.
government ends up paying the amount which was never deposited in the exchequer.
B- Domestic Missing Trader Fraud
Explanation: In domestic missing trader fraud, Firm D is actually purchasing goods from A but
would not be able to claim input tax because firm A is not registered to issue VAT invoice. Firm D,
A or both, now collude with suppliers of fake invoices who have set up fake units that only generate
invoices without conducting actual business. These units are registered in different geographical ju-
risdictions making audit difficult for the revenue authorities. They also provide plausible deniability
for firm D which operates in formal sector. In case of Pakistan, the different territorial jurisdictions
of the tax offices provide an incentive to operate a missing trader fraud as the audit and enforcement
can only be conducted by the office having geographical jurisdiction and the invoices of missing
traders can be difficult to verify.
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Figure 1.2: Raw Data- Domestic Input Tax Credit
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Explanation: 2(a) The graph plots the quarterly mean input tax
of the firms in balanced panel for the period from Jan-March
2012 to June 2014 such that Lead 5 is the quarter Jan-March
2012 and Lag 5 is the quarter July-September 2014. The mean
for comparison group in this graph has been scaled down by a
factor of three such that 4 million point corresponds to 12 mil-
lion for comparison group. 2(b) The graph shows parallel trend
by plotting logged mean quarterly domestic input tax credit of
control and treated groups in PKR millions. The reform occurs
at dashed vertical line (quarter April-June 2013) which is then
used as a reference to show lead and lag quarter time periods.
The drop is sudden and the treated group again follows the con-
trol group but with a bigger mean difference giving support to
the identification strategy especially with reference to common
shock assumption. Decline is approximately 70 log points or 50
percent.
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Figure 1.3: Domestic and Import Input Credits’ Ratio to Total Credits
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Explanation: The reform occurs at dashed vertical line which is
then used as a reference to show lead and lag quarter time pe-
riods. (Panel A) The graph shows pre-reform parallel trend by
plotting the ratio of mean quarterly domestic input tax credit
to total input claimed by both comparison and treated groups.
Sudden post-reform drop for the treatment group shows that
domestic credit claims declined as a percentage of total claims
by approximately 50%. (Panel B)The graph of ratio of imported
input tax credit to total input tax shows that the imports re-
mained stable for both groups which provides evidence that the
trend is not driven by a reduction in business or other factors
which should normally affect purchases in overall terms both
domestic as well as imported.
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Quarters Since Treatment
Explanation: The figure plots point estimates of DD dummies
for quarter specific interactions with 95% confidence level to rule
out any pre trend (for details see Table 1.2). The dependent
variable is the input tax against domestic purchases and the
regression controls for input tax against imports. The regression
covers the period from April 2012 to June 2014 such that Lead
4 is the quarter April -June 2012 and Lag 4 is the quarter April
-June 2014. Panels A & B show the results for a balanced and
unbalanced panel respectively. Standard errors are clustered at
firm level.
29






























































































−4 −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
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Explanation: The figure plots point estimates of DD dummies
for quarter specific interactions with 95% confidence level to rule
out any pre trend (for details see Table 1.3). The comparison
group is same as for previous figure but only the manufacturers
from the treatment group are included. The dependent variable
is the input tax against domestic purchases and the regression
controls for input tax against imports. The regression covers
the period from April 2012 to June 2014 such that Lead 4 is
the quarter April-June 2012 and Lag 4 is the quarter April-
June 2014. Panels A & B show the results for a balanced and
unbalanced panel respectively. Standard errors are clustered at
firm level.
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Quarters Since Treatment
Explanation: The figure plots point estimates of DD dummies
for quarter specific interactions with 95% confidence level to
rule out any pre trend (for details see Table 1.4). The com-
parison group is same as for previous figure but only the non-
manufacturers from the treatment group are included. The de-
pendent variable is the input tax against domestic purchases
and the regression controls for input tax against imports. The
regression covers the period from April 2012 to June 2014 such
that Lead 4 is the quarter April -June 2012 and Lag 4 is the
quarter April -June 2014. Panels A & B show the results for
a balanced and unbalanced panel respectively. Standard errors
are clustered at firm level.
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Quarters Since Treatment
Explanation: The figure plots point estimates of DD dummies
for quarter specific interactions with 95% confidence level to rule
out any pre trend (for details see Table 1.6 ). The comparison
group is same as for previous figure but only the sole propri-
etorships (businesses owned by only one individual) from the
treatment group are included. The dependent variable is the in-
put tax against domestic purchases and the regression controls
for input tax against imports. The regression covers the period
from April 2012 to June 2014 such that Lead 4 is the quarter
April -June 2012 and Lag 4 is the quarter April -June 2014.
Panels A & B show the results for a balanced and unbalanced
panel respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level.
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Quarters Since Treatment
Explanation: The figure plots point estimates of DD dummies
for quarter specific interactions with 95% confidence level to rule
out any pre trend (for details see Table 1.5). The comparison
group is same as for previous figure but only the firms regis-
tered as partnerships in the treatment group are included. The
dependent variable is the input tax against domestic purchases
and the regression controls for input tax against imports. The
regression covers the period from April 2012 to June 2014 such
that Lead 4 is the quarter April -June 2012 and Lag 4 is the
quarter April -June 2014. Panels A & B show the results for
a balanced and unbalanced panel respectively. Standard errors
are clustered at firm level.
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Quarters Since Treatment
Explanation: The figure plots point estimates of DD dummies
for quarter specific interactions with 95% confidence level to rule
out any pre trend (for details see Table 1.7). The comparison and
treatment groups both have the firms registered as companies
only. The dependent variable is the input tax against domestic
purchases and the regression controls for input tax against im-
ports. The regression covers the period from April 2012 to June
2014 such that Lead 4 is the quarter April-June 2012 and Lag 4
is the quarter April -June 2014. Panels A & B show the results
for a balanced and unbalanced panel respectively. Standard er-
rors are clustered at firm level.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Domestic Suppliers Exporters Others
(Treatment) (Comparison)
All Firms
Domestic Input Tax (Mean) 706,928 4,093,938 5
Std. Deviation 36,900,000 68,800,000 126
# Observations 6,214,612 626,090 2,617,535
Manufacturers
Domestic Input Tax (Mean) 1,140,941 3,003,698 7
Std. Deviation 32,400,000 55,600,000 162
# Observations 1,791,292 546,030 411,623
Non-Manufacturers
Domestic Input Tax (Mean) 531,167 11,500,000 5
Std. Deviation 38,600,000 126,000,000 118
# Observations 4,423,320 80,060 2,205,912
Companies
Domestic Input Tax (Mean) 4,825,110 12,300,000 5
Std. Deviation 110,000,000 122,000,000 137
# Observations 679,688 197,840 231,599
Partnerships
Domestic Input Tax (Mean) 217,788 230,911 5
Std. Deviation 1,943,833 934,920 124
# Observations 1,156,853 199,296 498,439
Sole Proprietorships
Domestic Input Tax (Mean) 183,904 329,014 5
Std. Deviation 1,458,975 8,198,891 125
# Observations 4,376,500 228,615 1,887,235
Government Agencies
Domestic Input Tax (Mean) 35,700,000 1,880,429 1
Std. Deviation 376,000,000 2,633,667 0
# Observations 1,607 228,615 262
Notes: Domestic input tax figures are in Pakistani Rupees (100 PKR =1 $). The
comparison firms are the ones who had claimed refund in excess of 1 million PKR
for the five year period before the reform, making all the remaining firms treatment
group except “Others”. “Others” column shows the firms who had very little or no
input tax credit for the five year period before the reform (less than 10,000 PKR in
total) and therefore, remain out of the purview of analysis for this paper.
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Table 1.2: Revenue Impact of CREST Reform
Domestic Input Tax (PKR in Millions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balanced Balanced Unbalanced Unbalanced




Lead 4 0.12 0.15
(0.45) (0.44)
Lead 3 -0.06 -0.05
(0.44) (0.42)
Lead 2 0.29 -0.29
(0.26) (0.59)
Lead 1 0.24 0.29
(0.37) (0.36)
Lag 1 -2.80*** -2.53***
(0.86) (0.81)
Lag 2 -2.26*** -2.19***
(0.73) (0.7)
Lag 3 -1.90*** -1.91***
(0.6) (0.59)
Lag 4 -2.72*** -2.86***
(0.82) (0.77)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard
Errors
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Groups 43,928 43,928 115,669 116,038
N 395,352 438,539 670,213 717,469
Notes: Table displays the main coefficients as well as coefficients on quarter specific inter-
action dummies for firm level regressions. Monthly return data is used to compute quarterly
values, therefore N denotes the quarterly number of observations. The variable DD is de-
fined as an interaction between the dummy for suppliers who were not claiming refund
before July 2013 and the dummy which equals one for the period July 2013 onwards. The
dependent variable is the input tax against domestic purchases and the regression controls
for input tax against imports. Leads and lags variables are DD dummies for quarter specific
interactions to rule out any pre trend (for plot see figure 1.4). The regression covers the
period from March 2012 to June 2014 such that Lead 4 is the quarter March-June 2012 and
Lag 4 is the quarter March-June 2014. Column (1) (2), and (3) (4) show the results for a
balanced and unbalanced panel respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and
shown in parenthesis. See Table A.3 for robustness checks. *** denotes that the results are
significant at 1% level.
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Table 1.3: Revenue Impact on Manufacturers
Domestic Input Tax (PKR in Millions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balanced Balanced Unbalanced Unbalanced




Lead 4 0.13 0.15
(0.46) (0.45)
Lead 3 -0.09 -0.08
(0.45) (0.43)
Lead 2 0.28 -0.29
(0.29) (0.60)
Lead 1 0.11 0.17
(0.38) (0.37)
Lag 1 -2.83*** -2.52***
(0.84) (0.81)
Lag 2 -2.00*** -1.99***
(0.76) (0.73)
Lag 3 -1.60*** -1.66***
(0.66) (0.63)
Lag 4 -2.5*** -2.58***
(0.82) (0.79)
Input Tax on Imports -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Groups 21,323 21,323 33,374 33,484
N 191,907 212,937 241,149 263,597
Notes: Table displays the main coefficients as well as coefficients on quarter specific
interaction dummies for firm level regressions in case of manufacturers. Monthly
return data is used to compute quarterly values, therefore N denotes the quarterly
number of observations. The variable DD is defined as an interaction between the
dummy for suppliers who were not claiming refund before July 2013 and the dummy
which equals one for the period July 2013 onwards. The dependent variable is the
input tax against domestic purchases and the regression controls for input tax against
imports. Leads and lags variables are DD dummies for quarter specific interactions
to rule out any pre trend (for plot see figure 1.5). The regression covers the period
from March 2012 to June 2014 such that Lead 4 is the quarter March-June 2012 and
Lag 4 is the quarter March-June 2014. Column (1) (2), and (3) (4) show the results
for a balanced and unbalanced panel respectively. Standard errors are clustered at
firm level and shown in parenthesis. See Table A.3 for robustness checks. *** denotes
that the results are significant at 1% level.
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Table 1.4: Revenue Impact on Non-Manufacturers
Domestic Input Tax (PKR in Millions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balanced Balanced Unbalanced Unbalanced




Lead 4 0.02 0.07
(0.4) (0.39)
Lead 3 -0.05 -0.05
(0.44) (0.42)
Lead 2 0.28 -0.32
(0.27) (0.59)
Lead 1 0.31 0.37
(0.37) (0.36)
Lag 1 -2.76*** -2.58***
(0.88) (0.82)
Lag 2 -2.45*** -2.34***
(0.73) (0.72)
Lag 3 -2.05*** -2.01***
(0.58) (0.59)
Lag 4 -2.93*** -3.07***
(0.91) (0.84)
Input Tax on Imports -0.25 -0.21 -0.17 -0.15
(0.38) (0.4) (0.32) (0.28)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Groups 28,971 28,971 89,700 89,972
N 260,739 289,173 491,079 522,346
Notes: Table displays the main coefficients as well as coefficients on quarter specific
interaction dummies for firm level regressions in case of non-manufacturers. Monthly
return data is used to compute quarterly values, therefore N denotes the quarterly
number of observations. The variable DD is defined as an interaction between the
dummy for suppliers who were not claiming refund before July 2013 and the dummy
which equals one for the period July 2013 onwards. The dependent variable is the
input tax against domestic purchases and the regression controls for input tax against
imports. Leads and lags variables are DD dummies for quarter specific interactions
to rule out any pre trend (for plot see figure 1.6). The regression covers the period
from March 2012 to June 2014 such that Lead 4 is the quarter March-June 2012 and
Lag 4 is the quarter March-June 2014. Column (1) (2), and (3) (4) show the results
for a balanced and unbalanced panel respectively. Standard errors are clustered at
firm level and shown in parenthesis. See Table A.3 for robustness checks. *** denotes
that the results are significant at 1% level.
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Table 1.5: Revenue Impact on Partnerships
Domestic Input Tax (PKR in Millions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balanced Balanced Unbalanced Unbalanced




Lead 4 -0.06 -0.01
(0.37) (0.37)
Lead 3 -0.13 -0.11
(0.41) (0.4)
Lead 2 0.28 -0.28
(0.28) (0.59)
Lead 1 0.27 0.32
(0.36) (0.35)
Lag 1 -3.32*** -3.07***
(0.8) (0.76)
Lag 2 -2.88*** -2.83***
(0.69) (0.67)
Lag 3 -2.39*** -2.41***
(0.55) (0.54)
Lag 4 -3.77*** -3.73***
(0.86) (0.82)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Groups 13,496 13,496 27,879 27,928
N 121,464 134,775 177,296 191,492
Notes: Table displays the main coefficients as well as coefficients on quarter specific
interaction dummies for firm level regressions in case of partnerships. Monthly return
data is used to compute quarterly values, therefore N denotes the quarterly number
of observations. The variable DD is defined as an interaction between the dummy
for suppliers who were not claiming refund before July 2013 and the dummy which
equals one for the period July 2013 onwards. The dependent variable is the input tax
against domestic purchases and the regression controls for input tax against imports.
Leads and lags variables are DD dummies for quarter specific interactions to rule out
any pre trend (for plot see figure 1.8 ). The regression covers the period from March
2012 to June 2014 such that Lead 4 is the quarter March-June 2012 and Lag 4 is
the quarter March-June 2014. Column (1) (2), and (3) (4) show the results for a
balanced and unbalanced panel respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm
level and shown in parenthesis. See Table A.3 for robustness checks. *** denotes that
the results are significant at 1% level.
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Table 1.6: Revenue Impact on Sole Proprietorships
Domestic Input Tax (PKR in Millions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balanced Balanced Unbalanced Unbalanced




Lead 4 -0.14 -0.1
(0.37) (0.37)
Lead 3 -0.16 -0.15
(0.41) (0.4)
Lead 2 0.28 -0.32
(0.28) (0.59)
Lead 1 0.31 0.35
(0.37) (0.36)
Lag 1 -3.27*** -3.03***
(0.8) (0.76)
Lag 2 -2.85*** -2.80***
(0.7) (0.68)
Lag 3 -2.33*** -2.38***
(0.55) (0.54)
Lag 4 -3.73*** -3.69***
(0.86) (0.82)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Groups 32,106 32,106 84,558 84,867
N 288,954 320,489 489,989 524,581
Notes: Table displays the main coefficients as well as coefficients on quarter specific
interaction dummies for firm level regressions in case of sole proprietorships. Monthly
return data is used to compute quarterly values, therefore N denotes the quarterly
number of observations. The variable DD is defined as an interaction between the
dummy for suppliers who were not claiming refund before July 2013 and the dummy
which equals one for the period July 2013 onwards. The dependent variable is the
input tax against domestic purchases and the regression controls for input tax against
imports. Leads and lags variables are DD dummies for quarter specific interactions
to rule out any pre trend (for plot see figure 1.7). The regression covers the period
from March 2012 to June 2014 such that Lead 4 is the quarter March-June 2012 and
Lag 4 is the quarter March-June 2014. Column (1) (2), and (3) (4) show the results
for a balanced and unbalanced panel respectively. Standard errors are clustered at
firm level and shown in parenthesis. See Table A.3 for robustness checks. *** denotes
that the results are significant at 1% level.
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Table 1.7: Revenue Impact on Companies
Domestic Input Tax (PKR in Millions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Balanced Balanced Unbalanced Unbalanced




Lead 4 0.54 0.5
(1.6) (1.56)
Lead 3 0.20 0.29
(1.61) (1.56)
Lead 2 0.83 0.88
(0.93) (0.91)
Lead 1 0.27 0.39
(1.23) (1.21)
Lag 1 -6.41** -5.95**
(3.15) (3.00)
Lag 2 -4.42 -4.15
(2.63) (2.60)
Lag 3 -3.22 -3.08
(2.32) (2.29)
Lag 4 -4.5 -5.55*
(0.86) (2.95)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Groups 6,670 6,670 12,754 12,780
N 60,030 66,607 83,365 90,274
Notes: Table displays the main coefficients as well as coefficients on quarter specific
interaction dummies for firm level regressions in case of companies. Monthly return
data is used to compute quarterly values, therefore N denotes the quarterly number
of observations. The variable DD is defined as an interaction between the dummy
for suppliers who were not claiming refund before July 2013 and the dummy which
equals one for the period July 2013 onwards. The dependent variable is the input tax
against domestic purchases and the regression controls for input tax against imports.
Leads and lags variables are DD dummies for quarter specific interactions to rule out
any pre trend (for plot see figure 1.9). The regression covers the period from March
2012 to June 2014 such that Lead 4 is the quarter March-June 2012 and Lag 4 is
the quarter March-June 2014. Column (1) (2), and (3) (4) show the results for a
balanced and unbalanced panel respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm
level and shown in parenthesis. See Table A.3 for robustness checks. *** denotes that
the results are significant at 1% level.
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Chapter 2
Is Minimum the Maximum? Tax Burden on Informal Sector in VAT: Evidence from
Pakistan
Developing countries with large informal sectors collect a very low percentage of
their GDP as tax revenue. Many businesses remain out of the tax net despite having
large volume of sales and significant profits. These countries, therefore, rely on tax
instruments that can place an adequate burden of taxes on informal firms. This desire
to tax informal sector is a major reason why indirect taxes, considered regressive by
economists, still bring major share of tax revenues through import tariffs, excises
and other consumption taxes. Value added tax (VAT) remains the most widely used
indirect tax on consumption across the world including developing countries.
A critical debate in public finance deals with value added tax (VAT) and its welfare
effect in developing countries who have large informal sectors. These countries have
lowered their import tariffs in response to WTO agreement and greatly reduced ex-
cise duties over the last few decades. Reducing the magnitude and scope of tariffs
and excises without a compensating tax instrument is revenue inefficient and also
relieves informal sectors from indirect burden of taxes. Consequently, the countries
enacted VAT regimes to make up for the revenue lost and increase tax burden on
informal sectors of their economies. The underlying premise is that VAT would gen-
erate sufficient revenue by taxing the imported goods and their subsequent supply
chain. At the same time, informal sector would bear the tax burden because staying
out of registered supply chain would result in denial of tax credit to an informal firm
which is available to a formal one. However, on the other hand, if firms can evade tax
easily it would greatly undermine both revenue efficiency and burdening of informal
sector hypotheses. A revenue neutral VAT in these circumstances would be welfare
decreasing not increasing (Emran and Stiglitz 2005).
The welfare increasing argument relies on the assumption that production effi-
ciency of formal sector and indirect burden of VAT on informal sector makes it a
better choice compared to trade taxes (Keen 2008). Apparently, informal sector
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would be burdened through VAT to the extent it pays tax on purchases obtained
from formal sector. However, for government, revenue gained from informal sector
consumption may actually be very small if importers can suppress their sales value
by declaring a very low or no value addition. It implies that the tax paid at import is
now lower because of lower tariffs and anticipated compensation through tax on post-
import value addition cannot be collected. Additionally, the informal sector which
buys these imported goods bears lesser burden of tax. Therefore, presence of large
evasion undermines welfare increasing argument and strengthens the opposite view.
In developed countries, informal sectors are very small and the importers sell goods
to other formal firms who demand a VAT invoice to claim credit for the tax already
paid. In developing countries, importers sell goods to both formal and informal sector
buyers. The formal buyer would need a true value invoice because they can claim
credit only with a verifiable VAT invoice. But informal buyer has no need for an
invoice and may even prefer not getting one because it would help her conceal her
business and remain out of the ambit of tax authority. In such cases, importer can
easily declare little to no value addition1 and evade VAT. Tax authorities tackle
this value addition suppression by imposing minimum values addition thresholds to
calculate output tax due on sales.2 It implies that tax liability of an importer is
flat below this threshold. This minimum tax threshold introduces a non-linear kink
in an otherwise linear tax schedule. This kink provides an incentive to firms with
higher value additions to bunch at or below the kink in a manner similar to kinks in
non-linear income tax schedule. If the firms were reporting true value addition they
should remain unaffected by introduction of this kink. If the firms bunch, then this
behavior indicates evasion by suppression of sales to informal sector. Recent evidence
points to a strong incentive to evade in environments where tax authority does not
have the advantage of in-built information trail to obtain third party information
such as the retail sales to the consumers (Naritomi 2019). Similarly, self-regulating
mechanism of VAT can collapse if buyers and sellers both have an incentive to report
lower sales value. Because buyer is an unregistered person or informal firm, she gains
by lower declared price as long as she shares some of the benefits of these lower value
declarations. The VAT structure built on the concept of arm’s length transactions
between buyers and sellers starts breaking down under these conditions.
This chapter exploits the kinks created by minimum value addition thresholds
1Value addition is simply the difference of gross sales and gross purchases. In case of an importer
value addition would, thus, simply be a difference of sales value and value assessed at import by
customs authorities.
2Minimum taxes in corporate and personal income taxes are very common.
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in Pakistani VAT regime to calculate volume of evasion on account of value addition
suppression by non-manufacturer importers (hereinafter referred simply as importers).
Pakistani law requires importers to pay a minimum value addition tax, based on an
arbitrary single value addition threshold for all firms irrespective of the type of goods
being imported. If subsequent actual value addition of firms is higher than this pre-
sumptive value addition, they deposit excess differential tax liability with their VAT
returns. But in case their actual value addition is less than the presumptive value
addition, they cannot claim adjustment of excess tax paid at the time of import.
Therefore, firms have no incentive to cheat if their value addition is less than arbi-
trarily set threshold but a strong incentive to bunch below the threshold when their
actual value addition is higher than threshold.
My setting is unique because it can easily disentangle income effect from VAT
evasion benefit. The VAT evading firms earn dual benefits because they not only
lower their VAT liability but also use this evasion to decrease their income tax lia-
bility. Presence of this additional income effect prevents an accurate estimation of
VAT evasion under normal settings. It becomes difficult to estimate whether this
misdeclaration is driven solely by VAT evasion benefits or not. The present setting is
unique because income tax liability of an importer is fixed based on its import value
and not its value addition or actual profits. They would get no benefit from declaring
a lower sales value nor would they be paying anything extra no matter how large a
sales value they declare. Consequently, the whole evasion can be solely attributed
to VAT benefit. The estimates in this chapter are therefore more reliable than any
other estimates in VAT literature because they, unlike other estimates, disentangle
the effect of income tax enforcement and evasion from VAT enforcement and evasion.
I use administrative data for the universe of monthly VAT returns filed in Pak-
istan for tax years 2009 to 2016 to estimate evasion using value addition thresholds.
Using the variation created by different minimum thresholds in different years for the
non-manufacturing firms exclusively engaged in imports, I can estimate an average
measure of evasion at post importation stage. I build on the methodology developed
to estimate elasticity of taxable income for non-linear tax schedule by Saez (2010)
and Chetty et al. (2011). I find high bunching with approximately 50% of all firms
bunching on average around the threshold. It translates to an evasion rate of 78%.
This large bunching can only be explained by negligible adjustment costs and the fact
that firms far above the threshold can easily bunch around minimum value addition
threshold. In personal income taxes where individuals loose wages by working less,
the incentive to bunch is limited to a very small window where tax savings compen-
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sate for the loss of income. In present case bunching results from misreporting and
firms are not loosing any actual sales. They are only declaring wrong sales to tax
authorities. Hence, given the incentive, huge bunching is surprising but possible.
This chapter adds to three strands of literature. First, it adds to the debate
on revenue efficiency and enforcement of VAT in developing countries with large
informal sectors. This literature provides evidence of VAT evasion in developing
countries, see (Pomeranz 2015; D. R. Agrawal and Zimmerman 2019; Naritomi 2019;
Waseem 2019; Waseem 2020). However, this literature is exclusively restricted to
manipulation of purchases and sales either at local supplies or export. I add to this
debate by providing evidence of value addition manipulation by importers. Another
important debate in VAT evasion literature centers around impact of VAT withheld at
import stage on informal sector with two opposite views. Emran and Stiglitz (2005)
argue that high import tariffs and excise duties mean that large informal sectors
share the burden of indirect taxes adequately. When VAT replaces these high import
tariffs, informal sector’s tax burden gets lowered and, therefore, a revenue neutral
VAT would decrease welfare. Keen (2008) opposes this view by arguing that VAT
is collected at import stage and then importers also charge tax on subsequent value
addition thereby imposing sufficient burden on informal sector who cannot claim
any credit of tax paid at import stage. I provide, to the best of my knowledge,
first empirical evidence regarding this debate. I estimate widespread evasion post
importation which implies that the argument of Emran and Stiglitz (2005) is valid
regarding VAT implementation in developing countries. Third, a growing literature in
personal and corporate income taxes estimates evasion response at a kink by bunching
estimator (for example (Blomquist et al. 2021; Gelber, Jones, and Sacks 2020; Card
et al. 2015)). Henrik Jacobsen Kleven (2016) explains the methodology of bunching
and provides a detailed review. Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2018) use bunching
methodology for enforcement notches in Spain. Liu et al. (2021) use bunching to
estimate response at VAT notches created by registration thresholds in VAT. However,
bunching estimators have not been used to estimate responses at VAT kinks. Sow
and Gebresilasse (2020) use bunching at VAT registration notch in Ethiopia to model
firm behavior at VAT notches. I provide evidence of bunching at VAT kinks created
by minimum taxes and use the program developed by Chetty et al. (2011) to estimate
bunching at VAT kinks.
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2.1 Institutional Setting
The federal VAT in Pakistan operates mainly under standard VAT regime where firms
deduct input tax paid on their local and imported purchases from the tax due on sales.
They either deposit the difference with their VAT return or claim refund of excess paid
tax. Pakistan also has large informal sectors which remain outside formal tax regime.
Presence of these large informal sectors often forces the government to enact special
procedures to guard against revenue leakage through sales to these informal sectors
of economy. Importers who do not have manufacturing facility sell their imported
goods at wholesale markets which largely remain informal. Informal buyer has no
concern with sales value reported by their sellers because truthful reporting of seller
has no marginal benefit for buyer. On the other hand, misreporting of true sales
value provides a direct benefit to seller who can keep differential amount of tax due
as profit. Therefore, these importers have a strong incentive to deviate from truthful
reporting and declare lower than actual value addition. They collect price inclusive
of tax but can keep a portion of this collected tax by declaring a price lower than the
actual price. For revenue authorities, cost of audit and establishing a case of sales
suppression without any third party information is very high. Audit observation is
very difficult to withstand judicial scrutiny because the goods are of foreign origin
and open market price is rarely available independently.3 Lower sales declaration also
implies lesser income tax liability and this increases the incentive for evasion.
In an effort to check the double incentive described above, Pakistani tax regime
introduced two different deviations from standard VAT and income tax regimes. The
importers have to pay a fixed percentage over and above their assessed value at
import stage as a “final” tax on their income tax liabilities. This means that these
firms can neither adjust the income tax paid at the time of import nor the income tax
department would demand any amount over and above the withholding tax collected
at import stage. This effectively rules out any income effect on account of lesser sales
declaration. Therefore, the setting provides an interesting scenario where all the effect
can be attributed to VAT evasion.
Minimum value addition (MVA) regime operates under a special procedure. The
law stipulates additional tax to be paid over and above the standard tax rate. This
additional tax varied from 2% to 3% from the year 2008 to 2016. At a VAT rate of
3This sale value suppression does not take into account under invoicing at import stage and
assumes that assessed customs value of the goods on which this tax was withheld is fair. If the
customs value of the goods is lower than the market value, it would be another source of evasion
but is not the subject of this research.
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16%, this translates to 12.5% and 18.75% value addition respectively. For example, if
an importer imported goods whose custom duty inclusive value is assessed at 100 PKR
then she would pay a 16% tax amounting to 16 PKR and an additional 2 PKR for the
2% MVA tax. This implies that the government is assuming that the importer would
sell these goods which cost him 100 at a value of 112.5 (112.5*0.16=18). The threshold
is therefore sensitive to MVA tax rate as well as the standard tax rate. Threshold
is calculated using a simple relation between after-import sales value Vsand import








where t is the standard tax rate and tmis the minimum tax rate at imports. During
this period, the tax rate also changed once from 16% to 17% implying the threshold
also shifted slightly from 18.75% to 17.65% (see Figure 2.1). All these changes were
passed with the beginning of new fiscal years, therefore, I can aggregate monthly data
to yearly data to determine behavior through bunching more precisely.
2.1.1 MVA on Non-Manufacturer Importer
The importers (who are selling goods imported without further processing) in Pak-
istan operate under a “minimum value addition” (MVA) regime. The rationale for
imposing an MVA is to ensure that sectors prone to evasion on supply of goods (on
account of supplies made to informal sector) are paying their due share. However, if
the actual value of supply is more than this minimum then importer shall pay excess
tax due at the time of filing return. The minimum VAT collected at the time of
import is not refundable.4 Additionally, the importers falling under this MVA regime
are exempt from Audit which implies that an importer has no enforcement pressure
to declare a value addition more than the one required by MVA threshold. Only three
factors can induce her to declare more sales than the statutory minimum, i) Arm’s
length transaction between registered buyers and sellers which requires truthful re-
porting, (ii) maintaining double books of accounts without being traced and (iii) lack
of information about the loophole that prevents the firm from evasion.5 These fac-
tors can induce adjustment frictions similar to those observed by Chetty et al. (2011)
4In Pakistan, for the period under consideration, the importers were taxed on income under a
“Final Tax” regime wherein a fixed percentage of import value (inclusive of all taxes) is considered
as the income tax liability and collected at the time of import.
5Although a third response driven by an altruistic responsibility to the society which demands
no tax evasion is possible but I shall ignore it in this chapter in line with tax evasion literature (
See (Allingham and Sandmo 1972)). Also, in present case, its not possible to differentiate between
a response arising from lack of information and altruism.
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which prevent income tax payers from reducing their income.
2.2 Theory
Consider a firm which imports goods at a value VI and sells them at a value Vssuch
that Vs = VI + Vawhere Vais the value added after import. If C is the cost of getting
this value addition then profit ∏
= VI + Va − C
When a tax at rate τ is imposed then
Vs ∗ τ = (VI + Va) ∗ τ
is the revenue remitted to the government by the importer. In this ideal scenario, VAT
would have no impact on the profit of a firm and would be an economically neutral
tax. However, when government imposes a minimum value addition requirement this
economic neutrality vanishes which would reduce economic efficiency but may or may
not improve revenue efficiency.
Now I consider an importer who is operating in an economy with a large informal
sector. In this case, many buyers of the imported goods may not be registered firms.
Therefore, even in the case of arm’s length transactions, these buyers do not derive
any benefit out of correct reporting of sales value by their sellers.VI is the only refer-
ence value for the tax authority because any previous transactions of goods occurred
outside importing country.6
The importer can misreport sales value to increase her profit through evasion. If
Vgis the value reported to government such that Vg ≤ Va and φ is the adjustment cost
function then profit is given by∏
= VI + Va − C − (VI + Vm) ∗ τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tax paid at import
− (Vg − Vm) ∗ τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tax due with return
+ (Va − Vg) ∗ τ − φ(ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Evasion Benefit
(2.2)
I define parameter ωε {0, 1} as ratio of sales to unregistered buyers to total sales
such that φ(ω) is increasing in ω and concave. An additional restriction on φ is that
φ → 0 as Vg → Vawhich is evident from the nature of the problem that if there is
no under declaration then there would be no adjustment costs as well. In a standard
6VI is the customs value which according to WTO rules is the transaction value between importer
and exporter subject to certain additions and restrictions.
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VAT there is no limit onVgand an importer can claim refund or adjustment of tax
paid at import stage by declaring a negative value addition post importation. In
Pakistani case, government restricts any adjustment or refund of excess VAT paid by
importer through imposing a minimum value addition (Vm) requirement and collects
that portion of tax at the time of import. The importer pays an additional tax
with the return when Vm ≤ Va. It imposes an additional constraint onVgsuch that
Vm ≤ Vg ≤ Vs. It also implies that evasion would only be feasible if Va > Vm and
the evasion expression is positive. In cases where Vm ≤ Va, the firm’s adjustment
cost function would determine the most feasible Vg. I now examine firms in different
scenarios and their expected response in light of equation (2.2).
When Actual Value Addition is less than MVA; This is the case when Va ≤ Vm.
Here, firm declares correct value to the government so that Va = Vgand there is no
evasion by the firm as positive term for evasion response goes to zero. Tax due with
return is now negative or refundable but the government has expressly prohibited
adjustment or refund of this excess paid amount. Therefore, this is an additional cost
to a firm whose actual value addition is lower than the minimum threshold.
When Actual Value Addition is more than MVA; In this case, a firm can evade
taxes and add an amount over and above its profit absent an MVA requirement,
because it is now out of purview of any audit or enforcement measure and only
restriction it faces is determined by ω which is lower for a lower volume of sales to
unregistered buyers. It charges the market price inclusive of tax from unregistered
buyer in informal sector but remits a lesser amount to government thereby increasing
its profits. This firm would try to declare a value addition as close to the threshold as
possible. These firms locate at or around Vm and that would produce a corresponding
hole above this threshold.
Consider firms with preferences defined over price received at true value minus the
tax paid and the effort given by actual value addition percentage such that the utility
function is given by U(V −T (V ), V
n
), where V is the value added, T (V ) is output tax
function and n is the ability of the firm. The heterogeneity in ability can be described
by a density distribution f(n). I assume that the ability distribution, the tax system
and preferences are smooth. Also, the optimization by firms produces a smooth value
addition distribution. The kinked tax function can now be constructed based on the
fact that below the minimum value threshold there is no change in output tax liability.
This implies that
T (V ) =
Vm ∗ τ V ≤ Vm(Vg − Vm) ∗ τ V > Vm
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If there’s no kink then firms would simply show a value addition at which they can
maximize their utility and would locate along the (1− τ) slope line. However, when
kink is introduced, they have an incentive to bunch around the kink. The firms can
reasonably defend their value addition at or close to threshold determined by the
government. The adjustment cost of locating at the kink reduces considerably for the
firms whose actual value addition is higher because of audit exemption. Nonetheless,
they would still need to keep two different books of accounts and could be charged
with fraud if this manipulation is caught. An implication of this new scenario is that
the bunching around threshold is a very feasible and adjustable strategy . The slope
of resulting line is 0 before the kink and 1 − τ after the kink. Figure 2.2 shows the
case of a firm whose actual value addition is dV higher than the threshold Vm. This
firm would be better off declaring a value addition less than its actual value addition.
The present problem is analogous to traditional theory of bunching at kinks. The
only difference here is a much sharper kink which after allowing for optimization fric-
tions and adjustment costs is similar in functional form to the bunching methodology
employed by Chetty et al. (2011).
2.2.1 Implications of a Kinked Output Tax Function
Introduction of minimum tax threshold creates a kinked output tax liability function
as described above. For any firm this functions presents a problem only when its
actual value addition is less than Vm. In such case this firm would be forced to pay an
amount equal to (Vm−Va)∗τ over and above its true liability where Va is actual value
of sales. Also, this firm would have no incentive to misreport its true sales value. For
firms with value additions greater than Vm, there is an incentive to report as low a
value to government Vg as possible. A lower Vg implies lower tax payment than the
tax due and higher profit. This firm can face three possible scenarios:
i) All Supplies to Formal Firms: If all buyers are from formal sector they would
demand a true value invoice to claim input tax credit already paid on the goods and
firm would report Vg = Va. The government would loose no revenue.
i) All Supplies to Informal Firms: If all buyers are informal firms, importer
would have an incentive to declare Vg = Vm. In this case the firm would bunch very
close to threshold because the adjustment cost is small and revenue authority has no
meaningful way of knowing true sales value.
i) Supplies to Both Formal and Informal Firms: If the firm is selling goods to
both formal and informal sector then it faces adjustment costs because it would report
formal sector sales correctly as in case (i) above but would suppress sale value for sales
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made to informal firms as is the case at (ii) above. This firm may or may not be able
to bunch near threshold depending upon her particular circumstances.
2.3 Identification Strategy
MVA in Pakistani case is selected arbitrarily by government and is same irrespective
of the goods being sold. The imported goods can range from agricultural produce
to sophisticated engineering products with hundred of different countries of origins.
In this case, it is reasonable to assume that actual value addition for the underlying
distribution of value addition post importation would be smooth in absence of this
threshold. If Ψ is this underlying distribution then Ψ =
´ +∞
−∞ dΨ. The real response
should show no consistent bunching at any arbitrarily determined point. But given
the incentive available for importers to bunch around the kink, an evasion response is
expected which would produce an excess mass at or below the kink and a hole above
it. I approach this problem in the same manner as developed by Saez (2010) with
minor modifications as described below.
Let H0(V ) be the cumulative frequency distribution of value addition when there’s
a constant marginal tax rate τ0 and h0(v) = H
′
0
(V ) be the corresponding density
distribution. I assume that sales value are smoothly distributed according to the
distribution h(v). The heterogeneity in profits (including profit through evasion) de-
pends on two factors- inherent entrepreneurial ability of the firm represented by sales
value and its preference to evasion- both captured by a utility function defined on two
parameters U(π, v). In a pre-kink world with evasion, the slope of profit after value
addition tax line is (1− τ) .When a minimum value addition threshold is introduced,
then slope of corresponding line is zero because the line is now flat till the point
Vm. Introduction of kink at this point means that firms who were previously showing
values below the MVA point remain unaffected but firms whose value additions are
above this level would be better off by bunching below this minimum point as shown
in figure 2.2. I assume that there is an infinitesimally small segment below Vmwhere
slope is (1− τ + dτ) so that the evasion (e) by declaring lesser value addition than






In a heterogeneous population of firms there would be now a new distribution of firms
Ψ(v, e) such that h(Vm) =
´
e
Ψ(Vm, e)de and average evasion at this value addition
level Vm is then given by ē =
´
e
eΨ(Vm, e)de/h(Vm). The presence of a kink at
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To account for kink points which are not small enough, I consider a parameterized
model in which evasion response is assumed to be a quasi-linear and constant across
firms, so that the utility function has the form









where n is entrepreneurial ability parameter of the firms which has a cumulative
frequency distribution F (n), a corresponding density given by f(n) and normal-
ized to one.7 The bunching would therefore identify evasion because I am assum-
ing that affinity to evade is similar across firms (although their actual response may
be attenuated by adjustment cost). I maximize U(π, v) subject to the constraint
π = V − T (V ) = (1− τ) ∗ v. The resulting first order condition: 1− τ − ( v
n
)e = 0 can
be rewritten as:
v = n(1− τ)e
If there was no tax (τ = 0) then simply v = n which means I can interpret (n)as
declared value addition in absence of VAT. For the constant marginal tax rate case
with τ0,v = n(1 − τ0)eand therefore H0(V ) = Pr(n(1 − τ0)e ≤ v) = F (v/(1 − τ0)e)
which means that corresponding density function is h0(v) = f(v/(1− τ0)e)/(1− τ0)e.
Now introduce a convex kink by increasing the marginal tax rate to τ1such that τ1 > τ0
when value addition is above Vm. Introduction of a kink above means that for v > Vm,
v = n(1 − τ1)e, therefore, in a corresponding manner as done earlier cumulative
frequency distribution and density function are H1(V ) = Pr(n(1 − τ1)e ≤ v) =
F (v/(1− τ1)e) and h1(v) = f(v/(1− τ1)e)/(1− τ1)e = h0(v((1− τ0)/(1− τ1))e)× ((1−
τ0)/(1− τ1))e. If I denote h(Vm)+ and h(Vm)− as the right and left band around Vm,
then h(Vm)
− = h0(Vm) and h(Vm)
+ = h0(Vm((1−τ0)/(1−τ1))e)×((1−τ0)/(1−τ1))e).
I denote the density of realized value addition and its cumulative distribution
by h(v) and H(v)so that for the actual value addition below the kink at Vm, v =
n(1− τ0)e for n < Vm/(1− to)e. This implies that h(v) = h0(v) for v < Vm. Because
v = n(1 − τ1)e for n > Vm/(1 − t1)etherefore, it follows that for v > Vm, H(v) =
Pr(n(1− τ1)e ≤ v) = F (v/(1− τ1)e) and h(v) = f(v/(1− τ1)e)/(1− τ1)e = h0(v((1−
τ0)/(1− τ1))e)× ((1− τ0)/(1− τ1))e. When v → Vm then the left and right limits of
7The quasi-linearity assumption may not be necessary in this particular case as income tax is
already fixed and collected at the time import as final liability but would be required for cases where
income tax is not collected under final tax type mechanism applied here.
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the function are simply h(Vm−) = h0(Vm) and h(Vm+) = h0(Vm((1− τ0)/(1− τ1))e)×
((1 − τ0)/(1 − τ1))e respectively. The firms with value additions higher than Vmover









This equation is similar to the relationship developed by Saez (2010) for bunching
in the piece-wise linear income tax schedule with VAT minimum threshold point Vm
replacing the bunch point z∗for income threshold. It is also a general form of equation
(2.3). Therefore, the bunching of firms represents a trapezoid over and above the
counterfactual distribution given by h0(v)which can be evaluated from trapezoidal
rule of approximation for a definite integral by using the relationship h(v) = h0(v)






























Vm is directly observable and τ0 is simply VI ∗τm, knowing B, h(Vm−) and h(Vm+) the
evasion response can be estimated. This would be similar to the estimation used by
Saez (2010). Estimation of this equation assumes that there is no friction. Also, this
would need an approximate value of VI for all firms or at least an average measure
of VI . Therefore, it would be better to employ the method proposed by Chetty et al.
(2011) which relies on estimating counterfactual density. Because of my large sample,
I can estimate a counterfactual density and excess bunching mass taking into account
the adjustment costs and frictions.
There are two important differences that must be taken into account here. First,
income response of an individual together with net of marginal tax rate can identify
elasticity of taxable income but in case of VAT I also need a measure of volume of sales
to calculate the volume of evasion. Ideally, I can assume that sales value of bunching
and non-bunching firms are same on average but this assumption would need actual
support from sales and bunching behavior of the firms in different deciles or quartiles.
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If, there is sufficient variation between sales volume of two categories then I would
need to incorporate a measure for average sales of bunching firms. Second, unlike
income tax, firms cannot evade by actually manipulating their purchase and sales as
the customs has already recorded purchases. Also, output goods are in same state
as they were imported without undergoing any manufacturing process. Therefore,
there can be no actual response and all the variation is due to manipulation of sales
value. For registered buyers, seller cannot manipulate invoice value because buyer
would need that invoice to claim credit of tax already paid. For unregistered buyer,
however, there is no such restriction and seller can easily report any value. But this
misreporting would, at least, require maintaining two different books of accounts.
2.4 Data and Empirical Estimation
I use universe of data of monthly returns filed by VAT firms from the tax year 2008
to 2016 in Pakistan. The return data captures over 100 different return columns
which is required to disentangle different types of sales, purchases, carry forwards
etc. 8 I aggregate data by year because all changes in threshold were introduced
from the beginning of a financial year. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.
Manufacturing firms must have a manufacturing facility of their own and do not fall
under MVA regime (For a definition of important terms see Appendix ).
Pakistani MVA regime for importers deducts tax on a presumptive value addition.
Before 4th June 2011, the importers were assessed at 2% of the import value (inclusive
of all import stage taxes) as an MVA based tax and paid at the time of Customs
clearance. Using relation given by equation (2.4), it translates to an MVA of 12.5%
and implies that a firm can show any value addition in its return but it would not
matter in terms of tax liability if its less than 12.5%. But if it exceeds this threshold
then excess tax would be deposited with the return. Additionally, importers falling
under this category were exempt from audit till year 2012 but they were also exempt
in subsequent periods as this category was excluded from audit program. 9 From tax
year 2012, this tax was increased to 3% or 18.75% MVA. Because tax rate post MVA
threshold is linear and uniform, it implies that any excess bunching at or around
threshold is arising because of suppression of sales value of the imported goods and
If the importers were not directly or indirectly involved in evasion then there should
8Some firms are only required to file a quarterly return but aggregation by year automatically
takes care of this issue.
9The statutory exemption from audit was removed through Notification No. S.RO. 592(I)/2012,
dated 1st June, 2012, w.e.f. 2nd June, 2012, reported as PTCL 2013 St. 673.
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be no change post reform in their actual value addition and sales declared to formal
and informal sectors. Figure 2.1 shows the changes in threshold over eight years from
tax year 2009 to 2016. Empirical estimation of parameters through bunching requires
calculation of counterfactual density. I follow STATA code of Chetty et al. (2011) to
estimate counterfactual density, bunching mass b and number of firms bunching near
the kink.
2.4.1 Graphical Evidence
First step in bunching estimation is the graphical evidence. Figure 2.3 plots the
histograms for each year from 2009 to 2016. Horizontal axes show value addition
percentage which is calculated using gross sales and imports in a year for each im-
porting firm. Each bin on this axis has a width of 2 percent such that, for example,
any firm showing value addition equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6 percent
would be counted in that bin. Vertical axes show number of firms in the bins. Red
vertical lines show MVA threshold for a particular year. It is evident from these plots
that there is significant bunching near the threshold point in each year. Figure 2.3
shows yearly pattern of declared value addition and density around threshold points
is very high. I start these histograms from a value addition of negative 20 percent.
On the left side, the number of firms gets steadily lower until it almost reaches zero
or negligible value. On the right side of threshold, I extend these histograms till 80%
value addition. Naturally, there would be firms declaring more value addition than
80% or lesser value addition than -20% but extending analysis beyond these points
on either side is unlikely to impact any estimation significantly. Figure 2.4 shows
distribution of firms for different thresholds. By combining data of year 2009-2011,
I plot distribution for 12.5% threshold (Panel A). Similarly, by combining data for
years when threshold was same, I plot distribution for other two thresholds (Panels
B & C). Panel D shows a cumulative picture with different thresholds shown by red
lines. Plots for threshold periods are very similar to the yearly plots. These plots
show massive bunching compared to the bunching literature in income taxes. The
main reason for this high bunching are two. First, firms do not loose any real earn-
ings by reporting less sales instead they are evading taxes and adding to their profits.
Second, unlike registration thresholds where a firm may also gain by declaring its true
size and formalizing, these importing firms are already formal and are not producing
new products by employing labor. They have no similar incentive to declare sales
correctly.
The fact that firms almost seamlessly change their behavior in 2012 when threshold
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increases to 18.75% suggests that these bunching firms were coming from the right
side of bunch point because otherwise they would have no incentive to bunch at
higher tax liability point. Another important point is that when threshold changes
to 18.75%, firms shift to new point. It suggests that these firms are not showing
much friction in adjusting their response. It further strengthens the argument that
bunching is coming from right side of distribution. For example, if a firm had actual
value addition of 40% but was declaring only 12.5% value addition it was very easy
for this firm to show 18.75% value addition as the adjustment cost, however little it
may be, would go down as well.
2.4.2 Estimating Counterfactual Density
The next step is to estimate a counterfactual density. An inherent problem with this
setting is that there is no prior period available when this MVA threshold did not exist.
Had that been the case, I could take distribution of firms prior to the introduction
of kink and measure the changes. This threshold is general and applicable to all
firms dealing in any products as long as they are not manufacturers. Normally, there
would be a natural case for using manufacturers as the comparison group and use
their distribution as comparison. But manufacturers generally import raw materials
or intermediate goods and then further process them to sell a final product. Their
value additions are difficult to correlate with their imports. Many manufacturers use
locally procured inputs and they do not pay fixed and final income tax at import
stage. Also, locally procured inputs of manufacturers can be exempt goods as well as
taxable goods. It can confound value addition estimates for manufacturers. Therefore
manufacturers cannot be a good counterfactual in this particular case.
Another option is to assume a uniform distribution over a range of value addition.
The case for uniform distribution is supported by very flat and small mass outside a
reasonably wide bunching window centered on the bunch point. I can select bunching
windows based on graphical distribution. For example, in figure 2.3 for year 2009,
there is very little mass below zero and only a slightly thicker mass from zero to 5
percent. Similarly, on right side of bunch point after 35% bin there is very small mass
till 40% bin and then it starts becoming negligible. Years 2010 and 2011 are fairly
similar but from 2012 onward both left and right sides of distribution become thicker
and more gradual. This would make comparison across different years and threshold
periods difficult.
I, therefore, use the method developed by Chetty et al. (2011), to estimate a coun-
terfactual density. In figure 2.5 I plot histogram for all importing firms in Pakistan. I
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calculate value addition as difference between sales value and import value reported
in their returns. I divide it by import value to generate percentage value addition. I
divide firms in bins with each bin representing one percent. I then plot bin counts in
each bin to construct a histogram. Red vertical line shows the bin of threshold which
in year 2009 is 13% bin. The figure shows that there is a sharp spike around MVA
threshold. Now the underlying assumption of this analysis is that absent this MVA
threshold, distribution of firms by their value addition percentage would be smooth.
It implies that counterfactual distribution would be different from this histogram.
The excess bunching mass, b is proportional to evasion. But this bunching mass is
diffuse over a bunching window where the firms having value addition higher than
threshold are locating around threshold point to avoid higher VAT payments. To
measure this mass, I fit a polynomial to the points plotted in figure 2.5 by leaving









γ0i .1{Vj = i) + ε0j (2.7)
where Cj is the counter for number of firms in bin j, Vjis the percentage value addition
bin, m denotes the degree of fitted polynomial, −R corresponds to the width of
bunching window on left side of threshold and R shows the bunching window on right
side of bunch point. Chetty et al. (2011) describe the estimation procedure in detail.
I use the same code, therefore, estimation assumptions and calculations are identical
in this case. Only difference is that they estimate it over income bins whereas I am
estimating it over value addition bins. I estimate a value for parameter b, which
is the excess mass in terms of number of firms which locate around threshold kink
relative to counterfactual density of value addition distribution. I use a seventh degree
polynomial and a window of 12 bins centered on the bunch point. A value of b = 1
means that excess mass around kink is 100% of the average height of counterfactual
distribution within 6% (R=6) of the kink. I select 6% window because the reform
in 2012 shifted MVA threshold by 6% or 6 bins. This 6% window means that when
estimating b for second threshold period, there is no overlap for bins on the left
(right) with left (right) bins of previous threshold. Using the null hypothesis of b = 0,
I find that alternate is true in all cases discussed in this chapter at p-value of less
than 1%. The standard errors are calculated using bootstrap method with 200 or
more iterations. The estimation for all parameters and all estimates of counterfactual
shown in tables and figures converge within 10 iterations.
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2.4.3 Bunching Response by Year
A key feature of MVA reforms over time is that they were implemented at the start
of a financial year. It enables me to aggregate monthly and quarterly returns to get
yearly figures for sales and imports. Annual figures substantially reduce noise because
I can also see carry forward (brought forward) stocks for each year. Spillover from
previous year is recorded in first monthly return for next year. It means that spillover
amounts, if any, are very small compared to annual aggregates of imports and sales.
Another advantage for yearly aggregation is that I can see sales by quartiles and
deciles to see whether smaller importers behave differently from bigger importers.10
Figure 2.5 shows yearly estimates of bunching. Panels a, b & c for years 2009,2010
and 2011 plot bunching estimate for the period when threshold was 12.5%. Red
vertical line shows the bin of threshold. Bunching is very sharp with bunching mass b,
averaging around 18. It means the excess mass is 18 times the height of counterfactual
distribution. Number of firms bunching near kink is astonishingly high. Out of a
total of 5355 firms, 62% of firms are bunching near MVA threshold in year 2009. The
estimates for years 2010 and 2011 are also similar. Given the fact that threshold is
arbitrary and same across all products and countries of origin, it is unlikely to be
a real response or truthful declaration. Moreover, if the response is real then firms
should not shift to higher value addition when threshold changes. However, when
this MVA threshold changes to 18.75% in year 2012, firms start bunching at new
threshold point. Had the response been real and driven by market considerations
only, firms had no need to bunch at new threshold when this threshold is higher than
their actual value addition. On the other hand, firms facing reduced adjustment cost
in terms of possible lesser penalties and lesser misreporting related adjustments have
an incentive to declare closer to declare value addition closer to new threshold. New
MVA threshold is higher by 50% in year 2012 but number of firms bunching near
threshold is only 6-7% less than year 2011 (Panel d). A movement of bunch point
to 6.75% on right side has translated to roughly equivalent drop in percentage of
firms bunching near threshold. It implies that actual mass of firms on the left side of
previous bunching window was only approximately 7% (or 1% per bin).
Estimates of yearly bunching response are given in Table 2.1. Response of firms
is inelastic in terms of value addition and they bunch at MVA threshold as long as
threshold does not change but they quickly shift in almost perfectly elastic way to
new threshold. It also implies that frictions and adjustment costs are really low.
10Imports and sales can also be seasonal which would be problematic for division by quartiles and
deciles.
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Given this scenario, it is reasonable to predict that if this threshold is removed then
firms will declare little to no value addition. In extreme cases, they may start filing
for refund paid at import stage by claiming losses at sales stage. In such case, the
optimal strategy for revenue authority is to impose a backstop to disallow refunds.
In present case, FBR went a step ahead and imposed a minimum tax on these firms.
Absent, this MVA tax only 30-40% firms would have declared true value addition.
2.4.4 Bunching Behavior by Period
I also examine response of firms by particular threshold periods. Figure 2.6 plots
the distribution of firms in a particular threshold period. First period is from 2009-
2011, second from 2012-2013 and third is post 2013. Panel A shows that firms are
following their yearly behavior for a particular threshold period. In Table 2.1, value of
b are 16.92, 19.13 and 18.52 for years 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively. The results for
period wise response are tabulated at Table 2.2. Value of b for Period 1 is 18.26 which
is identical to the yearly average of 18.19 we get from Table 2.1. Similarly for Period 2
and Period 3, values of b are 14.13 and 11.82 from Table 2.2 and corresponding yearly
average calculated from Table 2.1 are 14.17 and 11.23. It shows that, over the course
of a period, the bunching response of firms is identical with little to no significant
deviation from their yearly response. There is a drop of roughly 6% when threshold
increase by 6.75%. It shows that there were only few firms whose actual value addition
was between two thresholds (12.5% and 18.75%). It implies that only 6% of the firms
in previous bunching window were declaring their actual value addition. It leaves me
with 55.5% of firms who were bunching near the kink on 12.5% MVA threshold but
have now shifted to new threshold. This response can only be attributed to evasion on
account of lesser value addition. These results provide strong support and evidence
that firms are shifting away from one value addition to another costlessly although
they are 50% apart in terms of value added. The numbers of firms bunching near kink
is 50% on average across three periods. However, there are some minor yet important
deviations in Period 3.
In Period 3, threshold shifts slightly from 18.75% to 17.65% or one bin towards
left in bunching estimation figures. Number of firms bunching near kink drops by
5% from Period 2 and bunching becomes more diffuse. Although, these numbers are
very small and do not impact the findings stated above, but I need to point a few
things to alleviate any concern about this minor drop. The response is driven by
more diffused bunching rather than the number of firms bunching below or only a
bin above. This change in threshold was only 1 bin movement to the left and it was
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on account of change in standard tax rate. It is expected that few firms may not
be aware of this change because it was not a result of direct amendment in special
rules governing these importers. Another factor that might be playing a role here is
introduction of 1% further tax on supplies made to unregistered informal buyers in
2014. This additional turnover tax increases adjustment cost for bunching below or
around threshold in two ways. First, importer now needs to collect an extra 1% from
unregistered buyer, keep track of that amount and deposit it with monthly returns.
Second, all else being equal, there is a comparative advantage in selling goods to
registered buyer compared to unregistered buyer.
My initial assumption is that there is no significant differences across deciles and
quartiles among bunching and non-bunching firms. If bunching behavior is different,
then I would need to calculate an average value of sales for bunching and non-bunching
firms. I would also need an assumption regarding the actual value addition of a
bunching firm. For example, I do not know what is the exact location towards right
of bunch point for a particular firm. In income tax bunching, the bunching individual
is not very far from bunch point and a mid point assumption is sufficient. The same
logic does not work here for two reasons. First, a firm much farther away from
bunch point can bunch below threshold. Counterfactual density in all plots does
not follow actual distribution till 30 to 40 bins towards right of bunch point. In
that case, it would be problematic to assume that an average buncher has actual
value addition of say 40% or 50% because the incentive to bunch is increasing with
more value addition. In Income tax schedule, economic incentive to bunch around
threshold decreases as the taxpayer’s income increases beyond bunch point. In this
case, reverse is true. Greater the value addition of a firm, more incentive they have
to bunch below threshold because bunching is nearly costless. Second, income in
itself defines incentive in an income tax scenario. However, I need sales along with
assumption on value addition to arrive at volume of evasion. Sales volume and value
addition are correlated in a way. Normally, businesses with high turnover or sales can
sustain on lower value addition compared to those with smaller sales volumes because
of lower average fixed costs. Additionally, value addition changes considerably from
nature of product and industry. Finished products can be sold at much higher value
addition factor compared to raw materials. I do not have data to see what were the
goods actually imported. Therefore, I check heterogeneity based on quartiles to spot
any significant differences.
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2.4.5 Heterogeneity by Volume of Sales
I analyze response by quartiles to determine heterogeneity on account of sales volume.
I construct quartiles and deciles based on yearly sales volume and then group these
yearly quartiles and deciles by period to calculate bunching estimates. I do not show
results for deciles in plots because they are very similar to their quartile without
much variation within quartile. Therefore, I restrict my analysis to quartiles only.
Key point for this analysis is whether firms with larger sales volume are bunching
more precisely or not. Larger firms face less average fixed cost and that can inflate
bunching. On the other hand, larger firms face more cost in terms of double book
keeping such as more transactions through banking channels.
Figure 2.3 plots response by quartile for third period. Response for first two
periods are described in Figure B.1.1 and Figure B.1.2. Firms in first and second
quartile are bunching very precisely. There is very high mass around bunch point
in these quartiles. In third and fourth quartile, bunching is more diffused around
threshold with heavy left and right tails. However, total number of firms bunching
on left of bunch point is similar. It translates to lesser value of b as we go to higher
quartiles. But if number of firms who are bunching below threshold does not change,
it implies that effect on actual evasion is insignificant. Table 2.3 shows results for
third period. Bunching mass b at 20.4 is very high for first quartile and it decreases
to only 5.4 for fourth quartile. However, percentage of firms bunching near bunch
point is 39% in fourth quartile compared to 56% for first quartile. Higher volume
of sales makes precise bunching more difficult but it does not appreciably change
behavior in terms of actual evasion as the firms are now less precise but still bunching
below threshold.
2.4.6 Elasticity of VAT at Post-import stage
The similarities between bunching window and quartile wise response in first two
periods allow me to calculate elasticity of tax collection with respect to changes in
tax rate. Change in tax collection in VAT is given by product of (change in number
of firms bunching)*(change in width of bunching window of value addition variable)*
(average sales) * (tax rate). Figure 2.6 shows that width of bunching window above
threshold is same across two periods. Similarly, quartile wise response of first two
periods is also identical which implies that average sales of firms in question do not
change. Because tax rate is also same in these two periods, therefore, percentage
change in number of firms bunching gives the percentage change in tax remitted.
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Percentage change in tax rate is given by the percentage difference of minimum tax
rate. Therefore, elasticity of tax remitted can be calculate using firms bunching near
kink from Table 2.2. The value of elasticity comes to 0.22. Changing threshold by
one percent increases tax collection by only 0.22% instead of at least 1% that should
be expected absent any evasion. Absent a minimum tax, 78% of the tax would be
evaded and only 22% deposited into treasury.
2.4.7 Robustness of Results
I check the behavior by deciles to check whether the results in top and bottom quartiles
are driven by very small or very large entities but do not find any significant deviation.
I also check whether this behavior is driven by geographic proximity but that also
does not exist. The response is not highly concerted at a particular tax office or
region.
2.5 Conclusion
My results indicate that importing firms are evading VAT and volume of this evasion is
approximately 78% with on average 50% of firms bunching at MVA kinks. It means
that if MVA threshold is not applied, government would loose significant revenue.
This behavior is largely consistent across quartiles by sales volume. The response
might be a deviation from economic neutrality concept of VAT but it is revenue
efficient. Increasing threshold by 50% automatically increases revenue by 50% but
it does not impact many higher value addition type firms adversely as only 6% of
firms were actually bearing increased cost of deviation from this economic neutrality.
The increased revenue is coming from truthful firms who are now burdened with extra
payments. My results provide evidence of significant evasion on account of supplies to
informal sector. VAT, in such case, is no longer a double edged sword which rewards
registered firms and penalizes unregistered sector. Absent any MVA, importers would
under-declare value of supplies to informal sector and pocket the burden intended to
be passed on informal sector as profit.
My evidence strengthens the argument of Emran and Stiglitz (2005) that replacing
high tariffs with VAT would decrease welfare. It does not find support for counter
argument advanced by Keen (2008). In tax literature, there are not many studies
who look exclusively at imports in VAT setting. This essay contributes to literature
on taxation at import stage and its downstream consequences. Owing to limitations
of my data which does not include product specific imports, I am unable to examine
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commodity wise behavior which may shed more light on behavior of importing firms.
Also, I have assumed assessed customs value as reference point. If these import
values of firms were higher and they declared less at time of customs clearance then
my results are underestimating evasion. However, if these import values were actually
lower and customs assessed them higher than transaction value, then my results are
overestimating evasion. Because studies and reports on Pakistan’s imports show
considerable aggregate less declaration at import compared to export value reported
at port of shipment, it is reasonable to assume that commercial importers are declaring
less than their actual transaction value. Therefore, in present case, my estimates of
evasion are likely to be less than actual evasion.
MVA threshold is an optimal choice for revenue administration to suppress evasion
through large informal sectors. Deviation from economic neutrality is small compared
to higher benefit through increased revenues. The firms do not gain any advantage for
income tax purposes because they have already paid full and final liability at import
stage. The response is, therefore, wholly attributable to VAT evasion. This chapter
also shows that there is an increased need to study response to import stage VAT in
developing countries casts doubt on the idea that VAT would self regulate evasion in
low income countries.
Copyright © Syed Jawad Ali Shah 2021
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Financial Year
Change in Threshold Over Years
Explanation: This figure plots changes in Minimum Value Ad-
dition threshold for importers. In 2012, threshold jumped from
12.5% to 18.75%, a 50% increase, and also changed slightly from
18.75% to 17.65% in 2014. These changes in threshold provide
the basis for studying bunching behavior of the firms.
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Figure 2.2: Bunching Incentive at MVA Threshold Kink




















    Vm 
Slope = 1- τ 
Vm + dV 
Declared Value Addition 
Explanation: 2(a) The figure shows bunching incentive at MVA
kink. For every firm the tax rate before and after is same when
there is no MVA requirement. But MVA makes pre-kink tax
liability a flat tax (given by green dashed line) which the firms
have to pay whether or not there actual tax liability is higher.
This creates an incentive to bunch at or below this kink because
this would reduce the tax liability thus increasing profit net-of-
tax. The firms which have value additions in excess of MVA,
shown above by Vm + dV , would have an incentive to bunch at
or below the threshold Vm.
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d. Bunching Evidence for Year 2012 h. Bunching Evidence for Year 2016
Explanation: This figure shows bunching evidence at or around MVA threshold over eight
years. Horizontal axes show value addition percentage which is calculated using gross sales
and imports in a year for each importing firm. Each bin on this axis has a width of 2 percent
such that, for example, any firm showing value addition equal to or greater than 4% but less
than 6 percent would be counted in that bin. Vertical axes show number of firms in the bins.
Red vertical lines show MVA threshold for a particular year. In 2012 threshold was increased
from 12.5% to 18.75% (representing a 50% increase). The firms were consistently bunching
around 12.5% threshold (shown by vertical red line) for years 2009-2011 but when threshold
increases to 18.75% in 2012, they immediately start bunching around new threshold. In 2014,
there was a very small shift from 18.75% to 17.65% but firms respond to this minimal change
very aggressively by shifting to the lower bin corresponding to new threshold. It also suggests
that adjustment costs are very low and firms do respond to very small benefits.
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c. Bunching at Slightly Shifted Threshold d. Cumulative Bunching at Different Thresholds
Explanation: This figure plots histograms showing bunching at different
thresholds. Horizontal axes show value addition percentage which is calcu-
lated using gross sales and imports in a year for each importing firm. Each
bin on this axis has a width of 2 percent such that, for example, any firm
showing value addition equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6 percent
would be counted in that bin. Vertical axes show number of firms in the
bins. Red vertical lines show MVA threshold for a particular year.Panel
(a) shows cumulative bunching histogram for the initial threshold of 12.5%
for years 2009-2011. Panel (b) shows a cumulative bunching histograms for
years 2012-2013 when bunching threshold changed to 18.75%. Similarly,
Panel (c) plots a combined histogram for years 2014-2016 when threshold
changed slightly downwards to 17.65%. Panel (d) shows firm responses for
all eight years with vertical red lines showing three different thresholds over
time.
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d. Bunching Evidence for Year 2012 h. Bunching Evidence for Year 2016
Explanation: This figure shows bunching evidence at or around MVA threshold over eight
years. Horizontal axes show value addition percentage which is calculated using gross sales
and imports in a year for each importing firm. Each bin on this axis has a width of 1 percent
such that, for example, any firm showing value addition equal to or greater than 4% but less
than 5% percent would be counted in that bin. Vertical axes show number of firms in the bins.
Red vertical lines show MVA threshold for a particular year. In 2012 threshold was increased
from 12.5% to 18.75% (representing a 50% increase). The firms were consistently bunching
around 12.5% threshold (shown by vertical red line) for years 2009-2011 but when threshold
increases to 18.75% in 2012, they immediately start bunching around new threshold. In 2014,
there was a very small shift from 18.75% to 17.65% but firms respond to this minimal change
very aggressively by shifting to the lower bin corresponding to new threshold. It also suggests
that adjustment costs are very low and firms do respond to very small benefits. The results
for this are shown in Table . The bunching mass within a period when threshold is similar
across years. Figure 2.6 shows bunching estimates period wise.
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c. Bunching at Slightly Shifted Threshold
Explanation: This figure plots number of firms along with its counter-
factual distribution, showing bunching at different thresholds. Horizontal
axes show value addition percentage which is calculated using gross sales
and imports in a year for each importing firm. Each bin on this axis has a
width of 1 percent such that, for example, any firm showing value addition
equal to or greater than 4% but less than 5% would be counted in that
bin. Vertical axes show number of firms in the bins. Red vertical lines
show MVA threshold for a particular year. Panel (a) shows cumulative
bunching for the initial threshold of 12.5% for years 2009-2011. Panel (b)
shows a cumulative bunching histograms for years 2012-2013 when bunch-
ing threshold changed to 18.75%. Similarly, Panel (c) plots a combined
histogram for years 2014-2016 when threshold changed slightly downwards
to 17.65%. Panel (d) shows firm responses for all eight years with vertical
red lines showing three different thresholds over time.
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c. Third Quartile d. Fourth Quartile
Explanation: This figure plots number of firms along with its counter-
factual distribution, showing bunching for different quartiles during third
period. Horizontal axes show value addition percentage which is calculated
using gross sales and imports in a year for each importing firm. Each bin
on this axis has a width of 1 percent such that, for example, any firm show-
ing value addition equal to or greater than 4% but less than 5% would be
counted in that bin. Vertical axes show number of firms in the bins. Red
vertical lines show MVA threshold for a particular year. The tails on left
and right of bunching window are relatively thick for fourth quartile sug-
gesting that these firms possibly face more adjustment costs. The results
are presented at Table 2.3. For response in first and second period, see
figures B.1.1 and B.1.2.
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Table 2.1: Bunching Response by Year
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total Firms 5355 5727 5987 8230 7986 6306 7171 7153
Firms near Bunch Point 3323 3497 3648 4546 4298 2973 3358 3153
Percentage of firms bunching 62.05 61.06 60.93 55.24 53.82 47.15 46.83 44.08
Excess Bunching Mass, b 16.92*** 19.13*** 18.52*** 13.34*** 14.99*** 11.37*** 11.4*** 10.92***
(2.60) (2.42) (2.63) (1.17) (1.56) (1.00) (1.11) (0.78)
Firms Bunching at Kink 2041 2189 1964 2099 2249 1373 1606 1081
Concentration 1.16 1.12 0.97 0.98 1.05 1.07 1.11 0.81
Notes: Table displays the results for bunching response by each year. Total firms is the
aggregate number of firms plotted bin-wise. Firms near bunch point is number of firms
within 6 bins on left side of MVA threshold. b represents the excess mass over and above the
counterfactual distributions shown in figure 2.5. All values for b are statistically significant
at p-value < 0.01. Bunching mass and percentage of firms bunching within 6% of bunching
decline when threshold increases in 2012.
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Table 2.2: Bunching Response by Threshold Period
Threshold Period First Second Third
Total Firms 17069 16216 24389
Firms near Bunch Point 10468 8844 10944
Percentage of firms bunching 61.33 54.54 44.87
Excess Bunching Mass, b 18.26*** 14.13*** 11.82***
(1.60) (1.07) (0.68)
Firms Bunching at Kink 6197 4348 4282
Concentration 1.08 1.01 0.89
Notes: Table displays the results for bunching response by each year. Total firms is the
aggregate number of firms plotted bin-wise. Period estimate is calculated by aggregating
firms falling in a certain bin by year over the period when threshold is same. Firms near
bunch point is number of firms within 6 bins on left side of MVA threshold. b represents the
excess mass over and above the counterfactual distributions shown in figure 2.6. All values
for b are statistically significant at p-value < 0.01. Bunching mass and percentage of firms
bunching within 6% of bunching decline when threshold increases in 2012.
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Table 2.3: Bunching Response by Quartile for 3rd Period
Period 3 Q-1 Q-2 Q-3 Q-4
Total Firms 5172 5159 5149 5150
Firms near Bunch Point 2901 2437 2153 1993
Percentage of firms bunching 56.09 47.24 41.81 38.7
Excess Bunching Mass, b 20.41*** 13.85*** 7.926*** 5.378***
(3.55) (1.35) (0.69) (0.47)
Notes: Table displays the results for bunching response by each year. Total firms is the
aggregate number of firms plotted bin-wise. Period estimate is calculated by aggregating
firms falling in a certain bin by year over the period when threshold is same. Quartiles are
constructed on yearly basis, meaning that firms in one quartile for year 2014 could be in
some other quartile depending on their sales volume for that particular year. Firms near
bunch point is number of firms within 6 bins on left side of MVA threshold. b represents the
excess mass over and above the counterfactual distributions shown in figure 2.7. All values
for b are statistically significant at p-value < 0.01. Bunching mass and percentage of firms
bunching within 6% of bunching decline when threshold increases in 2012.
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Chapter 3
The Deterrence Value of Tax Audit: Estimates from a Random-
ized Audit Program
3.1 Introduction
1Modern tax system are based on the principle of self-assessment. Taxpayers as-
sess their tax liability without interference from the revenue authority and report it
through the tax return. The returns are considered final unless they are selected for
audit. Typically, audit is the only point of contact between a taxpayer and the revenue
authority and therefore the sole instrument through which the authority can punish
noncompliance and create deterrence. How effectively audit does this is critical to
how much revenue a country collects. (Sarin and Summers 2019) estimate that in the
US around $1 trillion of additional revenue can be generated by improving IRS’s audit
capacity. Notwithstanding its importance to tax collection, audit has received little
attention from public finance researchers. Importantly, we still do not understand
fully how effective audits are in uncovering tax evasion and preventing it in future.
The central difficulty in identifying audit’s role in the tax evasion decision of
a taxpayer is its endogeneity. Modern tax administrations use sophisticated, risk-
based algorithms to target audits toward more egregious tax evaders. While such
targeting helps the authority deploy its scarce audit resources optimally, it prevents
researchers from estimating audit impacts cleanly. In this paper, we overcome this
central identification challenge by exploiting a national program of randomized audits
from Pakistan. The program covers the entire population of tax filers in the country,
and we have access to three waves of such randomized audits, leveraging which we
estimate tax evasion at the baseline and audit’s role in preventing it in future.
The randomized audit program began in 2013. Before that Pakistan’s revenue
authority (FBR) used to pick cases for audit using parametric, risk-based criteria.
1This chapter is prepared in collaboration with Michael Best, Email Addresses: Michael Best
mcb2270@columbia.edu; and Mazhar Waseem mazhar.waseem@manchester.ac.uk.
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This practice, however, was challenged before the superior courts of the country in-
ter alia on the grounds that the criteria were confidential and likely discriminatory
against some taxpayers. While these challenges were pending, the FBR could not use
parametric selection and was constrained to pick audit cases using random computer
ballots. It is important to emphasize that randomized audits in our setting are not a
subset of audits but for three consecutive years the entire audit program of the coun-
try was randomized. We focus on VAT audits conducted under the program. The
VAT return is filed every month. The high-frequency VAT data allow us to identify
both immediate and distant impacts of audit on behavior cleanly.
In the standard tax compliance model, a taxpayer reports it tax liability to the
government trading off the benefit and cost of tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo
1972). The cost of evasion here is that with some probability the government would
discover evasion and would recover the evaded amount along with a penalty. The
probability this event occurs with is a composite term comprising the probability of
audit and the probability of detection conditional on audit. In general, these two
probabilities are unknown to taxpayers, although they may have formed beliefs on
these based on their past interactions with the government. In our setting, the first of
these probabilities is public knowledge. Before each random ballot, the FBR informed
taxpayers the fraction of population to be picked for audit. The program thus creates
a clean experiment whereby only the latter component of detection probability is
manipulated: a random sample of firms are exposed to audit; they learn its ability to
uncover evasion and update their priors accordingly. Based on the direction of such
updating, they may start paying less or more revenue.
Random audits are commonly used to estimate the extent and anatomy of tax
evasion in the economy. Our aim in this paper extends beyond that. We are also
interested to see if audit changes the perceived likelihood of detection, thereby causing
a permanent change in behavior. We do so using a long panel of administrative
tax records spanning 120 months (July 2008 – June 2018), comprising the entire
population of tax filers and covering both audit findings and tax returns.
We first document the results of audit. Of the 3,482 firms audited in the first wave,
a positive unpaid amount was found against 986 (28.3%). In terms of volume, the
unpaid amount roughly equals 8% of the aggregate baseline tax liability of all audited
firms. For a developing country like Pakistan the evasion rate of 8% does not seem too
high but its distribution is extremely unequal. The evasion rate is only around 6% for
large firms (top 25%) but more than 100% for the rest. A related finding is that the
former group contributes more than 99% of the revenue remitted by audited firms at
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the baseline. In combination, we therefore find an extreme right-skewed distribution
of tax payment and a bimodal distribution of tax evasion. There roughly are two
types of firms: evaders who contribute little to revenue and nonevaders who evade
little and contribute roughly the entire revenue collected in the country. We obtain
similar results from later audit waves.
We next look at the effects of audit on firm behavior. We have access to multiple
waves of randomized audits, and our rich dataset lets us examine both proximate and
distant impacts on a variety of firm outcomes. None of these impacts, however, is
significantly different from zero. We examine ten intensive margin outcomes, including
reported sales, costs, and revenue and one extensive margin outcome but find no effect
for any of the audit waves and at any post-audit tenure. Audit seems to have no effect
on firm behavior. Nor is there any heterogeneity in this result. We use two non-
parametric approaches to explore heterogeneity: (1) the standard approach of adding
the treatment and firm characteristic interactions into the model, and (2) the more
flexible, machine-learning based approach developed in Athey, Tibshirani, and Wager
(2019) using Generalized Random Forests. We divide firms on the basis of more than
ten characteristics measured at the baseline including size, age, industry, location,
and position in the supply chain, but find null effect in almost every subgroup we
look at. Nor do we find any variation in results if we divide the sample on the basis
of audit outcomes, comparing firms audit found positive liabilities against with the
others or firms audited earlier with those audited later.
Pakistan’s revenue authority could not audit all firms picked through random
ballots. In addition, a few firms were audited by local tax offices on their own. To
account for these violations of the experimental protocol, we also estimate the LATE
parameters using initial random assignment as instrument. When the treatment
effect is heterogeneous and there is selection into treatment on the unobserved gain,
the LATE is informative only about the average effect on compliers (Imbens and
Angrist 1994). To show our estimates apply to a much wider population, we use the
marginal treat effects (MTEs) framework (James J. Heckman and E. Vytlacil 2005;
James J. Heckman and Edward J. Vytlacil 2007), identifying a linear version of the
model (Brinch, Mogstad, and Wiswall 2017; Kowalski 2016). The MTE functions we
estimate are flat, showing that treatment heterogeneity and selection on unobserved
gains are not important in our setting so that our LATE estimates have global external
validity.
That audit produces no behavioral response means it does not reveal any new
information to firms. Audit is a rare event. Only around 5% of firms in Pakistan
76
undergo audit in a given year, meaning a typical firm experiences it once every twenty
years. It is therefore surprising that audit does not register any change in firm priors
in either directions. Reading this result together with the baseline distribution of tax
evasion we uncover, we propose a simple explanation. Given the peculiar nature of
VAT, the cost of hiding a transaction varies a lot depending on who the other party
to the transaction is. If the other party is (1) a consumer, or (2) an unregistered
firm, or (3) a firm willing to collude, the cost is typically low as such transactions do
not produce third-party information. The cost of hiding a transaction, on the other
hand, is typically high if the other party is an uncooperative firm. This results in
an S-shaped detection probability function first suggested by Henrik J. Kleven et al.
(2011) and later confirmed in other setting including the Pakistan’s (Waseem 2019).
In this world, the easy-to-detect component of the tax base is reported and the hard-
to-detect component is not. Audit would change firm priors only if it goes after the
latter component. Our personal interviews with auditors suggest it is usually not
the case. During an audit, auditors go through returns filed by a firm line by line,
verifying if each line adheres to the tax code. They, for example, see that the correct
tax rate has been applied, no inadmissible input tax has been claimed, no unlawful
exemption has been availed, and the tax liability has been correctly calculated. While
these activities are important and are likely to result in additional revenue, they are
unlikely to move firm priors on the detection probability outward.
In the existing literature, no consensus exists on the sign or magnitude of the de-
terrence value of audit. Earlier contributions to this line of literature are lab studies
some of which do find a positive effect (see Kirchler (2007) for a survey). But in others
tax evasion increases after audit (for example (Maciejovsky, Kirchler, and Schwarzen-
berger 2007)). This occurs either because audit forces a downward revision of the
perceived detection probability or because taxpayers irrationally believe current au-
dit makes them less likely to face future audit, a phenomenon known as the gambler’s
fallacy (Gilovich 1983) or the bomb crater effect (Mittone 2006). Another strand
of this literature manipulates one or both components of the detection probability,
sending deterrence messages to a random sample of taxpayers. To maximize power,
these studies usually target more noncompliant sections of the population and their
results are thus not directly comparable to ours. In a recent meta analysis covering 45
such studies, done largely in rich economies, Antinyan and Asatryan (2019) find that
on average the effects of such interventions are modest, increasing the probability of
compliance by only 1.5-2.5 percentage points.
Another set of studies exploit random audits to estimate their effects on future
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behavior. Examples include Gemmell and Ratto (2012), DeBacker et al. (2015),
DeBacker et al. (2018), and Advani, Elming, and Shaw (2019). Of these, the latter
two, based in the US and the UK, find significant dynamic effects of audit: the audited
taxpayers continue to pay more in years after the audit. In contrast, the former two,
looking at the UK taxpayers and US corporations, report a null effect. Random audits
are in general not an optimal way to allocate resources by the tax authority and these
audits therefore are usually a small subset of audits done in a year. This is not the
case in our setting. Our sample frame is the universe of VAT filers and our randomized
sample includes all audits done in a year. Our results therefore apply to a typical firm
in the VAT net with the audit done under conditions (managerial oversight, intensity
of audit, political economy, etc.) a typical audit would be done under. The scale
of the intervention also means our estimates are robust to external validity concerns
randomized studies face commonly, arising for example from ignoring the general
equilibrium effects (Muralidharan and Niehaus 2017; Deaton and Cartwright 2018).
Tax evasion has received renewed research interest in recent years. This revival
is driven by the strong link between the economic development and fiscal capacity
of a state (Besley and Persson 2013). In part, it is also driven by the economist-as-
plumber approach emphasized recently by Duflo (2017), which requires researchers
to be mindful of how economic policies work in the real world. One important con-
tribution of the paper is to use randomized audits to uncover the contours of tax
evasion in a representative emerging economy. In this effort, the paper is similar to
Henrik J. Kleven et al. (2011), Waseem (2019), and Waseem (2020b) who do so in
other contexts. We find substantial evasion with an extremely skewed distribution.
This reinforces the point in Best et al. (2015) that both economic theory and public
policy must take into account enforcement constraints developing countries face more
seriously than is the case now.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
This paper has two broad aims. We first use the results of randomized audits to doc-
ument the extent and distribution of tax evasion at the baseline. We then examine
how audit in period t affects the behavior of audited firms, in particular their tax
evasion choices, in future periods. In this section, we outline a simple model that
links audit to behavior, highlighting the channel through it may deter future non-
compliance. The framework is based on a version of the canonical tax compliance
model (Allingham and Sandmo 1972) presented in Henrik J. Kleven et al. (2011).
78
3.2.1 Firm Behavior to Taxation
Consider a firm that uses taxable inputs valuing c(s) and nontaxable inputs valuing
ψ(s) to produce an amount s of output. The firm is subject to the standard VAT
whereby it charges tax at the rate τ of its sales and adjusts tax paid on inputs, facing
a tax liability of T (τ) = τ (s− c). We assume that the enforcement is imperfect so
that the firm can underreport sales ŝ < s and overreport input costs ĉ > c, evading
an amount e of its tax liability e = T̂ − T , where T̂ = τ (ŝ− ĉ).
The government runs an audit program to detect tax evasion, imposing a propor-
tional penalty at the rate θ of the evaded tax liability. The probability the government
detects evasion with is p(e) with p′(e) > 0 and p′′(e) > 0. The firm does not know this
true detection probability and its belief on the probability is denoted by p̃(e). Based
on this belief and other parameters of the tax system, the risk-neutral firm decides
how much tax to evade solving the following program
max
e
p̃(e).πA + (1− p̃(e)).πNA. (3.1)
Here πA = s− c(s)−ψ(s)− θτe and πNA = s− c(s)−ψ(s) + τe denote the after-tax
profits of the firm in the detected and undetected states. The FOC of the problem
[p̃(e) + e.p̃′(e)] (1 + θ) = 1 (3.2)
implicitly defines the mapping between the perceived detection probability and eva-
sion choice e (p̃, θ). The comparative statics of the problem with respect to p̃(e) are
unambiguous: the evaded amount decreases as the perceived detection probability
increases e(p̃′, θ) < e(p̃, θ) for ∀p̃′ > p̃.2
3.2.2 Audit and Belief Updating
Audit is a rare event. We show later that in a typical year the government audits only
around five percent of the population, a rate at which a typical firm will experience
audit once every twenty years. Audit thus represents a rare opportunity for the firm
to learn the efficacy of government’s detection technology, update its beliefs on it, and
tailor its future behavior in accordance with the revised incentives. To see how this
process works, assume that the firm’s prior belief on the detection probability is a
draw from the normal distribution with mean p̃t and variance σ
2
p̃t . The firm undergoes
2See, for example, (Henrik J. Kleven et al. 2011).
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audit at time t, receiving a noisy signal xt of the real detection probability
xt = pt + εt. (3.3)
For simplicity, we assume that εt is also a normal process with εt ∼ N (0, σ2εt). When
both the prior and signal are Gaussian, the posterior belief is also Gaussian with
mean
p̃t+1 = α.xt + (1− α)p̃t, (3.4)







. The mean posterior belief is a weighted average










Intuitively, the weight α ∈ [0, 1] depends on the noise to signal ratio with a more
precise signal receiving a higher weight. In the extreme case, when the precision of
the signal approaches infinity (σ2ε → 0), its weight tends to one and prior beliefs play
no role in the formation of posterior. This simple learning model provides intuitive
formulation to two conditions under which audit leads to a significant revision of firm
priors on the detection probability.
Condition 1. The distribution of prior beliefs is not degenerate σ2p̃t 6= 0.
Condition 2. The signal contains some useful information σ2εt <∞.
The first of these condition requires that the firm does not know beforehand the
detection probability with certainty. As long as there is some randomness to the audit
process, this condition must be satisfied trivially. The second condition requires that
the firm gleans some new, credible information from audit. Given that audit is such
a rare and intrusive process (see details in the following section), this condition must
also hold. To the extent that these conditions are satisfied, they lead to the following
result.
Result. If conditions 1 and 2 hold, audit causes a revision in firm beliefs on the
detection probability p̃t+1 6= p̃t.
The revision of beliefs will in turn reflect in the firm’s future behavior via the mapping
e (p̃, θ). For example, in case of upward revision p̃t+1 > p̃t, tax evasion will go down
e (p̃t+1, θ) < e (p̃t, θ) and the firm will remit more tax. To quantify the direction and
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magnitude of these movements, we define the deterrence value of audit (DV ) as the
proportional change in tax evasion caused by a marginal audit
DV =
e(p̃t+1, θ)− e(p̃t, θ)
e(p̃t, θ)
. (3.6)
We call it the deterrence value because any revision of firm beliefs will impact its
behavior not only in the next period but all future periods. In our empirical applica-
tion, we use the variation created by the randomized audit program to estimate this
deterrence value directly from the data.
Note that the functional form of the learning model we use above plays little role
in our key result, although the Gaussian case simplifies the exposition considerably.
Importantly, the result will hold in a general setting with p̃t+1 = f(p̃t, xt) as long as
the intuitive and trivial Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Nor is it necessary for our
result to hold that the firm must be a rational Bayesian learner. Biased learning due
either to mechanical failures of inference (bounded rationality, limited attention, etc.)
or to motivated thinking and cognitive tendencies of owners and managers would only
mean that the updating may exceed or fall short of the rational benchmark (Bénabou
and Tirole 2016). In either case, it would reflect in the firm’s future behavior.
Heterogeneity. Our analysis so far is from the standpoint of a single firm. Our data,
however, contain many firms which may be heterogeneous in terms of their prior beliefs
as well as in how they acquire and process information and how this information maps
on to their future behavior. Given that audits are randomly assigned in our sample,
our empirical results capture an unbiased estimate of the average deterrence effect
of audit. We, however, run multiple subgroup analyses to uncover any heterogeneity
along these dimensions.
3.2.3 Audit Rate and Detection Probability
A common simplification in the tax compliance literature is to model the detection
probability p̃(e) in a reduced form way. But it is important to emphasize that this
probability is a composite term comprising the audit rate (the probability that a given
firm will be picked for audit) and the detection probability conditional on audit (the
probability that the firm’s evasion will be uncovered by audit). Denoting these two
terms by p̃a(e) and p̃d(e), the detection probability p̃(e) featuring in the behavioral
rule (3.2) can be written as
p̃(e) ≡ p̃a(e) . p̃d(e). (3.7)
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This distinction is particularly important in our setup. Pakistan’s revenue authority,
before each wave of audits, explicitly announced the fraction of the population it
intended to audit. With this announcement, the perceived audit rate in the population
must converge toward its true value E [p̃a(e)]→ pa(e). The second component of the
detection probability, however, remains unknown and only firms that undergo audit
learn it from their interaction with auditors.
Of the two components of the detection probability, the existing empirical litera-
ture primarily focuses on the first. Many studies manipulate the firm’s real or per-
ceived likelihood of facing an audit through randomized interventions and examine
its effects on future tax payments (see for example (Bérgolo et al. 2017) or (Slemrod
2019) for a survey). In our setup, however, all firms know the audit likelihood pa(e),
but only a random subsample learn how likely the audit is to detect their tax evasion
pd(e). This learning as we describe above would lead to updating of their priors,
shaping the trajectory of their future tax payments.
3.3 Institutional Background
In this section, we document institutional features of the Pakistani environment that
are important for our empirical analysis.
3.3.1 Randomized Audit Program
Like all tax authorities, the FBR conducts the audit of a fraction of taxpayers each
year. Before 2010, the selection for audit used to take place at the local level with each
regional tax office picking taxpayers from their jurisdiction for audit. In 2010, the
FBR centralized this process, giving it the power to pick audits for all regional offices
using a computer ballot, which could be either random or risk-based (parametric).
Exercising these new powers, the FBR picked the first batch of audits using parametric
criteria in 2012. The selection, however, was challenged before the superior courts
mainly on the grounds that the selection criteria, which were confidential, could be
discriminatory against some taxpayers. While these challenges were pending, the FBR
could not pick audits using parametric criteria. The legal challenge was not resolved
till the end of 2015, and during the intervening period the FBR was constrained to
pick audits using random computer ballots. Importantly, random audits in our setting
are not a small subsample of total audits, but for three consecutive years (2013–2015)
the entire audit program of the country was randomized.
Before each random ballot, the FBR issued an audit policy that set out the pro-
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portion to be audited and the criteria for exclusion from the draw. The first infor-
mation, as we note above, anchors firms’ expectations on the true audit probability
E [p̃a(e)] → pa(e). The exclusions were fairly minor in the first two draws, which
only excluded government departments and taxpayers already under audit. But the
third draw also excluded firms under fixed and withholding type regimes of VAT. The
required number of cases were picked randomly from the eligible sample (population
minus exclusions) after stratifying it by business organization (corporate vs. noncor-
porate).3 The ballots were held in public in the presence of taxpayer representatives,
and the list of drawn cases was put on the FBR portal. The whole process was
anonymous and in case was any personal information such as the name or address
was revealed.4
The drawn cases were promptly communicated to local tax offices for initiating
audits. Although these audits were conducted by the local offices, the FBR maintained
central oversight through the newly developed Taxpayers’ Audit Monitoring System
(TAMS).5 In addition to the centrally assigned audits, local tax offices could initiate
audits on their own. But they could do so only in exceptional circumstances, such as
when they received specific information on tax evasion, and only after informing the
taxpayer in writing the grounds for doing so.
Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics of the five audit waves in our sample. For
our empirical analysis we use the first three only, where audit was assigned through
the random ballot. The fraction of population picked (pa) varied across audit waves,
ranging between 5% and 12%. The FBR did not have the capacity to take up audits
of all selected cases, and the actual audit rate in all years remained below 100% (70%
for the first wave and significantly lower in the later). As we not above, local tax
offices initiated a small number of audits on their own. These audits are listed in
the last column of the table. Our empirical framework takes into account these two
violations of the experimental protocol namely that the audit rate remained below
100% and that some audits not assigned through random ballots were conducted.
Table 3.2 shows audits were initiated soon after assignment. For example, almost
65% of those assigned through the first ballot were initiated within one month of the
draw. This ratio was even higher for the later waves. Significant underpayment was
3Please see FBR (2015) for details of the randomization procedure, including the set of exclusions.
4Both audit policies and lists of drawn cases are public information and have been available on
the FBR portal for view and download.
5TAMS was the new audit portal of the FBR. All processes related to audit, including all com-
munications to taxpayers, were to be handled through it. This meant the FBR could monitor the
progress of audits, compare it across regional offices, and take action in case of delinquency.
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detected by audits. The distribution of the detected amount, however, is strongly
skewed rightward, and the median detection in all three waves is zero. We present a
more detailed analysis of the audit findings in section 3.5 of the paper.
3.3.2 Pakistani VAT System
Pakistani VAT largely follows the standard design. Firms charge VAT on their sales
(output tax) and adjust the VAT paid on inputs (input tax). They remit the tax due
(output tax minus input tax) through the tax return, which is filed every month.6
The filing is based on the principle of self-assessment. Firms assess their own tax
liability, which is considered final unless the return is picked for audit. Audit, thus,
is the sole instrument through which the revenue authority can detect noncompliance
and create deterrence against it.
Pakistan’s revenue authority, FBR, is composed of a head office, located in Is-
lamabad, and multiple regional office located throughout the country. These regional
offices include four Large Taxpayers Units, two Corporate Regional Tax Offices and
twenty Regional Tax Offices. Random audits in our sample were assigned by the head
office and were completed at the regional offices. An audit team typically consists of
two auditors who report to the local hierarchy. The central audit office, located at the
FBR headquarter, exercises overall oversight through the online monitoring system
(TAMS). Importantly, all written communications with taxpayers have to be routed
through it and are considered invalid unless they contain a bar code issued by the
TAMS (FBR 2015).
Revenue authorities conduct multiple types of audits, which vary in terms of their
intrusiveness, such as desk audits or comprehensive audits. All random audits in our
sample are comprehensive audits. In each case, the taxpayer was notified, the records
were called and examined, and the results were entered into the TAMS.
Like other developing economies, tax evasion is a major issue in Pakistan. In
a recent paper, Waseem (2020b) estimates an evasion rate of 35-40% among the
VAT filers of the country. The tax evasion occurs through both undeclared sales
and overclaimed tax credits. Given a nontrivial amount is evaded, tax audits have
the potential to shift firms’ beliefs on the probability of detection outward, creating
deterrence against future noncompliance.
In terms of tax evasion and quality of its institutions, Pakistan is not different from
other emerging economies. (Sabaini and Jiménez 2012), for example, estimate the
6Some small firms in some of the periods included in our sample were allowed to file on a quarterly
rather than monthly frequency.
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VAT evasion rate among a host of Latin American economies. These rates are quite
similar to the Pakistan’s.7 Similarly, Pakistan’s score on the Ease of Doing Business
(59.51) is indistinguishable from the average (59.06) of all countries excluding the
High Income ones (Bank 2019).8 Nor is Pakistan an atypical country in terms of its
tax morale: its score on the tax morale question in the World Value Survey is in fact
better than the world average (Haerpfer et al. 2020).9
3.3.3 Data
We use administrative data from Pakistan that include the universe of VAT returns
filed between July 2008 and June 2018. The VAT return consists of three main
sections. In the first section, firms report the value of their sales, decomposing it into
its foreign (exports) and domestic components. In the second section, the value of
purchased inputs are reported, divided likewise in the two parts. In the final section,
firms compute their tax liability, indicating the tax charged on sales, the tax credited
on inputs, and the difference between the two—the tax payable. Since 2011, firms
also report the transaction-level details of their sales and purchases. Each firm is
assigned a unique ID and is required to file every month. The data, therefore, have a
panel structure.
In addition to the return data, we use information on firm characteristics from
the tax register. This information includes the business organization of the firm
(corporate vs. noncorporate etc.), its date of registration, and other variables we
use in our heterogeneity analysis. Appendix C.1 provides a complete list of these
variables.
Finally, we use audit data available on the FBR portal and the TAMS. As we
note above, the list of cases drawn in each computer ballot is publicly available. We
download it from the FBR portal and merge it with our VAT return data using the
unique firm ID. We are able to merge 43,465 out of 43,625 audits in our sample. For
the remaining 218 cases, the firm ID mentioned in the list is incorrect. We add the
audit information from the TAMS to this dataset. This information includes the date
the audit was initiated, the type of audit (randomly assigned vs. locally assigned),
7For example, the VAT evasion rates of Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru are 37.5%,
38.1%, 33.8%, and 37.7%. These are withing the range for the Pakistan’s estimate.
8The Ease of Doing Business score is widely used as a measure for the quality of institutions of
a country (see for example Besley and Persson (2014)).
9We refer to the Question 180 on the World Value Survey 2017-2021. The question asks respon-
dents if “Cheating on taxes if you have a chance” is justified, with responses varying from 1 (never
justifiable to 10 always justifiable). Pakistan’s average score on the question is 1.967, which is better
than the world’s average of 2.197.
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and the amount detected.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
One of our empirical goals in this paper is to estimate the deterrence value of audit
defined in equation (3.6). Since the VAT can be evaded by underreporting sales
(ŝ < s) or overreporting input costs (ĉ > c), the DV in our setup takes the following
form
DV =
ŝ(p̃t′ , θ)− ŝ(p̃t, θ)
ŝ(p̃t, θ)
− ĉ(p̃t′ , θ)− ĉ(p̃t, θ)
ĉ(p̃t, θ)
. (3.8)
We can compute the two terms on the RHS by estimating how reported sales and
input costs respond to a tax audit, running regressions of the following type
yi = α + β assigni + corporatei + εi, (3.9)
where yi is the log of reported sales or input costs, assigni denotes that firm i’s audit
was assigned through a random ballot, and corporatei is a dummy indicating that
the firm is a corporation. For space consideration, we sometimes denote the assigni
dummy simply as Zi. Since audits in our sample are assigned randomly on stratified
corporate and noncorporate samples, β̂ from these regressions identifies the causal
effect of interest. But most of our results are from the parallel difference-in-differences
model
yit = µi + γ assigni × aftert + λt + εit. (3.10)
Note that the corporate dummy—being time invariant—is absorbed by the firm fixed
effect here.10 This DD model offers us greater transparency (visual event-study re-
sults) and precision. We cluster standard errors at the firm level, but in some speci-
fications we cluster at the tax office level as robustness check.
The coefficient γ̂ from above model identifies the intention-to-treat effect (ITT).
We also estimate the corresponding LATE parameter by instrumenting audit with
initial random assignment. With treatment effect heterogeneity and selection on the
unobserved gain, the LATE is informative only about the average effect on com-
pliers (Imbens and Angrist 1994). Compliers are an interesting population in our
setup. They are the firms the tax authority would audit whenever they have spare
audit capacity available. Notwithstanding the policy-relevance of LATE, we are also
interested to know the average effect among the population. For this reason, we es-
10The tax code requires a firm that changes its business organization from non-corporate to cor-
porate and vice versa to re-register. Upon re-registration, a new identifier is issued to the firm.
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timate the marginal treat effect (MTE) of audit following the framework developed
in James J. Heckman and E. Vytlacil (2005) and James J. Heckman and Edward J.
Vytlacil (2007). Because we have access to a binary instrument only, we cannot iden-
tify the MTE nonparametrically and do so assuming a linear functional form (Brinch,
Mogstad, and Wiswall 2017; Kowalski 2016).
Table 3.3 runs balance tests on our baseline data. We compare ten VAT outcomes
and ten firm characteristics across firms drawn in a given random ballot (Zi = 1)
with others using model (3.9). The compared groups are very similar for the first
two waves: the difference in means is almost always insignificant or trivial. This,
however, is not true for the third wave. Firms drawn in this wave, for example, are
on average larger and more likely to be manufacturers. These differences are unlikely
to have arisen by chance. We have noted in section 3.3.1 that exclusions from the
draw were significantly expanded for the third wave. Importantly, firms under fixed
and withholding regimes were excluded from audit. We do not identify these firms in
our data and are thus unable to replicate the sample used for the random ballot of the
third wave. For this reason, we focus solely on the first two waves for our empirical
results. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness we always present our main results
for the third wave as well.
3.5 Tax Evasion at the Baseline
Audits we consider are randomly assigned. The amount detected by them therefore
represents an unbiased estimate of tax evasion at the baseline. In this section, we doc-
ument the average amount detected by audit, examining in particular its relationship
with firm observables.
Table 3.4 presents the results. All amounts in this table are in PKR billions. The
top row shows that 3,482 firms were audited in the first wave. These firms reported
a total turnover of around 500 billion in the baseline year. The audits detected 2.15
billion of short payment against them, which constitutes 0.45% of the turnover. These
firms remitted 28.16 billion of VAT at the baseline with an average effective tax rate
of 5.65% (columns 5–6). The unpaid revenue therefore amounts to nearly 8% of the
reported tax liability (column 7).
The next five rows of the table decompose the average rate. The second row shows
that positive liability is detected against 28% of firms. The detected amount equals
two-thirds of the VAT remitted by these firms. The next four rows divide firms into
four quartiles based on their annual turnover in the baseline year. Strikingly, the
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detected amount exceeds reported tax liability for all the bottom three quartiles,
implying an evasion rate of over 100%. In contrast, the evasion rate is only 6% in
the top quartile. The top-quartile firms also contribute disproportionately to the tax
revenue. Of the 28.16 billion VAT remitted by the audited firms, more than 99%
(27.91 billion) was remitted by them. We find qualitatively similar results for the
second audit wave, although the evasion at the top is even lower for this wave.
Figure 3.1 examines the relationship between tax evasion and firm size more
deeply. We divide audited firms into 10 or 20 groups based on their annual turnover
at the baseline and see how the evasion rate and tax payments vary with firm size.
Tax evasion is particularly high at the bottom; it then declines almost monotonically
before falling sharply at the top. The government revenue as a result comes almost
exclusively from firms at the very top. These results are not surprising. Recent mod-
els of tax compliance in weak enforcement setting predict such a distribution of tax
evasion;11 although to our knowledge we are the first to document this stark pattern
empirically. Large firms tend to have transparent accounting mechanisms within the
firm. These mechanisms let them operate at their economically optimal scale, but
render commonly used strategies to evade taxes—such as cash payments or keeping
double books of account—infeasible.12 Tax evasion as a result is lower among large
firms which end up remitting a disproportionate chunk of revenue.
In the audit data, the detected amount is reported in six heads. Table C.2.1
decomposes the detected amount into its major heads. Less than 2% of the detected
amount is recovered at the time of audit either by direct payment (column 2) or by
curtailing the taxpayer’s refund claim (column 7). The rest of the amount being
subject to quasi-judicial adjudication and appeal processes can be recovered only
after these processes have run out. We do not have data on the outcome of these
processes but anecdotal evidence suggests they are cumbersome and inefficient so
that the detected amount remains stuck in litigation for a long time.13
Although audits in our sample were randomly assigned, the audit rate for both
waves remained below 100%. If audits were targeted toward specific firm types,
selection resulting from it could bias the evasion rates we report above. Figure C.2.1
11See for example (Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez 2016; Gordon and Li 2009; Kopczuk
and Slemrod 2006).
12Without strong internal controls, firms cannot grow beyond a given scale as they may worry
about pilferage and stealing by local managers.
13According to a recent press report a total of 76,700 cases involving a recoverable amount of PKR
1.77 trillion are stuck in litigation. Nearly two-thirds of the litigated amount (PKR 1.1 trillion) is
pending internally (at the two appeal fora available within the FBR) and the rest with the superior
courts of the country. For details of these numbers see here.
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explores such selection, examining if firms audited early were systematically different
from those audited later. We find no systematic correlation between the amount
detected and the order in which audits were taken up. Nor is the order correlated
with other firm observables (see Table C.2.3). A much detailed analysis of selection
appears later in the paper. We find no evidence of such selection: within the randomly
assigned sample, audits do not appear to target any specific group. To this extent,
our estimates represent unbiased estimates of noncompliance at the baseline.
Tax audits are unlikely to uncover all tax evasion. For this reason, revenue author-
ities that use random audits to estimate the tax gap multiply the detected amount by
a scale factor to convert it into their official estimate. IRS, for example, uses a scale
factor of 3.28 for this purpose. The factor is derived from a direct survey of taxpayers
on tax compliance (see IRS 1996; Henrik J. Kleven et al. 2011 for details). We do not
have access to such a multiplying factor for the VAT in Pakistan. Nor are audits in
our sample extensive audits, done for the express purpose of measuring noncompli-
ance. They rather are routine audits revenue authorities conduct during the course of
their normal operation. Our estimates therefore likely represent a conservative lower
bound on the true evasion rate in Pakistan.
3.6 Audit and Firm Behavior
We now examine the effects of audit on firm behavior, assessing in particular if they
deter tax evasion in future periods.
3.6.1 ITT Estimates
We begin by presenting nonparametric evidence. Figure 3.1 plots the coefficients δjs
from the following regression
yit = µi +
N∑
j=2
δj. 1.(month=j)t + uit, (3.11)
where y denotes the log of variable indicated in the title of each panel. The regression
is run separately for firms drawn in the random ballot (assigni = 1) and other firms in
the sample (assigni = 0).
14 We drop the dummy for the first month (July 2008) and
plot coefficients on the other month dummies (up to June 2018). Figure 3.4 illustrates
14The sample here includes all firms other than government departments and firms already under
audit. Both categories of excluded firms together constitute a small (<5%) fraction of the assign = 0
sample.
89
the DD version of these plots, where we add interactions of the month and assign
dummies into (3.11) and plot the coefficients on these interactions along with the 95%
confidence intervals around them. Given the drawn firms are a random sample of the
population, it is unsurprising that the trajectory of treated and untreated outcomes
is indistinguishable from each other in the 62 pre-draw months. Table C.2.4 shows
this formally by estimating baseline trends using model (3.10).
Strikingly, however, the outcomes continue to evolve on the common, preexisting
trend even in the post-draw period. The relative difference between the two groups
remains indistinguishable from zero in the 70 post-draw months we consider. Figures
3.5 and 3.6 replicate this analysis for the second draw, showing similar results. Initial
evidence thus suggests that audit does not cause significant revision in firm priors on
the detection probability and thus does not induce a significant change in behavior.
Below, we examine this result in more details by running formal, regression-based
tests.
The top panel of Table 3.5 reports our ITT estimates from model (3.10). We
examine both short- (one-year) and medium-run (three-year) impacts produced by
the audits assigned in the first wave. Consistent with the visual evidence none of the
ten coefficients differs significantly from zero at the conventional level. Nor is there any
systematic difference between the proximate and distant responses. Table 3.6 repeats
the exercise for the second wave. Tables 3.7–3.8 examine six other VAT outcomes, and
Table C.2.5 clusters at the tax office level. All these 46 specifications—covering ten
intensive margin outcomes, one extensive margin outcome, and two audit waves—tell
a consistent story: audit does not have a meaningful impact on firm behavior, either
in the short or in the long run.
3.6.2 LATE Estimates
Since the FBR did not conduct audit of all cases drawn in the random ballots, the
above estimates capture the average effect of getting picked for audit rather than
the average effect of audit. To compute the latter parameter, we estimate the 2SLS
models corresponding to (3.10), instrumenting the endogenous variable audit by the
initial random assignment.15 Table C.2.6 reports the first stage of these regressions,
illustrating that a strong first stage exists in this setting. The bottom panels of
Tables 3.5–3.8 and C.2.5 report the LATE estimates for the 46 specifications we run.
The results are similar. The majority of the LATE estimates are of negative sign,
statistically insignificant, and economically trivial.
15For brevity, we sometimes denote auditi variable simply as Di in the subsequent sections.
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Figures C.2.2-C.2.3 and Table C.2.7 examine the third wave of audits, reporting
parallel results comprising the ITT and LATE estimates. Recall that for this wave
the balance tests reveal significant differences between Zi = 1 and Zi = 0 groups (see
Table 3.3). We therefore do not draw any conclusion from these results and produce
them only for the sake of completeness.
3.6.3 ATE Estimates
When treatment effects are heterogeneous and there is selection into treatment on the
unobserved gain, the LATE is informative on the average effect of the treatment on
compliers only (Imbens and Angrist 1994; Abadie 2003). Compliers, in our setting,
are firms that are pushed into audit by the instrument (being drawn in the random
computer ballot). The LATE we identify therefore may not reflect the average effect
in the population unless the impact of audit does not vary across firms or auditors
do not target specific firms, using information we do not observe.
We first explore the latter point, examining if auditors target selective types of
firms. Table 3.9 compares audited and unaudited firms.16 Audited firms here include
both that were picked by a random draw (Zi = 1) and that were picked by local tax
offices based on their information (Zi = 0). Tables 3.10-3.11 separate the analysis for
the two subgroups. A typical audited firm indeed differs from the unaudited in terms
of observables we examine (Table 3.9). But these differences are almost entirely driven
by the small group of firms local tax offices picked for audit on their own (Zi = 0).
Within the random-assignment group (Zi = 1), audits do not seem to target any
selected subgroup. Figures 3.7-3.8 compare audited and unaudited firms in our event
study framework (3.11). Since the specification includes firm fixed effects, the results
capture any residual selection into audit which is not explained by the firm’s fixed
characteristics, such as size or industry. There does not appear to be any such residual
selection as the reporting histories of both groups are similar. Table C.2.8 establishes
this rigorously by running formal tests on the baseline data. Parallel trends for a long
preaudit period mean our DD estimator remains internally valid and applies to all
audited firms rather than compliers only.
The above result is supported by our two previous results. First, the compliance
rate falls from 70% in the first audit wave to 30% in the second, yet we see no
meaningful difference between the corresponding LATE estimates (compare Tables
16Since audits were done at the local tax office, we need to compare audited and unaudited firms
within a tax office to rule out selection. We therefore include tax office fixed effects into these
regressions.
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3.5 and 3.6). This suggests that the marginal firm pushed into audit may not be
significantly different from others within the randomly assigned (Zi = 1) sample.
Second, the amount detected and other firm observables bear no correlation with the
order in which audits were taken up (Figure C.2.1 and Table C.2.3). This suggests
that audits are not systematically targeted toward specific group of firms. Auditors
do not seem to possess any privileged information to do so.
Continuing our effort to go beyond LATE, we next exploit the marginal treatment
effect (MTE) framework popularized by J. J. Heckman and E. J. Vytlacil (1999).
Since our instrument is binary, we cannot identify the MTE function nonparametri-
cally and instead identify a linear version of it following Brinch, Mogstad, and Wiswall
(2017) and Kowalski (2016). Figures 3.9–3.10 show the MTEs we estimate using the
two randomization waves as instruments. The technical details of the estimations
are in Appendix C.2. Importantly, the MTEs from all specifications are flat. The
change in the unaudited outcomes as the potential fraction audited increases reflects
selection. On the other hand, the gradient in the audited outcomes reflects selection
and audit effect heterogeneity. That both these curves are flat rules out these factors
in our setup. Note that the functional form assumption we make is not too restric-
tive. We have access to two randomized experiments and therefore can exploit more
information than is typically available in an RCT. Specifically, because the compli-
ance rate varies between the two waves, both audited and unaudited outcomes in our
setup are identified at four rather than two points. The flat MTEs we obtain from
all specifications therefore suggest that our LATEs have global external validity.
3.6.4 Heterogeneity
To strengthen the above conclusion, we also examine treatment heterogeneity directly.
We do so using two nonparametric approaches. First, we estimate triple-difference
versions of model (3.10), interacting the DD term with firm traits. We explore eight
traits introduced into the model as dummies indicating (i) firm size; (ii) firm age; (iii)
firm location; (iv) local tax office having jurisdiction over the firm; (v) the type of local
tax office (LTU vs. RTO etc.); (vi) firm’s position in the supply chain (manufacturer
vs. wholesaler etc.); (vii) firm’s business organization; and (viii) industry the firm
operates in. All these traits are measured at the baseline before the announcement
of ballot results, and we estimate the model separately for the two audit waves.
Figures C.2.4-C.2.11 display the results. We do not find any systematic treatment
effect heterogeneity across the subgroups we compare. The 95% confidence interval
almost always includes zero, showing that the response of each subgroup is statistically
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indistinguishable from that of the omitted category.
In addition to the predetermined firm traits, we also explore heterogeneity by the
timing and outcome of audit. Figure C.2.12 divides audited firms into ten groups,
depending upon the time lag between the assignment and initiation of audit. If
auditors have hidden information they use to target specific subgroups, it would be
reflected in the order they took up the assigned audits in. We, however, do not see
any differences along this dimension. Audited firms in all deciles appear to be very
similar. Table C.2.9 stratifies the audited sample by the detected amount, looking
for any differential effect upon firms auditors did find an underpaid amount against.
Here also we do not find any differential effect.
Finally, we explore treatment heterogeneity using a more flexible machine-learning
approach. We ask if the audit effect varies with the firm’s predetermined traits using
the Generalized Random Forest algorithm developed in Athey, Tibshirani, and Wager
(2019).17 To reduce the computational demands of the algorithm, we use the simple
difference-in-means model (3.9) as the baseline rather than the DD model (3.10) we
have been using so far. The results are in Figures C.2.13-C.2.22. The first four of
these figures show the audit effect does not vary with firm size or age. The rest of
the figures explore binary traits. Again, we do not find any systematic heterogeneity
in the audit effect along any of the eight traits we look at.
3.7 Why Audit has No Effect on Behavior?
We present extensive evidence above showing that audit does no affect future firm
behavior. Not only does this finding hold on average but also among more than 20
subgroups we define based on firm observables. In terms of our model, these results
suggest that either Condition 1 or Condition 2 fails. This is surprising given that these
conditions are so trivial and intuitive. The failure of the first condition, for example,
implies that prior beliefs of all firms are concentrated on the true detection probability
with no variance around the mean. This notion is extremely unlikely as existing
evidence shows that taxpayers misperceive even the most simple and accessible details
of the tax system, such as the marginal tax rates (Taubinsky and Rees-Jones 2016).
How can then they be expected to know something that has not even been revealed
and that too with certitude. The failure of the second condition is also equally
17In the approach, individual trees are grown by greedy recursive partitioning of the sample space,
with each split chosen to improve the model fit. The trees are then randomized using bootstrap
aggregation, whereby each tree is grown on a different random subset of the training data, and
random split selection that restricts the variable available at each step of the algorithm.
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unlikely. Not only is audit a rare event,18 it is quite intrusive as well. Auditors spend
considerable time with taxpayers going through their records, visiting their premises,
and discussing audit findings. It is therefore highly unlikely that taxpayers do not
glean any useful signal on the government’s detection technology during this weeks-
long interaction. No updating in either directions and consequently no reoptimization
of future behavior is puzzling. In this section, we make sense of this result.
We begin by tweaking the model we presented in section 3.2 slightly. Following
Basri et al. (2019), the revised model treats evasion as a discrete rather than the
continuous choice. Discretizing the choice variable brings the model closer to our
VAT setting, leading to simpler and more intuitive exposition. The firm engages in
L transactions, indexed by l = 1...L, and decides separately for each transaction
whether to report or hide it. It would report a transaction and remit the VAT due if





(1 + θ) > 1. (3.12)
This inequality is a discrete version of the behavioral rule (3.2), showing that the
firm’s choice critically hinges on the detection probability hiding a transaction en-
tails. Ordering transactions in terms of the hiding cost, we can define L∗ as the first
transaction for which the above inequality holds. The firm will accordingly report
transactions L∗...L and will remit the tax due, amounting to
´ L
L∗
τ(sl − cl) d(l). Note
that L∗ could be the first transaction, in which case the firm does not evade at all,
or it could be the last, in which case the firm evades the entire tax due. In general,
L∗ would be idiosyncratic to the firm, depending on its scale, trading network, and
other characteristics.
Note that hiding a transaction would be easier for the firm if the other party to
it is (1) a consumer, (2) an unregistered firm, or (3) a firm willing to collude. In
these cases, the firm can cover its tracks, making it harder for the government to
detect evasion. On the other hand, hiding a transaction would be difficult if the other
party is unwilling to collude, such as a firm that cannot handle unaccounted cash and
therefore cannot keep a transaction out of books.19 The p̃l(el) faced by the firm on
18During the ten-year period we consider, the FBR could not audit more than 5% of firms a year, a
rate at which a typical firm would experience audit once every twenty years. Note that the likelihood
of a firm facing the audit is endogenous to firm behavior if the authority runs a parametric, risk-
based system of audit selection. The raw audit probability is for illustrative purpose only, showing
that on average the authority can only audit one-twentieth of the population each year.
19These consideration can lead to segmentation of firms into good and bad VAT chains with
compliant firms dealing with compliant firms only and vice versa. See Paula and Scheinkman (2010),
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different transactions therefore takes the shape shown in Figure 3.11. It is typically
low for the former type of transactions but turns sharply once the latter type begins.
Such an S-shape detection probability function was first suggested by Henrik J. Kleven
et al. (2011) and has since then confirmed in other empirical settings (see Waseem
(2019) for one such example). The shape reflects that the probability of detection to
a first order depends on the external information an economic transaction generates
for the government.
The discrete choice model predicts a simple behavioral rule. The firm will report
transactions entailing high detection probability [L∗, L], hiding the rest. In this world,
it is easy to see why audit may not cause any observable change in future behavior.
For this purpose, let us characterize a marginal audit as the following.
Definition. An audit is pivotal if it leads to the flipping of inequality (3.12).
A pivotal audit causes sufficiently large revision in the firm’s perceived detection
probability so that the LHS of inequality (3.12) exceeds one after the audit if it
did not do so earlier and vice versa. For example, indexing the post- and pre-audit










(1 + θ) > 1.
In this case, the transaction l will not be reported prior to audit but will be reported
after it. Thus, a necessary condition for audit to cause an observable change in firm
behavior is that it is pivotal.
If the structure of the detection probability is of the form shown in Figure 3.11
with the probability on most transactions being close either to zero or one, it is
highly unlikely that a given audit will be pivotal. Indeed, in this world even when
Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied so that audit does cause a revision in firm priors,
it would still not cause an observable change in firm behavior if such revision is not
large enough to flip inequality (3.12). This is particularly likely if the auditors do
not have incentives or resources to uncover transactions not reported by firms [1, L∗).
They, for example, may have a shorter planning horizon than the government and
therefore may not value the dynamic gains from uncovering hidden transactions as
much as a forward-looking planner will do. Instead, they may focus on already-
Gadenne, Nandi, and Rathelot (2019), and Gerard et al. (2019) for empirical evidence on market
segmentation caused by a VAT.
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reported transactions only, uncovering any mechanical violations of the tax code and
therefore the underpayments of tax.
In our data, we do not observe activities performed by auditors during an audit,
but personal interviews with them reveal that they indeed spend most of their time
checking mechanical violations of law. During an audit, they go through the returns
filed by a firm line by line, verifying if each line adheres to the tax code, ensuring
for example that the correct tax rate has been applied, no inadmissible input tax has
been claimed, no unlawful exemption has been availed, and the exact tax liability
has been calculated. While these activities are important and are likely to bring
additional revenue, they are unlikely to cause sufficiently large revision in firm priors
that would reflect in their future behavior as a deterrence effect of audit.
A testable prediction of the proposition that auditors devote little attention to
transactions not reported by firms is that the detected amount will fall as the pro-
portion of such transactions in a firm’s sales rises. Table C.2.10 tests this prediction.
We divide firms into four groups based on the share of final sales in their turnover at
the baseline. Final sales are transactions where the other party is either a consumer
or an informal firm, and we identify these using our transaction-level data. Theory
predicts that the likelihood of not reporting transactions of such a kind is much higher
than others, and audit therefore must detect a greater amount against firms a greater
proportion of whose turnover comprises such transactions. But it is not what we
find. The amount detected in fact falls as the share of final transactions in a firm’s
turnover rises. This correlation holds even when we add important covariates to the
specification including firm size. The evidence thus supports the notion that much
of the audit effort goes into reconciling the already-reported transactions rather than
uncovering the unreported ones.
3.8 Conclusion
In modern tax systems, audit is to some extent the sole instrument through which the
revenue authority can detect and deter tax evasion. We exploit a national program of
randomized audits from Pakistan to examine how much evasion audit detects and how
much evasion it prevents by changing post-audit behavior. Combining VAT returns
and audit outcomes data, we find audit detects a substantial amount of evasion: the
detected amount is 8% of the aggregate annual turnover of audited firms. The evasion
rate, however, varies substantially across firms. It is more than 100% among firms in
the bottom three size quartiles but only 6% among the rest. Despite detecting such a
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large amount of evasion, audit does not create any deterrence against it. Examining
more than ten intensive and extensive margin outcomes, we find no significant impact
of audit on immediate or distant behavior for any of the randomization wave we
consider. This result is robust to a number of specification checks, and we do not find
any heterogeneity in audit effects across any subpopulation.
That audit does not affect behavior is puzzling. Audit is a rare event, with a
typical firm likely to experience it once every twenty years. Lack of response to it
means audit does not reveal any new information to firms. We suggest a simple
explanation of this result. Transactions carried out by a firm can be roughly divided
into two types. Transactions with consumers, unregistered firms, or colluding firms
can be hidden easily, while those with uncooperative firms cannot. In this world,
profit-maximizing firms report easy-to-detect transaction but hide the rest, and audit
would change firm priors only if it goes after the hidden transactions. Our interviews
with auditors reveal it is usually not the case. Instead, auditors scrutinize reported
transactions only, looking for any mechanical violations of law. Insufficient focus
on uncovering hidden transactions means audit does not change firm priors on the
detection probability and thus does not induce a permanent change in behavior.
Copyright © Syed Jawad Ali Shah 2021
97
Figure 3.1: Evasion Rate By Firm Size
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Notes: The figure plots the tax evasion rate by firm size. In the top panel, we divide firms
into 10 equal groups based on their annual turnover in the baseline year. We calculate the
evasion rate in each group as the total amount detected by audit against all firms in the group
as a fraction of total VAT remitted by these firms at the baseline. This evasion rate is shown
by the red curve with the y-axis on the left. To maximize power, the sample here includes all
firms audited in the first two audit waves. We superimpose a series indicating the total VAT
remitted by firms in each group as a fraction of total VAT remitted by all firms in this sample.
This series is shown by the blue curve with the y-axis on the right. The bottom panel repeats
the exercise after dividing firms into 20 equal groups on the basis of their baseline turnover.
Both plots begin from the 20th percentile because firms below this threshold remit no VAT
at the baseline so that their evasion rate is not defined.
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Figure 3.2: Evasion Rate By Firm Size
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Notes: The figure plots the tax evasion rate by firm size. In the top panel, we divide firms
into 10 equal groups based on their annual turnover in the baseline year. We calculate the
evasion rate in each group as the total amount detected by audit against all firms in the group
as a fraction of total VAT remitted by these firms at the baseline. This evasion rate is shown
by the red curve with the y-axis on the left. To maximize power, the sample here includes all
firms audited in the first two audit waves. We superimpose a series indicating the total VAT
remitted by firms in each group as a fraction of total VAT remitted by all firms in this sample.
This series is shown by the blue curve with the y-axis on the right. The bottom panel repeats
the exercise after dividing firms into 20 equal groups on the basis of their baseline turnover.
Both plots begin from the 20th percentile because firms below this threshold remit no VAT
at the baseline so that their evasion rate is not defined.
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Figure 3.3: Intention to Treat Effects of Audit – First Wave
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Notes: The figure explores the impacts of audit on future firm behavior. We compare the evolution of
four VAT outcomes across the treatment and control groups. The treatment groups consists of firms
whose audit was assigned through the first random ballot held on September 13, 2013. The control group
comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of
VAT filers excluding government departments and firms already under audit. To construct these charts,
we regress the log of the outcome variable shown in the title of each panel on the full set of firm and month
fixed effects, dropping the dummy for July 2008. We then plot the coefficients on the time dummies of
these regressions. The sample includes all tax periods from July 2008 to June 2018. The regressions are
run separately for the two groups of firms. Year t on the horizontal axis indicates July of the corresponding
year. Vertical dashed lines demarcate the date the random computer ballot was held on.
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Figure 3.4: Intention to Treat Effects of Audit – First Wave
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Notes: The figure shows the difference-in-differences version of the plots in Figure 3.1. To construct these
charts, we regress the log of the outcome variable shown in the title of each panel on the full set of firm,
month, and month×treat dummies, dropping the dummies for July 2008. We then plot the coefficients
on the month×treat dummies from these regressions. The gray surface plot shows the 95% confidence
interval around the coefficient. The treatment groups consists of firms whose audit was assigned through
the first random ballot held on September 13, 2013. The control group comprises the rest of the firms
in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers excluding government
departments and firms already under audit. We cluster standard errors at the firm level. Year t on the
horizontal axis indicates July of the corresponding year. Vertical dashed lines demarcate the date the
random computer ballot was held on.
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Figure 3.5: Intention to Treat Effects of Audit – Second Wave































2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
































2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Month of the Year
Treatment Control































2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
































2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Month of the Year
Treatment Control
Notes: The figure explores the impacts of audit on future firm behavior. We compare the evolution of
four VAT outcomes across the treatment and control groups. The treatment groups consists of firms
whose audit was assigned through the first random ballot held on September 25, 2014. The control group
comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of
VAT filers excluding government departments and firms already under audit. To construct these charts,
we regress the log of the outcome variable shown in the title of each panel on the full set of firm and month
fixed effects, dropping the dummy for July 2008. We then plot the coefficients on the time dummies of
these regressions. The sample includes all tax periods from July 2008 to June 2018. The regressions are
run separately for the two groups of firms. Year t on the horizontal axis indicates July of the corresponding
year. Vertical dashed lines demarcate the date the random computer ballot was held on.
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Figure 3.6: Intention to Treat Effects of Audit – Second Wave
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Notes: The figure shows the difference-in-differences version of the plots in Figure 3.5. To construct these
charts, we regress the log of the outcome variable shown in the title of each panel on the full set of firm,
month, and month×treat dummies, dropping the dummies for July 2008. We then plot the coefficients
on the month×treat dummies from these regressions. The gray surface plot shows the 95% confidence
interval around the coefficient. The treatment groups consists of firms whose audit was assigned through
the first random ballot held on September 25, 2014. The control group comprises the rest of the firms
in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers excluding government
departments and firms already under audit. We cluster standard errors at the firm level. Year t on the
horizontal axis indicates July of the corresponding year. Vertical dashed lines demarcate the date the
random computer ballot was held on.
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Figure 3.7: Audited Vs. Unaudited Firms – First Audit Wave
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Notes: The figure compares the evolution of outcomes across audited and unaudited firms. To construct
these charts, we regress the log of the outcome variable shown in the title of each panel on the full set
of firm, month, and month×audit dummies, dropping the dummies for July 2008. We then plot the
coefficients on the month×audit dummies from these regressions. The gray surface plot shows the 95%
confidence interval around the coefficient. The audit dummy indicates firms whose audit was conducted
during the first wave. These includes firms whose audit was assigned through the random computer ballot
(Zi = 1) and firms whose audit was initiated by the local tax office on their own accord (Zi = 0). The
unaudited firms are all other firms in the population of VAT filers. We cluster standard errors at the firm
level. Year t on the horizontal axis indicates July of the corresponding year. Vertical dashed lines denotes
September 13, 2013—the date first random computer ballot was held on.
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Figure 3.8: Audited Vs. Unaudited Firms – Second Audit Wave
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Notes: The figure compares the evolution of outcomes across audited and unaudited firms. To construct
these charts, we regress the log of the outcome variable shown in the title of each panel on the full set
of firm, month, and month×audit dummies, dropping the dummies for July 2008. We then plot the
coefficients on the month×audit dummies from these regressions. The gray surface plot shows the 95%
confidence interval around the coefficient. The audit dummy indicates firms whose audit was conducted
during the second wave. These includes firms whose audit was assigned through the random computer
ballot (Zi = 1) and firms whose audit was initiated by the local tax office on their own accord (Zi = 0).
The unaudited firms are all other firms in the population of VAT filers. We cluster standard errors at the
firm level. Year t on the horizontal axis indicates July of the corresponding year. Vertical dashed lines
denotes September 25, 2014—the date first random computer ballot was held on.
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Figure 3.9: Marginal Treatment Effects – First Audit Wave
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Notes: The figure plots the MTE(p) curve for four outcomes using random assignment in the first audit
wave as instrument. Please see Appendix C.2 for technical details. The fraction treated p ≡ P (D = 1|Z) is
shown along the horizontal axis. It increases from 0 (no treatment) to 1 (full treatment). We also indicate
the baseline treatment probability pB ≡ P (D = 1|Z = 0) and the intervention treatment probability
pI ≡ P (D = 1|Z = 1) along this axis. The green solid curve shows the marginal treated outcomes curve
MTO(p). It is identified at two points indicated in the plot by circular markers. The blue, dashed curve
depicts the marginal untreated outcomes curve MUO(p). It is also identified at two points indicated in
the plot with square markers. For both curves, we extrapolate between the two points using linearity
assumption. The difference between the two curves represents the MTE(p). Since in our setting all three
curves sit above each other, we lift both MTO(p) and MUO(p) up by adding the constant from the
corresponding regression to distinguish them from the primary object of our interest MTE(p).
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Figure 3.10: Marginal Treatment Effects – Second Audit Wave
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Notes: The figure plots the MTE(p) curve for four outcomes using random assignment in the second audit
wave as instrument. Please see Appendix C.2 for technical details. The fraction treated p ≡ P (D = 1|Z) is
shown along the horizontal axis. It increases from 0 (no treatment) to 1 (full treatment). We also indicate
the baseline treatment probability pB ≡ P (D = 1|Z = 0) and the intervention treatment probability
pI ≡ P (D = 1|Z = 1) along this axis. The green solid curve shows the marginal treated outcomes curve
MTO(p). It is identified at two points indicated in the plot by circular markers. The blue, dashed curve
depicts the marginal untreated outcomes curve MUO(p). It is also identified at two points indicated in
the plot with square markers. For both curves, we extrapolate between the two points using linearity
assumption. The difference between the two curves represents the MTE(p). Since in our setting all three
curves sit above each other, we lift both MTO(p) and MUO(p) up by adding the constant from the
corresponding regression to distinguish them from the primary object of our interest MTE(p).
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l(el)](1 + θ) > 1
Notes: The figure plots the probability of detection faced by a typical firm. We arrange L
transactions carried out by the firm in term of the detection probability they entail pl(el) in
ascending order. The probability of transaction is low if the other party to the transaction is
(1) a consumer, (2) an unregistered firm, or (3) a firm willing to collude. In all these case, the
transaction does not create any third-party information for the government. The probability
of detection is high otherwise. The curve accordingly turns sharply once transactions between
arm-length parties unwilling to collude begin. The transaction L∗represents the first transac-
tion for which the detection probability is so high that inequality (3.12) fails. The firm would
accordingly report transactions [L∗, L], hiding the rest. Note that the threshold L∗would vary
across firms depending among other things on their size, industry, and trading network.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Audit I
Audit Tax Ballot Audits Assigned Audits Conducted
Wave Year Date Mode Number Percent Assigned Unassigned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 2013 Sep 13, 2013 Random 4,926 5% 3,482 521
2 2014 Sep 25, 2014 Random 12,447 12% 3,612 293
3 2015 Sep 14, 2015 Random 8,372 7.5% 1,122 164
4 2016 Jan 05, 2017 Parametric 8,935 7.5% 884 332
5 2017 Apr 12, 2018 Parametric 8,785 7.5% 852 352
Notes: The table reports some descriptive statistics of the five audit waves in our sample. Column (2)
reports the tax year during which the computer ballot to draw audit cases was held. Column (3) reports
the exact ballot date. The ballot was random for the first three waves and parametric for the next two.
The volume of cases picked during the ballot is mentioned in Column (5) in numbers and in Column (6)
as the proportion of population. Column (7) reports the number of audits completed out of those assigned
through the computer ballot. Column (8), on the other hand, reports the number of audits initiated by the
local tax office on their own accord. During the five audit waves, a total of 43,625 cases were picked for
audit through computer ballots. Out of these, the tax identifiers of 218 were inaccurate. We were therefore
unable to merge these 218 cases with VAT and audit records. We accordingly drop these 218 cases from the
sample and focus instead on the 43,465 audits assigned through the computer ballot as reported in Column
(5).
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Audit II
Audit Audits Initiated Amount Detected
Wave Within 1 Month Within 3 Months Within 6 Months Mean Median 90th Percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1 0.646 0.942 0.950 617 0 165
2 0.925 0.993 0.998 619 0 100
3 0.852 0.945 0.964 4,098 0 158
Notes: The table presents a few descriptive statistics of randomly assigned audits during the first three audit waves.
Columns (2)-(4) report the time lag between the assignment and initiation of audit. Column (2), for example, shows
that around 65% of audits assigned in the first random ballot were initiated with the first month of assignment. This
ratio was 93% and 85% for the next two audit waves. Columns (5)-(7) report the amount detected during each wave
of audit. Column (5) reports the mean amount detected in PKR thousands. The US$-PKR exchange rate during this
time (2013) was around 100. The next columns of the table report the median and the 90th percentile of the amount
detected, illustrating that it is highly skewed toward right with the mean significantly larger than the median for all
three audit waves.
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Table 3.3: Randomization Test
First Wave Second Wave Third Wave
Mean Mean Diff. in SE Mean Mean Diff. in SE Mean Mean Diff. in SE
(Zi = 0) (Zi = 1) Means (Zi = 0) (Zi = 1) Means (Zi = 0) (Zi = 1) Means
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A: VAT Outcomes
1. Sales 14.251 14.282 0.031 0.043 14.278 14.298 0.020 0.026 14.335 14.831 0.496 0.029
2. Purchases 14.081 14.095 0.014 0.047 14.234 14.186 -0.048 0.029 14.264 14.248 -0.015 0.035
3. Output Tax 11.671 11.707 0.036 0.049 11.791 11.768 -0.024 0.030 11.969 11.953 -0.017 0.035
4. Input Tax 11.768 11.802 0.033 0.052 11.990 11.911 -0.079 0.031 12.149 11.886 -0.263 0.037
5. Tax Payable 10.200 10.300 0.100 0.063 10.392 10.360 -0.032 0.041 10.570 10.830 0.260 0.045
6. Tax Paid 9.532 9.607 0.076 0.058 9.805 9.785 -0.020 0.034 9.850 10.338 0.488 0.039
7. Exports 15.288 15.169 -0.119 0.114 14.904 15.145 0.241 0.068 14.619 15.655 1.036 0.064
8. Imports 14.905 14.887 -0.018 0.078 14.858 14.843 -0.015 0.048 14.878 15.902 1.024 0.076
9. Refund 12.037 11.884 -0.153 0.152 12.214 12.188 -0.026 0.089 12.086 12.424 0.338 0.093
10. Carry Forward 11.642 11.667 0.026 0.078 12.010 12.160 0.150 0.046 12.162 12.248 0.086 0.050
B: Firm Characteristics
11. Manufacturer 0.339 0.350 0.010 0.010 0.314 0.339 0.025 0.006 0.215 0.786 0.572 0.006
12. Importer 0.111 0.109 -0.003 0.006 0.124 0.118 -0.006 0.004 0.159 0.019 -0.140 0.002
13. Exporter 0.025 0.019 -0.005 0.003 0.040 0.025 -0.016 0.002 0.050 0.021 -0.029 0.002
14. Distributor 0.028 0.030 0.001 0.003 0.031 0.034 0.003 0.002 0.036 0.011 -0.025 0.002
15. Wholesaler 0.240 0.241 0.001 0.008 0.229 0.240 0.011 0.005 0.251 0.046 -0.205 0.003
16. Service Provider 0.193 0.192 -0.002 0.008 0.193 0.185 -0.009 0.005 0.208 0.099 -0.110 0.005
17. Major City 0.640 0.636 -0.004 0.010 0.631 0.639 0.008 0.006 0.625 0.650 0.024 0.007
18. LTU 0.013 0.013 0.000 0.004 0.012 0.008 -0.004 0.002 0.005 0.042 0.037 0.003
19. Years Registered 12.987 13.680 0.694 0.109 11.745 12.967 1.222 0.070 10.496 13.607 3.111 0.091
20. Textile 0.162 0.163 0.001 0.008 0.143 0.152 0.009 0.005 0.108 0.266 0.157 0.006
Notes: The table runs balance tests on the three randomization waves in our sample. For each outcome, we estimate model (3.9) restricting
the sample to the baseline period only. The baseline period is June 2012 for the first, June 2013 for the second, and June 2014 for the third
randomization wave. The last two columns for each randomization wave report the coefficient β̂ and its standard error from the model. The
details of the variables used here are provided in Appendix C.1.
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Table 3.4: Audit Findings
# Audits Sales Amount Detected VAT Paid at the Baseline Evasion Rate
PKR % of Sales PKR % of Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A: First Audit Wave
All Audited Firms 3,482 498.4 2.15 0.43 28.16 5.65 7.1
Amount Detected > 0 986 137.0 2.15 1.57 3.20 2.33 40.2
Size Quartile 1 1,057 0.0 0.06 684.76 0.00 8.78 98.7
Size Quartile 2 824 1.7 0.07 3.94 0.04 2.52 61.0
Size Quartile 3 809 12.3 0.22 1.75 0.21 1.67 51.1
Size Quartile 4 792 484.3 1.80 0.37 27.91 5.76 6.1
B: Second Audit Wave
All Audited Firms 3,612 2200.0 2.24 0.10 88.37 4.02 2.5
Amount Detected > 0 1,220 264.6 2.24 0.84 7.52 2.84 22.9
Size Quartile 1 1,007 0.4 0.04 10.21 0.02 3.81 72.8
Size Quartile 2 892 4.9 0.17 3.37 0.11 2.15 61.0
Size Quartile 3 862 24.4 0.22 0.89 0.30 1.24 41.8
Size Quartile 4 851 2170.2 1.81 0.08 87.95 4.05 2.0
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics of audit outcomes. The first column reports the number of audits conducted
for each group of firms indicated in the corresponding row. Aggregate turnover of this group for the baseline year in PKR
billions is reported in the next column. The next two columns report the amount detected by audit, in PKR billions in
column 3 and as a percent of aggregate sales in column 4. Columns 5-6 report the VAT paid at the baseline by the group
of firms indicated in the corresponding row, in PKR billions in column 5 and as a percent of aggregate sales in column 6.
The last column presents the evasion rate implied by the detected amount. It is calculated as the ratio of columns 4 and 6
(alternatively columns 3 and 5).
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Table 3.5: Impact of Audit on Firm Behavior – First Wave
Impacts After One Year Impacts After Three Years
Sales Purchases Output Input Tax Sales Purchases Output Input Tax
Tax Tax Payable Tax Tax Payable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A: ITT Estimates
assign × after -0.010 -0.010 -0.016 -0.017 -0.037 -0.007 -0.021 -0.025 -0.036 -0.016
(0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023) (0.028) (0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.028)
Observations 2,831,140 2,468,502 2,086,889 2,099,210 1,415,795 3,839,502 3,328,628 2,884,225 2,906,045 1,913,096
B: LATE Estimates
audit × after -0.014 -0.014 -0.023 -0.024 -0.051 -0.010 -0.030 -0.035 -0.051 -0.022
(0.023) (0.027) (0.030) (0.033) (0.039) (0.024) (0.028) (0.031) (0.033) (0.039)
Observations 2,831,140 2,468,502 2,086,889 2,099,210 1,415,795 3,839,502 3,328,628 2,884,225 2,906,045 1,913,096
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table estimates the impact of audit on firms’ future behavior. In the top panel, the coefficient assign× after shows γ̂ from model
(3.10), where the dummy variable assigni denotes that firm i’s audit was assigned through the first random ballot held on September 13, 2013.
The control group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers excluding
government departments and firms already under audit. The dummy variable aftert indicates that month t falls after the date of the ballot.
The sample includes periods up to October 2014 for the first five columns and periods up to October 2016 for the rest. Panel B shows the
corresponding results from 2sls regressions, where the endogenous variable auditi is instrumented by the initial random assignment. Standard
errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the firm level.
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Table 3.6: Impact of Audit on Firm Behavior – Second Wave
Impacts After One Year Impacts After Three Years
Sales Purchases Output Input Tax Sales Purchases Output Input Tax
Tax Tax Payable Tax Tax Payable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A: ITT Estimates
assign × after -0.021 -0.021 -0.030 -0.026 -0.022 -0.010 -0.009 -0.013 -0.007 0.006
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
Observations 3,133,061 2,725,243 2,343,583 2,357,343 1,568,363 4,159,404 3,587,740 3,088,403 3,137,794 2,034,932
B: LATE Estimates
audit × after -0.071 -0.073 -0.109 -0.091 -0.081 -0.032 -0.033 -0.044 -0.025 0.022
(0.033) (0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.058) (0.035) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.057)
Observations 3,133,061 2,725,243 2,343,583 2,357,343 1,568,363 4,159,404 3,587,740 3,088,403 3,137,794 2,034,932
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table estimates the impact of audit on firms’ future behavior. In the top panel, the coefficient assign× after shows γ̂ from model
(3.10), where the dummy variable assigni denotes that firm i’s audit was assigned through the first random ballot held on September 25, 2014.
The control group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers excluding
government departments and firms already under audit. The dummy variable aftert indicates that month t falls after the date of the ballot.
The sample includes periods up to October 2015 for the first five columns and periods up to October 2017 for the rest. Panel B shows the
corresponding results from 2sls regressions, where the endogenous variable auditi is instrumented by the initial random assignment. Standard
errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the firm level.
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Table 3.7: Impacts of Random Audits Assigned in the First Wave – Other Outcomes
Impacts After One Year Impacts After Three Years
Exports Imports Tax Refund Carry Exports Imports Tax Refund Carry
Paid Forward Paid Forward
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A: ITT Estimates
assign × after 0.013 0.047 -0.052 -0.116 -0.049 0.027 0.035 -0.025 -0.070 -0.085
(0.037) (0.028) (0.031) (0.092) (0.040) (0.038) (0.027) (0.033) (0.091) (0.040)
Observations 317,130 570,949 1,161,513 234,207 1,594,740 450,661 838,590 1,723,448 287,241 2,490,894
B: LATE Estimates
audit × after 0.018 0.073 -0.072 -0.175 -0.071 0.037 0.054 -0.035 -0.102 -0.124
(0.051) (0.043) (0.043) (0.138) (0.058) (0.053) (0.042) (0.046) (0.134) (0.059)
Observations 317,130 570,949 1,161,513 234,207 1,594,740 450,661 838,590 1,723,448 287,241 2,490,894
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table estimates the impact of audit on firms’ future behavior. In the top panel, the coefficient assign× after shows γ̂ from model
(3.10), where the dummy variable assigni denotes that firm i’s audit was assigned through the first random ballot held on September 13, 2013.
The control group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers excluding
government departments and firms already under audit. The dummy variable aftert indicates that month t falls after the date of the ballot.
The sample includes periods up to October 2014 for the first five columns and periods up to October 2016 for the rest. Panel B shows the
corresponding results from 2sls regressions, where the endogenous variable auditi is instrumented by the initial random assignment. Standard
errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the firm level.
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Table 3.8: Extensive Margin Impact of Random Audits
Outcome: 1(Return Filedit)
Random Draw Held On: September 13, 2013 September 25, 2014 September 14, 2015
Impacts After: One Year Three Years One Year Three Years One Year Three Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: ITT Estimates
assign × after 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 7,097,120 9,852,941 8,129,498 11,062,795 8,502,891 11,171,180
B: LATE Estimates
audit × after 0.002 0.006 0.027 0.029 0.075 0.058
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.009)
Observations 7,097,120 9,852,941 8,129,498 11,062,795 8,502,891 11,171,180
Mean of the Dependent Variable 0.955 0.955 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.956
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table estimates the impact of audit on firms’ extensive margin behavior. We estimate model (3.10) using an indicator that the firm
filed its VAT return for the period (month) t as the outcome variable. In the top panel, the coefficient assign× after shows γ̂ from the model.
The dummy variable assigni denotes that firm i’s audit was assigned through the random ballot held on the date indicated in the heading
of each column. The control group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of
VAT filers excluding government departments and firms already under audit. The dummy variable aftert indicates that month t falls after the
date of the ballot. The sample for odd columns includes periods up to one year after the ballot and for even columns up to three years after
the ballot. Panel B shows the corresponding results from 2sls regressions, where the endogenous variable auditi is instrumented by the initial
random assignment. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the firm level.
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Table 3.9: Selection in Compliance? Audited Vs. Non-Audited Firms
First Wave Second Wave
Mean Mean Difference Standard Mean Mean Difference Standard
(Di = 0) (Di = 1) in Means Error (Di = 0) (Di = 1) in Means Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: VAT Outcomes
1. Sales 14.547 14.816 0.269 0.044 14.553 14.776 0.222 0.043
2. Purchases 14.311 14.567 0.255 0.048 14.438 14.519 0.080 0.049
3. Output Tax 11.936 12.214 0.279 0.050 12.031 12.199 0.168 0.051
4. Input Tax 12.006 12.328 0.322 0.051 12.196 12.230 0.033 0.051
5. Tax Payable 10.537 10.866 0.328 0.068 10.698 10.870 0.172 0.075
6. Tax Paid 10.039 10.435 0.397 0.062 10.221 10.359 0.137 0.063
7. Exports 15.752 15.705 -0.047 0.114 15.353 15.793 0.440 0.096
8. Imports 15.183 15.261 0.078 0.075 15.096 15.235 0.139 0.074
9. Refund 12.410 12.673 0.263 0.139 12.578 12.667 0.089 0.130
10. Carry Forward 11.926 12.192 0.266 0.081 12.276 12.446 0.170 0.083
B: Firm Characteristics
11. Manufacturer 0.383 0.448 0.064 0.010 0.361 0.418 0.056 0.009
12. Importer 0.105 0.087 -0.018 0.006 0.116 0.111 -0.005 0.006
13. Exporter 0.023 0.016 -0.007 0.003 0.036 0.013 -0.023 0.003
14. Distributor 0.027 0.026 -0.001 0.004 0.029 0.028 -0.001 0.004
15. Wholesaler 0.214 0.196 -0.018 0.008 0.206 0.219 0.012 0.008
16. Service Provider 0.190 0.174 -0.016 0.008 0.189 0.166 -0.023 0.008
17. Major City 0.661 0.661 0.000 0.000 0.654 0.654 0.000 0.000
18. LTU 0.045 0.045 -0.000 0.000 0.039 0.039 -0.000 0.000
19. Years Registered 13.499 14.729 1.230 0.117 12.388 14.221 1.833 0.119
20. Textile 0.165 0.171 0.005 0.007 0.148 0.160 0.012 0.006
Notes: The table explores selection in audit, comparing audited and unaudited firms. We estimate a version of model (3.9), regressing the
outcome in each row on two dummy variables (Di and corporatei) and tax office fixed effects. We restrict the sample to the baseline period
only. The dummy variable Di takes the value 1 for all audited firms including those whose audit was assigned through the random ballot and
those whose audit was taken up by the local tax office of its own accord. The unaudited firms (Di = 0) include all other firms in the eligible
sample. The baseline period is June 2012 for the first and June 2013 for the second audit wave. The last two columns for each wave report the
coefficient β̂ and its standard error from the model. The details of the variables used here are provided in Appendix C.1.
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Table 3.10: Selection in Compliance? Audited Vs. Non-Audited Firms (Within Zi = 1 Group)
2013 Draw 2014 Draw
Mean Mean Difference Standard Mean Mean Difference Standard
(Di = 0) (Di = 1) in Means Error (Di = 0) (Di = 1) in Means Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: VAT Outcomes
1. Sales 14.567 14.569 0.001 0.095 14.560 14.633 0.073 0.061
2. Purchases 14.360 14.312 -0.048 0.108 14.393 14.410 0.017 0.066
3. Output Tax 11.885 12.005 0.120 0.104 11.982 12.094 0.112 0.069
4. Input Tax 11.944 12.075 0.131 0.117 12.131 12.115 -0.017 0.070
5. Tax Payable 10.524 10.666 0.142 0.132 10.648 10.715 0.067 0.101
6. Tax Paid 9.935 10.175 0.240 0.129 10.206 10.173 -0.033 0.083
7. Exports 15.602 15.678 0.076 0.285 15.476 15.897 0.422 0.226
8. Imports 15.131 15.150 0.018 0.178 15.057 15.154 0.097 0.101
9. Refund 11.650 12.482 0.832 0.385 12.502 12.681 0.179 0.257
10. Carry Forward 11.833 12.023 0.190 0.173 12.424 12.331 -0.093 0.108
B: Firm Characteristics
11. Manufacturer 0.364 0.406 0.042 0.022 0.378 0.397 0.019 0.013
12. Importer 0.115 0.096 -0.019 0.016 0.107 0.120 0.013 0.010
13. Exporter 0.018 0.017 -0.001 0.006 0.022 0.022 0.000 0.004
14. Distributor 0.030 0.027 -0.003 0.008 0.033 0.029 -0.003 0.005
15. Wholesaler 0.228 0.210 -0.018 0.020 0.218 0.215 -0.003 0.012
16. Service Provider 0.186 0.188 0.001 0.017 0.185 0.170 -0.015 0.011
17. Major City 0.655 0.655 -0.000 0.000 0.659 0.659 -0.000 0.000
18. LTU 0.043 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.035 0.000 0.000
19. Years Registered 13.865 14.313 0.448 0.258 13.175 14.222 1.047 0.167
20. Textile 0.163 0.167 0.005 0.017 0.158 0.154 -0.004 0.009
Notes: The table explores selection in audit, comparing audited and unaudited firms within the sample drawn for audit in the corresponding
random ballot. We estimate a version of model (3.9), regressing the outcome in each row on two dummy variables (Di and corporatei) and
tax office fixed effects. We restrict the sample to the baseline period only. The dummy variable Di takes the value 1 for firms whose audit was
conducted. The unaudited firms (Di = 0) include all other firms in the randomly drawn sample. The baseline period is June 2012 for the first
and June 2013 for the second audit wave. The last two columns for each wave report the coefficient β̂ and its standard error from the model.
The details of the variables used here are provided in Appendix C.1.
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Table 3.11: Selection in Compliance? Audited Vs. Non-Audited Firms (Within Zi = 0 Group)
2013 Draw 2014 Draw
Mean Mean Difference Standard Mean Mean Difference Standard
(D = 0) (D = 1) in Means Error (D = 0) (D = 1) in Means Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: VAT Outcomes
1. Sales 14.548 15.693 1.145 0.086 14.556 15.776 1.220 0.149
2. Purchases 14.312 15.330 1.018 0.095 14.446 15.549 1.103 0.169
3. Output Tax 11.936 12.958 1.022 0.098 12.040 13.046 1.006 0.170
4. Input Tax 12.008 13.045 1.037 0.097 12.208 13.053 0.844 0.171
5. Tax Payable 10.537 11.704 1.167 0.148 10.708 11.979 1.270 0.235
6. Tax Paid 10.040 11.220 1.180 0.132 10.227 11.390 1.163 0.190
7. Exports 15.750 16.009 0.258 0.216 15.330 16.019 0.689 0.372
8. Imports 15.183 15.473 0.290 0.129 15.101 15.689 0.588 0.198
9. Refund 12.425 13.168 0.743 0.291 12.585 13.168 0.583 0.381
10. Carry Forward 11.927 12.857 0.930 0.164 12.255 13.138 0.883 0.279
B: Firm Characteristics
11. Manufacturer 0.384 0.622 0.239 0.021 0.359 0.531 0.172 0.030
12. Importer 0.105 0.049 -0.055 0.010 0.117 0.110 -0.007 0.019
13. Exporter 0.023 0.017 -0.006 0.004 0.037 0.026 -0.011 0.002
14. Distributor 0.026 0.020 -0.006 0.007 0.028 0.017 -0.012 0.014
15. Wholesaler 0.214 0.133 -0.081 0.012 0.205 0.182 -0.023 0.022
16. Service Provider 0.190 0.111 -0.079 0.016 0.190 0.103 -0.087 0.025
17. Major City 0.661 0.661 0.000 0.000 0.652 0.652 -0.000 0.000
18. LTU 0.045 0.045 -0.000 0.000 0.040 0.040 0.000 0.000
19. Years Registered 13.493 16.379 2.886 0.288 12.266 14.597 2.331 0.437
20. Textile 0.165 0.187 0.021 0.017 0.147 0.208 0.061 0.025
Notes: The table explores selection in audit, comparing audited and unaudited firms excluding from the sample firms drawn for audit in the
corresponding random ballot. We estimate a version of model (3.9), regressing the outcome in each row on two dummy variables (Di and
corporatei) and tax office fixed effects. We restrict the sample to the baseline period only. The dummy variable Di takes the value 1 for firms
whose audit was conducted. The baseline period is June 2012 for the first and June 2013 for the second audit wave. The last two columns for




This dissertation analyzes evasion and enforcement issues in VAT with special refer-
ence to developing countries using three different policy reforms in Pakistan. The first
essay provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of computerization and mea-
sures its impact on input tax credits claimed on domestic purchases. Conversely, it
also shows that evasion and fraudulent transaction are rampant absent an extensive
enforcement mechanism which can utilize third party information effectively. The
second essay studies a minimum tax regime within a standard VAT system. The re-
sults of this study show that commercial importers may use informal sector to lower
their declared value at the cost of revenue. Tax authorities, thus, may be forced to
impose a minimum tax burden on these evasion prone firms. Third chapter examines
a randomized audit program and its impact on subsequent tax filing and revenue
reporting behavior of selected and audited firms. The results show that there is no
effect of audit and detection on post audit behavior of firms.
In the first chapter, I study the introduction of a risk-based evaluation system
which cross checks input tax credits and automatically invalidates suspicious and
fraudulent invoices. Using a difference-in-differences empirical estimation, I find that
input tax credits for domestically operating firms (treatment) went down by 50%
on average. The response depended on firm’s structure and category of operations.
Manufacturers showed an average decline of 30% whereas for non-manufacturers it was
70%. Input tax credits for Sole Proprietors, Partnerships and Companies decreased
by 70%, 60% and 30% respectively. Computerized enforcement was very effective, and
it was able to check fake credit invoices. It also indicates that absent this effective
enforcement, a huge amount of revenue can be evaded in developing countries who
have limited enforcement capacity. I argue that implementation of VAT in developing
countries was premature because of enforcement capacity constraints.
The second essay deals with minimum taxes within VAT. I utilize kinks produced
by minimum value addition tax imposed on commercial importers for studying tax
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evasion on sales made to informal sector. Pakistan imposes a minimum value addition
tax on importers at the time of import which is adjustable only when the declared
value addition at post importation stage is more than minimum already paid. I
find that importers bunch strongly around this minimum value addition threshold
and utilizing changes in threshold over time I can estimate evasion. Depending on
the threshold, fifty percent firms, on average, bunch at or near the bunch point. I
estimate elasticity of tax remitted at 0.22 which implies that 78% of tax would be
evaded in this setting. This response implies that informal sector is not sufficiently
burdened. It strengthens the argument that replacement of high tariffs at import
with revenue neutral VAT would decrease welfare.
The third essay is based on a randomized audit program which was initiated by
FBR in 2013 instead of traditional parametric audit. The change in audit selection
method should result in different responses. First, firms selected for audits are ex-
pected to change their behavior realizing that they are now less (more) likely to be
audited. But firms show no change in behavior over time across any of the key pa-
rameters. The result is surprising because, theoretically, the change in probability of
audit should affect firm behavior.
In conclusion, these essays show that firms behave differently in limited enforce-
ment capacity regimes. The volume of evasion is high and traditional instruments to
increase compliance such as audit do not have predicted effect in these settings.
Copyright © Syed Jawad Ali Shah 2021
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Additional Tables and Figures
Figure A.1: Impact on Manufacturers vs. Non-Manufacturers by Business Type
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Explanation: (Panel A & C) The graph plots the logged mean quarterly domestic
input of manufacturers in control and treated groups based on their business type.
The reform occurs at dashed vertical line (quarter April-June 2013) which is then
used as a reference to show lead and lag quarter time periods. The input tax of each
category drops after the reform. Decline in raw numbers is approximately 30 percent
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for the manufacturers in each category. (Panel B & D) The graph plots the logged
mean quarterly domestic input of non-manufacturers in control and treated groups
based on their business type. The reform occurs at dashed vertical line (quarter
April-June 2013) which is then used as a reference to show lead and lag quarter
time periods. The input tax of each category drops after the reform. Decline in raw
numbers is approximately 70 log points or 50 percent for the companies and 90 log
points or 60 percent for the partnerships and sole proprietorships.
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Figure A.2: Heterogeneity by Business Types
(a) Control Group Response
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(b) Treatment Group Response
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Explanation: The graph plots the logged mean quarterly domes-
tic input of Companies, Partnerships and Individual Businesses
in control and treated groups. The reform occurs at dashed
vertical line (quarter April-June 2013) which is then used as a
reference to show lead and lag quarter time periods. The in-
put tax of each category drops after the reform. Decline in raw
numbers is approximately 30 percent for the companies and 70
percent for individual and partnership businesses.
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics for Sales, Purchases and Tax Credits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Total Purchase 7.621 7.939 8.68 9.849 10.249 10.557 9.48 8.873 9.336
Taxable Purchase 6.437 7.313 8.015 9.373 9.785 10.067 9.106 8.432 8.797
Domestic Tax Credit 0.585 0.615 0.655 0.732 0.761 0.855 0.782 0.808 0.786
Import Tax Credit 0.226 0.248 0.292 0.374 0.347 0.349 0.371 0.432 0.426
Total Sale 9.304 9.526 10.547 13.13 13.528 13.591 13.402 11.77 12.242
Taxable Sale 8.2 8.591 9.63 10.437 10.644 10.307 9.508 8.631 8.954
Export sale 1.83 1.571 2.674 1.822 1.831 1.808 1.656 1.443 1.347
Observations 855,632 967,549 1,058,021 1,109,744 1,155,709 1,249,873 1,321,672 1,392,310 580,542
Notes: Table provides the financial yearly statistics of average purchase and sales for the
eight complete years 2009-2016 and first five months of year 2017 in millions Pak Rupees
(100 Pak Rupee = 1 US Dollar). The returns are filed on monthly basis except under
very few special cases where the returns are required to be filed quarterly. Total purchase
includes the exempt purchases as well as the taxable purchases. Taxable purchase is the
total value of purchases including the one taxed at reduced or higher rate than the standard
rate. Domestic tax credit is the input tax credit claimed against the purchases made locally
and imported tax credit is the credit claimed against imports. Total sales include both
exempt and taxable sales (including export sales which are zero rated).
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Table A.2: Robustness to Monthly Time Periods (July 2008- September
2016)
Domestic Input Tax (PKR in Millions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Groups 144,211 36,798 115,050 33,112 105,063 15,841
N 6,840,702 2,417,382 5,049,410 1,782,943 5,002,590 877,528
Notes: The table provides estimation of difference in difference coefficients for the specifications
used in Table 1.2 to Table 1.7 for the complete period of July 2008 to September 2016 using the
Monthly return data. The variable DD is defined as an interaction between the dummy for suppliers
who were not claiming refund before July 2013 and the dummy which equals one for the period
July 2013 onwards. The dependent variable is the input tax against domestic purchases and the
regression controls for input tax against imports. The coefficient estimates are approximately 1/3
of the coefficients in odd-numbered columns of Table A.3 because the time period is month instead
of quarter. Standard Errors are clustered at firm level. The significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level is
denoted by *, ** and *** respectively.
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Table A.3: Robustness of the Results in Tables 2-7 to Full Period (July
2008- September 2016)
Domestic Input Tax (PKR in Millions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Unbal Bal Unbal Bal Unbal Bal Unbal Bal UnBal Bal Unbal Bal
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Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Groups 144,211 43,928 36,798 21,323 115,050 28,971 33,112 13,496 105,063 32,106 15,841 6,670
N 2,348,653 1,331,390 825,108 651,571 1,736,768 877,298 618,385 414,900 1,711,742 968,968 297,478 208,366
Notes: The table provides estimation of difference in difference coefficients for the specifications used
in Table 1.2 to Table 1.7 for the complete period of July 2008 to September 2016. The Monthly return
data is used to compute quarterly values, therefore N denotes the quarterly number of observations.
The variable DD is defined as an interaction between the dummy for suppliers who were not claiming
refund before July 2013 and the dummy which equals one for the period July 2013 onwards. The
dependent variable is the input tax against domestic purchases and the regression controls for input
tax against imports. The odd numbered columns show the results for the unbalanced panel which
includes all the firms and the even numbered columns show the results for balanced panel of the
firms used for Table 1.2 to Table 1.7. Standard Errors are clustered at firm level. The significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, ** and *** respectively.
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A.1.1 Legal Definitions & Institutional Background
A.1.1.1 Definitions
Many important terms such as distributor, companies etc. used in the paper are
clearly defined under the law. All the definitions provided below are directly taken
from the text of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. It should be noted here that VAT law
was implemented in Pakistan without changing the name of the sales tax law which
it replaced because of constitutional restrictions faced by the Federal Government in
Pakistan.
I. Association of Persons (AOP) includes a firm, a Hindu undivided family, any
artificial juridical person and anybody of persons formed under a foreign law,
but does not include a company.
II. Company means – (a) a company as defined in the Companies Ordinance,
1984 (XL VII of 1984); (b) a body corporate formed by or under any law
in force in Pakistan; (c) a modaraba; (d) a body incorporated by or under
the law of a country outside Pakistan relating to incorporation of companies;
(e) a trust, a co-operative society or a finance society or any other society
established or constituted by or under any law for the time being in force; or
(f) a foreign association, whether incorporated or not, which the Board has,
by general or special order, declared to be a company for the purposes of the
Income Tax Ordinance 2001 (XLIX of 2001)
III. CREST means the computerized program for analyzing and cross matching
of sales tax returns, also referred to as COMPUTERISED RISK-BASED
EVALUATION of SALES TAX
IV. Distributor means a person appointed by a manufacturer, importer or any
other person for a specified area to purchase goods from him for further supply
and includes a person who in addition to being a distributor is also engaged
in supply of goods as a wholesaler or a retailer
V. Supply Chain means the series of transactions between buyers and sellers
from the stage of first purchase or import to the stage of final supply
VI. Wholesaler includes a dealer and means any person who carries on, whether
regularly or otherwise, the business of buying and selling goods by wholesale
or of supplying or distributing goods, directly or indirectly, by wholesale for
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cash or deferred payment or for commission or other valuable consideration
or stores such goods belonging to others as an agent for the purpose of sale
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A.1.1.2 Invoice Summary Provision
Pakistan introduced federal VAT in 199o but with a very limited scope. In 1996, Pak-
istan expanded it and introduced standard credit invoice system VAT. The govern-
ment intended to bring down excise and custom duties and expand tax base through a
broad based consumption tax. Until 2001, the use of computers and software was min-
imal. The criminal elements exploited the zero rating against exports to defraud the
government of billions of rupees through fake exports and invoices. Federal Board
of Revenue (FBR) responded by launching STARR (Sales Tax Automated Refund
Repository) in July 2002 which provided limited cross matching ability to the re-
fund processing units. The criminal syndicates, however, continued to misuse, hack
or dodge STARR. It also increased compliance cost for genuine firms significantly
without curtailing the fraud substantially. A growing perception of inability of tax
authorities to plug continued leakage put pressure on the government for more com-
prehensive measures. Consequently, FBR quickly moved to CREST in 2008. CREST
enabled FBR to conduct more comprehensive risk analysis by scrutinizing transaction-
level data through invoice summary filed as an annexure of monthly VAT return. FBR
was able to capture the information that was previously unavailable, within risk anal-
ysis software automatically (Federal Board of Revenue 2008; Government of Pakistan
2008).
Pakistan’s tax administration uses this transaction-level data to check fake input
tax credit. The invoice summary provision in the tax law makes it mandatory for each
VAT registered firm to file a monthly summary of purchase and sale invoices. The
invoice summary, thus, gives digital synopsis of transactions. It includes registration
number of each buyer and seller along with total number of invoices issued and the
total tax involved in those invoices. This huge information is designed to limit different
frauds including DMT fraud. The detailed format is in Appendix A.1.2 where the
Annexure A, B, C, and D of the return show all the information captured in invoice
summaries. Annexure A and C deal with purchases and sales respectively. Pakistani
VAT regime requires compulsory electronic filing of VAT returns and its annexures.
It implies that transaction-level data is available in electronic form for processing and
counterchecking immediately with the filing of the return.
A.1.1.3 Missing Trader Fraud
The invoice summary provisions exist in most VAT regimes requiring the businesses to
submit an electronic summary of sale and purchase invoices to substantiate their VAT
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return. The backward and forward linkage is designed to enable the tax authorities to
comprehensively check the invoice trail in suspicious transactions. The non-deposit
of input tax credit claimed on the basis of invoice issued by a non-existent seller can
be denied retrospectively or through audit, making both the buyer and seller jointly
and severally responsible for the deposit of tax.
DMT fraud operates in a chain. In Pakistani case, one firm issues invoices to the
other and so on. Usually, the first supplier S1, issues sales invoices of the desired
goods to a buyer without actually supplying them. The buyer in these cases is a
well-established business operating in formal sector, generally a manufacturer. The
invoice issued by S1 gives the buyer right to claim input tax credit although she
actually purchased those goods from unregistered suppliers in the informal sector. In
order to reduce her tax liability, the buyer now has legal claim of input tax against
purchases, which never physically occurred. This can reduce tax liability of the buyer
significantly. For example, a buyer who made purchases worth ten million PKR from
the unregistered or informal sector can reduce her payable VAT by 1.5 million rupees
(assuming a 15% tax rate). The self-enforcing mechanism of VAT demands that seller
S1 has a large amount of output tax which must be deposited in the treasury but to
this end S1 is backed by a chain of suppliers say S2, S3, S4, S5 etc. who can provide
the fake input tax credit to reduce the actual tax payment by S1 to zero or a negligible
amount. One such network of suppliers who are criminally colluding with each other
can deprive the exchequer to the tunes of billions of rupees each month.
These fake suppliers exploit the difficulty of audit and enforcement faced by the
tax administration to get away with this fraud. The EU analogy is applicable here. In
Pakistan, audit and enforcement jurisdictions are territorial and the auditors lack the
authority and resources to conduct audit and verifications beyond their geographical
limits. If the suppliers are carefully registered in different jurisdictions then these
geographical limits work in a manner similar to the countries in EU but with far
more ease of operation for the fraudsters. Clearly, if the suppliers S1, S2, ..., Sn are
registered in different audit and enforcement jurisdictions, then practically there’s
very little an auditor can do. The investigation can be impeded further by two
critical factors. First, the audit normally requires a period of year or more of activity
and can take months or even years to complete and still more time is needed to get
an enforceable order of recovery from the court. Second, once in the court, the courts
are reluctant to buy the argument that based on a presumption some of the suppliers
never existed at the time transaction took place. The government ends up giving
refund or tax credit for the tax, which was never deposited in the treasury.
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I elaborate it with an example. Suppose“M”is a manufacturer who buys recyclable
paper and paperboard from large wholesalers operating in informal sector. It costs
“M” ten million PKR to purchase this recyclable paper. M manufactures paper from
it and sells it for PKR12.5 million. This firm is required to collect and remit a tax
of 1,875,000 PKR (assuming a 15% tax rate) on this sale. If M can now get an
invoice from S1 for its purchase, then it reduces the tax liability by PKR 1,500,000.
now collects full PKR 1,875,000 from its buyers but remits only 375,000 PKR. S1
provides this fake invoice to M through a chain extending to S2, S3, S4, S5 and so on.
The situation gets worse when M passes on some of this gain to the market through
a reduced price. M starts capturing the market which leaves no other way for the
competitors but to lower their cost by either engaging in similar fraud or changing
its operations. Since the capital cost of changing operations is high and benefits are
risky, the slippage to fraud is a more realistic and economically rational choice for the
firm. This leads to an exponential growth where large segments of the industry get
involved in these transactions. Virmani (1989) provides theoretical analysis of these
types of problems in sales tax with reference to the evasion through mis-declaration
of output but the intuition used by him can be extended to mis-declaration of inputs.
A.1.1.4 CREST and Reform in July 2013
CREST software analyzes and scrutinizes invoice summaries submitted by the buyers
and suppliers. Then it goes back in the supply chain to identify any suspicious activity
and points out invoice by invoice discrepancy. CREST is also linked with import and
export data and cross verifies imports and export data submitted by the firms in their
returns. Exhibit B-I provides a snapshot of the actual interface and output given by
the CREST.
If an audit or further inquiry is necessary because either some invoices were not
cleared by CREST or for any other reason, the amount cleared by CREST and ap-
proved by the refund processing division is sanctioned and the remaining amount is
withheld pending further clarification. In short, refund claimant has to go through
a month by month scrutiny which may often result in audit or inquiries. Through
CREST system each invoice for the month is under scrutiny for refund claimant. This
system is operational since financial year 2008 and the rules provide legal cover for
the scrutiny of claims through CREST. Furthermore, the cases in which a firm is
supplying goods locally as well as exporting them, CREST scrutinizes each and every
invoice whether it pertains to a material used in export of goods or not. If CREST
objects to a purchase, refund portion of the claim gets attenuated by the amount of
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Figure A.3: CREST Output showing Supply Chain Discrepancies
Explanation: The exhibit shows the output after processing of a refund claim through
CREST along with invoice specific discrepancies raised against invoices with suspicious
supply chain. This system was operational prior to the reform starting in early 2003 and
completely rolled out countrywide by the financial year 2008.
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that invoice even if the goods in question were not used in export. For example, a firm
has total input for taxable purchases aggregating to PKR 1 million for a month but
is only claiming a refund to the tune of PKR 0.5 million against exports. If CREST
objects to PKR 0.1 million of input tax credit only, then the refundable amount takes
the first hit and gets reduced to PKR 0.4 million.
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Figure A.4: CREST Output Showing Other Discrepancies
Explanation: The exhibit shows the output for a supplier who is not a refund claimant
by CREST along with invoice specific discrepancies raised against invoices with suspicious
supply chain. This system was available to the tax authorities prior to the reform but
didn’t have any legal force in itself to deny input tax claim. After the reform in June 2013,
the discrepancy raised by CREST against the domestic supplier as seen in the Exhibit
automatically denied input tax claims against the difference amount.
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A.1.2 Data Description
The data used in the paper is the administrative data of all the returns filed for the
tax year 2009-2016 and first five months of the year 2017 constituting a total of 9.69
million returns. The data is anonymized so that it does not reflect actual registration
numbers of firms to preserve confidentiality of specific firms. The returns are filed on
monthly basis with the exception of a few industries or categories which file return
on quarterly basis. Figure A.5 shows the return for the year 2016-17 (tax year 2017)
on FBR’s website and has several annexures which are also required to be filed with
the return electronically. Figure A.5 only contains the annexures relevant for this
paper. All returns are filed electronically, however, the period from 2009-2012 may
have manual as well as electronic returns because the administration was transitioning
towards electronic filing.
The data consists of 100 variables in total and few variables which directly relate
to this paper are described in table A.4. Domestic input tax credit is the key variable.
The penalty for not filing a return when no tax is due to be paid with the return is
nominal throughout this period. The firms have the option to file a revised return to
correct any error or misreporting in their return. A total of 3, 134 duplicate returns
were filed and therefore dropped. The duplicate returns were also checked to ensure
there’s no change in the domestic input tax credit but no such case was found. Those
who claimed refund in excess of 1 million PKR in total before the year of the reform
were tagged as the control and those who obtained no or less than one million in
total were tagged as treatment. The variable “Business Activity” includes all that
apply, therefore, separate variables were generated to identify manufacturers and
other business activities such as importer, wholesaler, and distributor (please refer
to the definitions at Appendix A.1.1). The data for quarter Oct-Dec 2016 was not
complete for the month of December and was therefore dropped from this analysis.
Outliers in terms of domestic input tax credit were identified by setting a monthly
threshold of PKR 2 billion to guard against data entry error. Only one such case was
found and dropped. Missing values for the input tax credit for domestic as well as
the import purchases were converted to 1 instead of zero for ease of calculations. It
should be noted that a missing input tax value implies a zero claim.
Although the errors in data cannot be completely ruled out but the electronic
filing on FBR’s portal implies that the feeding errors that result in figure mismatches
are eliminated. As one column of the return is calculated and links forward and
backwards through in built software, data entry errors can be ignored. However,
the firms can file a revised return, without prior approval voluntarily if that doesn’t
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interfere with tax credits or payments such that tax liability remains the same or
increases but in case the liability is to be revised downwards then a prior approval is
required. The data does not show whether a duplicate return is revised or not but the
duplicate returns are substantially less than 1% (3134 returns or 0.03%). For analysis
purpose, I drop the duplicate returns for the same tax period but it is possible that
revised return is dropped instead of the original one.
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Table A.4: Data Variables and Description
Variable Description
TAXPAYER TYPE Taxpayer Type (AOP/Company/Sole Proprietorship/FTN or Government Agencies)
BUSINESS ACTIVITY Business Activity (Manufacturer, distributor etc.), includes all that apply
ITEM NAME Name of the product sold, includes all that apply
CITY City of registration
TAX PERIOD Monthly Tax Period in which return is filed
D GPUPCH Domestic Purchases from Registered Persons (excluding fixed assets) (Gross Value)
D TPURCH Domestic Purchases from Registered Persons (excluding fixed assets) (Taxable Value)
D INPUT Domestic input tax credit
DU GPURCH Domestic Purchases from Un-registered Persons (Gross Value)
I GPURCH Imports excluding fixed assets (includes value addition tax on commercial imports) (Gross Value)
I TPURCH Imports excluding fixed assets (includes value addition tax on commercial imports)
(Taxable Value)
I INPUT Imported Input tax credit
FIX GPURCH Capital Goods / Fixed Assets (Domestic Purchases & Imports)
(Gross Value)
FIX TPURCH Capital Goods / Fixed Assets (Domestic Purchases & Imports) (Taxable Value)
FIX INPUT Input Tax on account of Capital Goods / Fixed Assets (Domestic Purchases & Imports)
TOT PURCH Total Purchase (Gross Value)
TOT TPURCH Total Purchase (Taxable Value)
INPUT Total Input tax credit for the month
STAX CREDIT Credit carried forward from previous tax period(s)
INADMIS INPUT Non creditable inputs (relating to exempt, non-taxed supplies of goods or services etc.)
D GSALE Total Goods or services supplied locally (Gross Value)
D TSALE Total Goods or services supplied locally (Taxable Value)
D OUTPUT Total Goods or services supplied locally (Sales Tax)
E SALE1 Goods or Services exported (Gross Value)
TOT SALE Total Sales (Gross Value)
TOT TSALE Total Sales (Taxable Value)
G OUTPUT Output Tax
TURNOVER TAX BY RETAILERS Turnover Tax payable by retailers @ 2%
TO OUTPUT Retail Turnover - for the Quarter (Taxable Value)
TO OUTPUT TAX Output Tax on Retail Turnover - for the Quarter
REFUND Refund Claim (Provide Stock Statement as Annex-H)
TAX PAYABLE Total Tax Payable
TAX PAID NORMAL Tax paid on normal/previous return (applicable in case of amended return)
BALANCE TAX Balance Tax Payable/ (Refundable)
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Additional Tables and Figures
Figure B.1.1: Quartile Wise Bunching Estimates for First Period
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Explanation: The graph plots number of firms along with its counterfactual distribution, showing
bunching for different quartiles during first period. Horizontal axes show value addition percentage
which is calculated using gross sales and imports in a year for each importing firm. Each bin on this
axis has a width of 1 percent such that, for example, any firm showing value addition equal to or
greater than 4% but less than 5% would be counted in that bin. Vertical axes show number of firms
in the bins. Red vertical lines show MVA threshold for a particular year. The tails on left and right
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of bunching window are relatively thick for fourth quartile suggesting that these firms possibly face
more adjustment costs.
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Figure B.1.2: Quartile Wise Bunching Estimates for Second Period
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Explanation: The graph plots number of firms along with its counterfactual distribution, showing
bunching for different quartiles during second period. Horizontal axes show value addition percentage
which is calculated using gross sales and imports in a year for each importing firm. Each bin on this
axis has a width of 1 percent such that, for example, any firm showing value addition equal to or
greater than 4% but less than 5% would be counted in that bin. Vertical axes show number of firms
in the bins. Red vertical lines show MVA threshold for a particular year. The tails on left and right




I use administrative data of all the returns filed for the tax year 2009-2016 and first
five months of the year 2017 constituting a total of 9.69 million returns. Normal
returns are filed on monthly basis with the exception of a few industries or categories
which file return on quarterly basis or may file special or revised returns. The data
consists of 100 variables in total and few variables which directly relate to this chapter
are described in table B.1.1. Import value and domestic sale are key variables. The
return has a separate columns for input tax paid as MVA tax at time of import.
Taxable sales value may include some taxable purchase and sales at domestic level
but they are not bifurcated for the analysis in this essay.
Although the errors in data cannot be completely ruled out but the electronic
filing on FBR’s portal implies that the feeding errors that result in figure mismatches
are eliminated. As one column of the return is calculated and links forward and
backwards through in built software, data entry errors can be ignored. However,
the firms can file a revised return, without prior approval voluntarily if that doesn’t
interfere with tax credits or payments such that tax liability remains the same or
increases but in case the liability is to be revised downwards then a prior approval is
required. The data does not show whether a duplicate return is revised or not but the
duplicate returns are substantially less than 1% (3134 returns or 0.03%). For analysis
purpose, I drop the duplicate returns for the same tax period but it is possible that
revised return is dropped instead of the original one.
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Table B.1.1: Data Variables and Description
Variable Description
TAXPAYER TYPE Taxpayer Type (AOP/Company/Sole Proprietorship/FTN or Government Agencies)
BUSINESS ACTIVITY Business Activity (Manufacturer, distributor etc.), includes all that apply
ITEM NAME Name of the product sold, includes all that apply
CITY City of registration
TAX PERIOD Monthly Tax Period in which return is filed
D GPUPCH Domestic Purchases from Registered Persons (excluding fixed assets) (Gross Value)
D TPURCH Domestic Purchases from Registered Persons (excluding fixed assets) (Taxable Value)
D INPUT Domestic input tax credit
DU GPURCH Domestic Purchases from Un-registered Persons (Gross Value)
I GPURCH Imports excluding fixed assets (includes value addition tax on commercial imports) (Gross Value)
I TPURCH Imports excluding fixed assets (includes value addition tax on commercial imports)
(Taxable Value)
I INPUT Imported Input tax credit
FIX GPURCH Capital Goods / Fixed Assets (Domestic Purchases & Imports)
(Gross Value)
FIX TPURCH Capital Goods / Fixed Assets (Domestic Purchases & Imports) (Taxable Value)
FIX INPUT Input Tax on account of Capital Goods / Fixed Assets (Domestic Purchases & Imports)
TOT PURCH Total Purchase (Gross Value)
TOT TPURCH Total Purchase (Taxable Value)
INPUT Total Input tax credit for the month
STAX CREDIT Credit carried forward from previous tax period(s)
INADMIS INPUT Non creditable inputs (relating to exempt, non-taxed supplies of goods or services etc.)
D GSALE Total Goods or services supplied locally (Gross Value)
D TSALE Total Goods or services supplied locally (Taxable Value)
D OUTPUT Total Goods or services supplied locally (Sales Tax)
E SALE1 Goods or Services exported (Gross Value)
TOT SALE Total Sales (Gross Value)
TOT TSALE Total Sales (Taxable Value)
G OUTPUT Output Tax
TURNOVER TAX BY RETAILERS Turnover Tax payable by retailers @ 2%
TO OUTPUT Retail Turnover - for the Quarter (Taxable Value)
TO OUTPUT TAX Output Tax on Retail Turnover - for the Quarter
REFUND Refund Claim (Provide Stock Statement as Annex-H)
TAX PAYABLE Total Tax Payable
TAX PAID NORMAL Tax paid on normal/previous return (applicable in case of amended return)
BALANCE TAX Balance Tax Payable/ (Refundable)
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Definition of Variables
(i) Sales. The value of all goods and services supplied by the firm in the given tax
period (month) including exports.
(ii) Purchases. The value of all taxable intermediates acquired by the firm in the
given tax period (month).
(iii) Output Tax. The value of VAT charged on sales made by the firm in the given
tax period (month). It equals τ. (ŝit − ŝE,it), where τ is the applicable VAT rate
and (ŝit − ŝE,it) is the value of non-export sales reported by firm i in period t.
Because exports are zero-rated, they do not appear in the output tax.
(iv) Input Tax. The value of VAT credit claimed on intermediates acquired by the
firm in the given tax period (month). It equals τ.ĉit, where τ is the applicable
VAT rate and ĉit is the value of purchases of intermediates claimed by firm i in
period t.
(v) Tax Payable. The VAT payable by the firm in the given tax period (month). By
definition, it equals the output tax minus the input tax.
(vi) Tax Paid The VAT actually paid by the firm in the given tax period (month).
It may differ from Tax Payable if the firm has any carry-forward from previous
months.
(vii) Exports. The value of all goods and services exported by the firm in the given
tax period (month).
(viii) Imports. The value of all goods and services imported by the firm in the given
tax period (month).
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(ix ) Refund. The amount of refund claimed by the firm in the given tax period
(month). The refund arises when the firm’s input tax exceeds its output tax. In
this case, the firm has the option to carry forward the balance amount or seek
its refund. Because exports are zero-rated, firms the majority of whose output is
exported are likely to claim refund every tax period.
(x ) Carry Forward. The amount of carry forward claimed by a firm. The carry
forward arises when the firm’s input tax exceeds its output tax and it does not
opt to seek the refund of the balance amount.
(xi) Manufacturer. A firm whose principal business activity is the manufacture of
goods. Manufacturing is the process whereby a firm converts inputs into a distinct
article capable of being put to use differently than inputs and includes any process
incidental or ancillary to it.
(xii) Importer. A firm whose principal business activity is the import of goods for sale
in the local market without carrying out any manufacturing process on them.
(xiii) Exporter. A firm whose principal business activity is the export of goods. These
firms may supply in the local market, but a majority of their output is exported
out of country.
(xiv) Distributor. Distributor means a person appointed by a manufacturer, importer
or any other person for a specified area to purchase goods from him for further
supply and includes a person who in addition to being a distributor is also engaged
in supply of goods as a wholesaler or a retailer.
(xv) Wholesaler. Wholesaler’ includes a dealer and means any person who carries
on, whether regularly or otherwise, the business of buying and selling goods by
wholesale or of supplying or distributing goods, directly or indirectly, by wholesale
for cash or deferred payment or for commission or other valuable consideration
or stores such goods belonging to others as an agent for the purpose of sale; and
includes a person supplying taxable goods to a person who deducts income tax
at source under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.
(xvi) Retailer. A person, supplying goods to general public for the purpose of con-
sumption.
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(xvii) Industry. The Pakistani tax administration uses 4-digit Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding System (HS code) to classify firms into industry. The
code, used by customs administrations throughout the world, divides all goods
and services into 99 chapters (the first two digits in the code) and 21 sections.
The sections broadly correspond to major industries in the country. I take the
section a firm falls in as its industry.
(xviii) Major City The dummy variable takes the value 1 if the firm’s head office is in
one of the three major cities of Pakistan—Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad.
(xix ) LTU The dummy variable takes the value 1 if the firm is administered by on of
the four Large Taxpayer Centers in the country located in Karachi, Lahore, and
Islamabad.
C.2 Marginal Treatment Effects
In this section, we describe how we estimate the MTE(p) curves shown in Figures
3.9 and 3.10. Because we have access to a binary instrument only, full nonparametric
identification (see James J. Heckman and E. Vytlacil 2005; James J. Heckman and
Edward J. Vytlacil 2007) is not feasible in our setup, and instead we identify MTEs
under a functional structure following the approach developed in Kowalski (2016) and
Brinch, Mogstad, and Wiswall (2017).
As in the paper, Z here denotes the instrument (random assignment) and D the
treatment (actual audit). Following the standard terminology in this literature, we refer
to p ≡ P (D = 1|Z) as the potential fraction treated. For any outcome Y , The MTE(p)
is defined as
MTE(p) ≡ E(YT − YU |UD = p)
where YT represents the potential outcome in the audited state (D = 1) and YU the
potential outcome in the unaudited state (D = 0). The unobserved cost and benefit
of audit are represented by UD and p. The MTE therefore captures the treatment
effect on a unit marginal to selecting into treatment. Using the above definition, it
can be written as the difference between the marginal treated outcome (MTO) and the
marginal untreated outcome (MUO)
MTO(p) ≡ E(YT |UD = p)
MUO(p) ≡ E(YU |UD = p)
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These curves are defined for every value of p(Z) but given our binary instrument only
two values of p are observed: the baseline treatment probability pB ≡ P (D = 1|Z = 0)
and the intervention treatment probability pI ≡ P (D = 1|Z = 1). We therefore assume
that both these curves are linear. The MTO(p) is identified at two points
BTTO = E(Y |X = x,D = 1, Z = 0)
LATO = 1
pI−pB
[pIITTO − pBBTTO] ,
where ITTO = E(Y |X = x,D = 1, Z = 1). We use the linearity assumption to
extrapolate between these two points. Similarly, the MUO(p) is identified at
IUUO = E(Y |X = x,D = 0, Z = 1)
LAUO = 1
pI−pB
[(1− pB)BUUO − (1− pI)IUUO]
where BUUO = E(Y |X = x,D = 0, Z = 0).1
To plot the MTO(p) curve, we regress the outcome variable on a full set of firm and
period fixed fixed effects and an interaction term of the audit (D) and post dummies, re-
stricting the sample to firms randomly selected for audit (Z = 1). The regression gives
us estimates of ITTO and IUUO. Running a similar regression on a sample of firms
not drawn in the random ballot (Z = 0) delivers the estimates of BTTO and BUUO.
We then find LATO and LAUO using the definitions above. The MTO(p) curve is
identified at two points (BTTO, pB
2
) and (LATO, pB+pI
2
). We extrapolate between the





), and we extrapolate using linearity. The MTO(p) curve is the dif-
ference between the two. We draw these curves for four outcomes and two audit waves
separately. Since in our setting all these curves sit above each other, we lift both
MTO(p) and MUO(p) up by adding the constant from the corresponding regression to
distinguish them from the primary object of our interest MTE(p).
1In all these definitions, O stands for outcomes, T for treated, U for untreated, B for baseline, I
for intervention, and LA for local average. Please see kowalski2016doing for detail of these terms.
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Figure C.2.1: Amount Detected by Timing of Audit
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Notes: The figure examines if the order in which audits were taken up is correlated with audit outcomes,
exploring thereby if audits were systematically targeted toward specific firms. We divide the time between
assignment and initiation of audit into ten deciles and then plot the average audit outcome and the 95%
confidence interval around it for each decile. The top panels look at the average amount detected by
audit in PKR thousands, the middle panels at the average amount recovered in PKR thousands, and the
bottom panels at the average amount detected as a ratio of annual baseline turnover of the firm. To take
care of outliers, we drop observations where the amount detected is more than the 99th percentile of the
distribution. This affects the top and bottom panels only. The LHS panels plot outcomes for the first
randomized ballot and the RHS for the second.
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Figure C.2.2: Intention to Treat Effects of Third Audit Wave
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Notes: The figure explores the impacts of audit on future firm behavior. We compare the evolution of
four VAT outcomes across the treatment and control groups. The treatment groups consists of firms
whose audit was assigned through the first random ballot held on September 14, 2015. The control group
comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of
VAT filers excluding government departments, firms already under audit, and firms subject to fixed and
withholding tax regimes. We do not identify the last type of firms and therefore are unable to exclude
them from the eligible sample. To construct these charts, we regress the log of the outcome variable shown
in the title of each panel on the full set of firm and month fixed effects, dropping the dummy for July
2008. We then plot the coefficients on the time dummies of these regressions. The sample includes all
tax periods from July 2008 to June 2018. The regressions are run separately for the two groups of firms.
Year t on the horizontal axis indicates July of the corresponding year. Vertical dashed lines demarcate
the date the random computer ballot was held on.
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Figure C.2.3: Intention to Treat Effects of Third Audit Wave
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Notes: The figure shows the difference-in-differences version of the plots in Figure C.2.2. To construct
these charts, we regress the log of the outcome variable shown in the title of each panel on the full
set of firm, month, and month×treat dummies, dropping the dummies for July 2008. We then plot
the coefficients on the month×treat dummies from these regressions. The gray surface plot shows the
95% confidence interval around the coefficient. The treatment groups consists of firms whose audit was
assigned through the first random ballot held on September 14, 2015. The control group comprises the
rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers
excluding government departments, firms already under audit, and firms subject to fixed and withholding
tax regimes. We do not identify the last type of firms and therefore are unable to exclude them from the
eligible sample. We cluster standard errors at the firm level. Year t on the horizontal axis indicates July
of the corresponding year. Vertical dashed lines demarcate the date the random computer ballot was held
on.
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Figure C.2.4: Heterogeneity in Response by Firm Size
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Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into ten deciles based on
their annual turnover in the baseline year. We then estimate a triple-difference version of model (3.10).
The model includes interactions of the firm decile dummy with the assign×afterit dummy. The assigni
dummies takes the value 1 if the firm’s audit was assigned in the corresponding random computer ballot.
The control group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the
population of VAT filers excluding government departments and firms already under audit. The dummy
variable aftert indicates that month t falls after the date of the ballot. We drop the triple-interaction
term involving the first decile. The coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals on the double and triple-
interaction terms from these regressions are plotted. Regressions are run separately for the first and the
second audit waves. The first wave results are in blue and the second wave results are in red. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure C.2.5: Heterogeneity in Response by Firm Age
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Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into ten deciles based on
their age, defining age as the number of days between July 1, 2013 and the date of registration of the
firm. We then estimate a triple-difference version of model (3.10). The model includes interactions of
the firm decile dummies with the assign× afterit dummy. The assigni dummy takes the value 1 if the
firm’s audit was assigned in the corresponding random computer ballot. The control group comprises
the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers
excluding government departments and firms already under audit. The dummy variable aftert indicates
that month t falls after the date of the ballot. We drop the triple-interaction term involving the first
decile. The coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals on the double and triple-interaction terms from
these regressions are plotted. Regressions are run separately for the first and the second audit waves. The
first wave results are in blue and the second wave results are in red. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm level.
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Figure C.2.6: Heterogeneity in Response by Location
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Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into five groups depending
upon the city their head office is located in. Firms not located in the four major cities of the country—
Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, and Faisalabad— are included in the baseline category. We then estimate
a triple-difference version of model (3.10). The model includes interactions of the firm location dummies
with the assign×afterit dummy. The assigni dummy takes the value 1 if the firm’s audit was assigned in
the corresponding random computer ballot. The control group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible
sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers excluding government departments
and firms already under audit. The dummy variable aftert indicates that month t falls after the date of
the ballot. The coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals on the double and triple-interaction terms
from these regressions are plotted. Regressions are run separately for the first and the second audit waves.
The first wave results are in blue and the second wave results are in red. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level.
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Figure C.2.7: Heterogeneity in Response by Tax Office
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Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into eleven groups based on
the local tax office they are subject to. Firms not in the ten major tax offices are included in the baseline
category. We then estimate a triple-difference version of model (3.10). The model includes interactions
of the tax office dummies with the assign × afterit dummy. The assigni dummy takes the value 1 if
the firm’s audit was assigned in the corresponding random computer ballot. The control group comprises
the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers
excluding government departments and firms already under audit. The dummy variable aftert indicates
that month t falls after the date of the ballot. The coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals on the
double and triple-interaction terms from these regressions are plotted. Regressions are run separately for
the first and the second audit waves. The first wave results are in blue and the second wave results are
in red. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure C.2.8: Heterogeneity in Response by Tax Office Type
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Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into three groups based on
the type of tax office they are subject to. Firms in four Large Taxpayer Units of the country are included
in the first group (LTU), firms in the two Corporate Regional Tax Offices are included in the second
group, and the rest of the firms are included in the baseline category. These firms are subject to a normal
Regional Tax Office. We then estimate a triple-difference version of model (3.10). The model includes
interactions of the tax office type dummies with the assign× afterit dummy. The assigni dummy takes
the value 1 if the firm’s audit was assigned in the corresponding random computer ballot. The control
group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population
of VAT filers excluding government departments and firms already under audit. The dummy variable
aftert indicates that month t falls after the date of the ballot. The coefficients and the 95% confidence
intervals on the double and triple-interaction terms from these regressions are plotted. Regressions are
run separately for the first and the second audit waves. The first wave results are in blue and the second
wave results are in red. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure C.2.9: Heterogeneity in Response by Production Stage
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Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into seven groups based
on their principle business activity. The baseline category are retailers. These activities roughly capture
the position of the firm in the supply chain. We then estimate a triple-difference version of model (3.10).
The model includes interactions of the production stage dummies with the assign× afterit dummy. The
assigni dummy takes the value 1 if the firm’s audit was assigned in the corresponding random computer
ballot. The control group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample
consists of the population of VAT filers excluding government departments and firms already under audit.
The dummy variable aftert indicates that month t falls after the date of the ballot. The coefficients and
the 95% confidence intervals on the double and triple-interaction terms from these regressions are plotted.
Regressions are run separately for the first and the second audit waves. The first wave results are in blue
and the second wave results are in red. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure C.2.10: Heterogeneity in Response by Business Organization
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Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into three groups based
on their business organization. The baseline category are sole proprietors. We then estimate a triple-
difference version of model (3.10). The model includes interactions of the business organization dummies
with the assign×afterit dummy. The assigni dummy takes the value 1 if the firm’s audit was assigned in
the corresponding random computer ballot. The control group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible
sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers excluding government departments
and firms already under audit. The dummy variable aftert indicates that month t falls after the date of
the ballot. The coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals on the double and triple-interaction terms
from these regressions are plotted. Regressions are run separately for the first and the second audit waves.
The first wave results are in blue and the second wave results are in red. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level.
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Figure C.2.11: Heterogeneity in Response by Industry
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Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into 12 groups based on the
industry they operate in. We separate firms in 11 major industries of the country and club the rest into
the baseline category. We then estimate a triple-difference version of model (3.10). The model includes
interactions of the industry dummies with the assign × afterit dummy. The assigni dummy takes the
value 1 if the firm’s audit was assigned in the corresponding random computer ballot. The control group
comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population
of VAT filers excluding government departments and firms already under audit. The dummy variable
aftert indicates that month t falls after the date of the ballot. The coefficients and the 95% confidence
intervals on the double and triple-interaction terms from these regressions are plotted. Regressions are
run separately for the first and the second audit waves. The first wave results are in blue and the second
wave results are in red. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure C.2.12: Heterogeneity in Response by Timing of Audit
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Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into ten deciles based
on the time lag between the assignment and initiation of audit in days. We then estimate a triple-
difference version of model (3.10). The model includes interactions of the firm decile dummies with the
assign × afterit dummy. The assigni dummy takes the value 1 if the firm’s audit was assigned in the
corresponding random computer ballot. The control group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible
sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers excluding government departments
and firms already under audit. The dummy variable aftert indicates that month t falls after the date
of the ballot. We drop the triple-interaction term involving the first decile. The coefficients and the
95% confidence intervals on the double and triple-interaction terms from these regressions are plotted.
Regressions are run separately for the first and the second audit waves. The first wave results are in blue
and the second wave results are in red. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure C.2.13: Heterogeneity in Response by Firm Size (First Wave)
A: Sales B: Purchases
C: Output Tax D: Input Tax
Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We use firm-size as a continuous variable.
We then use a generalized random forest model to estimate the treatment effects of the audit for all
values within the feasible range based on the available data. We consider a firm as treated (audited) if
the firm’s audit was assigned in the corresponding random computer ballot. The control group comprises
the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers
excluding government departments and firms already under audit. The estimated treatment effects and
95% confidence intervals on the estimated treatment effects are plotted. Models are estimated separately
for each outcome variable.
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Figure C.2.14: Heterogeneity in Response by Firm Size (Second Wave)
A: Sales B: Purchases
C: Output Tax D: Input Tax
Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We use firm-size as a continuous variable.
We then use a generalized random forest model to estimate the treatment effects of the audit for all
values within the feasible range based on the available data. We consider a firm as treated (audited) if
the firm’s audit was assigned in the corresponding random computer ballot. The control group comprises
the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers
excluding government departments and firms already under audit. The estimated treatment effects and
95% confidence intervals on the estimated treatment effects are plotted. Models are estimated separately
for each outcome variable.
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Figure C.2.15: Heterogeneity in Response by Firm Age (First Wave)
A: Sales B: Purchases
C: Output Tax D: Input Tax
Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We use firm-age as a continuous variable.
We then use a generalized random forest model to estimate the treatment effects of the audit for all
values within the feasible range based on the available data. We consider a firm as treated (audited) if
the firm’s audit was assigned in the corresponding random computer ballot. The control group comprises
the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers
excluding government departments and firms already under audit. The estimated treatment effects and
95% confidence intervals on the estimated treatment effects are plotted. Models are estimated separately
for each outcome variable.
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Figure C.2.16: Heterogeneity in Response by Firm Age (Second Wave)
A: Sales B: Purchases
C: Output Tax D: Input Tax
Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We use firm-age as a continuous variable.
We then use a generalized random forest model to estimate the treatment effects of the audit for all
values within the feasible range based on the available data. We consider a firm as treated (audited) if
the firm’s audit was assigned in the corresponding random computer ballot. The control group comprises
the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers
excluding government departments and firms already under audit. The estimated treatment effects and
95% confidence intervals on the estimated treatment effects are plotted. Models are estimated separately
for each outcome variable.
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Figure C.2.17: Heterogeneity in Response by Location
A: Sales B: Purchases
C: Output Tax D: Input Tax
Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into five groups
depending upon the city their head office is located in. Firms not located in the four major
cities of the country— Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, and Faisalabad— are included in the
baseline category. We then use a generalized random forest model to estimate the treatment
effects of the audit. The model includes dummy variables for each group along with a dummy
variable for ”after” - indicating the time period after the date of the ballot. We consider a firm
as treated (audited) if the firm’s audit was assigned in the corresponding random computer
ballot. The control group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible
sample consists of the population of VAT filers excluding government departments and firms
already under audit. The coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals on the estimated
treatment effects are plotted. Models are estimated separately for the first and the second
audit waves and for each outcome variable. The first wave results are in blue and the second
wave results are in red.
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Figure C.2.18: Heterogeneity in Response by Tax Office
A: Sales B: Purchases
C: Output Tax D: Input Tax
Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into eleven groups
based on the local tax office they are subject to. Firms not in the ten major tax offices are
included in the baseline category. We then use a generalized random forest model to estimate
the treatment effects of the audit. The model includes dummy variables for each group along
with a dummy variable for ”after” - indicating the time period after the date of the ballot.
We consider a firm as treated (audited) if the firm’s audit was assigned in the corresponding
random computer ballot. The control group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible
sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers excluding government
departments and firms already under audit. The coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals
on the estimated treatment effects are plotted. Models are estimated separately for the first
and the second audit waves and for each outcome variable. The first wave results are in blue
and the second wave results are in red.
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Figure C.2.19: Heterogeneity in Response by Tax Office Type
A: Sales B: Purchases
C: Output Tax D: Input Tax
Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into three groups
based on the type of tax office they are subject to. Firms in four Large Taxpayer Units of the
country are included in the first group (LTU), firms in the two Corporate Regional Tax Offices
are included in the second group, and the rest of the firms are included in the baseline category.
These firms are subject to a normal Regional Tax Office. We then use a generalized random
forest model to estimate the treatment effects of the audit. The model includes dummy
variables for each tax office type along with a dummy variable for ”after” - indicating the time
period after the date of the ballot. We consider a firm as treated (audited) if the firm’s audit
was assigned in the corresponding random computer ballot. The control group comprises
the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of
VAT filers excluding government departments and firms already under audit. The coefficients
and the 95% confidence intervals on the estimated treatment effects are plotted. Models are
estimated separately for the first and the second audit waves and for each outcome variable.
The first wave results are in blue and the second wave results are in red.
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Figure C.2.20: Heterogeneity in Response by Production Stage
A: Sales B: Purchases
C: Output Tax D: Input Tax
Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into seven groups
based on their principle business activity. The baseline category are retailers. These activities
roughly capture the position of the firm in the supply chain. We then use a generalized
random forest model to estimate the treatment effects of the audit. The model includes
dummy variables for each group along with a dummy variable for ”after” - indicating the time
period after the date of the ballot. We consider a firm as treated (audited) if the firm’s audit
was assigned in the corresponding random computer ballot. The control group comprises
the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of
VAT filers excluding government departments and firms already under audit. The coefficients
and the 95% confidence intervals on the estimated treatment effects are plotted. Models are
estimated separately for the first and the second audit waves and for each outcome variable.
The first wave results are in blue and the second wave results are in red.
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Figure C.2.21: Heterogeneity in Response by Business Organization
A: Sales B: Purchases
C: Output Tax D: Input Tax
Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into three
groups based on their business organization. The baseline category are sole proprietors We
then use a generalized random forest model to estimate the treatment effects of the audit.
The model includes dummy variables for each group along with a dummy variable for ”after” -
indicating the time period after the date of the ballot. We consider a firm as treated (audited)
if the firm’s audit was assigned in the corresponding random computer ballot. The control
group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists
of the population of VAT filers excluding government departments and firms already under
audit. The coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals on the estimated treatment effects
are plotted. Models are estimated separately for the first and the second audit waves and for
each outcome variable. The first wave results are in blue and the second wave results are in
red.
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Figure C.2.22: Heterogeneity in Response by Industry
A: Sales B: Purchases
C: Output Tax D: Input Tax
Notes: The figure explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into 11 groups
based on the industry they operate in. We separate firms in 10 major industries of the
country and club the rest into the baseline category. We then use a generalized random forest
model to estimate the treatment effects of the audit. The model includes dummy variables
for each group along with a dummy variable for ”after” - indicating the time period after the
date of the ballot. We consider a firm as treated (audited) if the firm’s audit was assigned
in the corresponding random computer ballot. The control group comprises the rest of the
firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers
excluding government departments and firms already under audit. The coefficients and the
95% confidence intervals on the estimated treatment effects are plotted. Models are estimated
separately for the first and the second audit waves and for each outcome variable. The first
wave results are in blue and the second wave results are in red.
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Table C.2.1: Breakdown of the Detected Amount
Amt. Detected Amt. Recovered Amt. Recoverable Refund Curtailed
PKR % PKR % PKR % PKR %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: First Audit Wave
All Audited Firms 2.147 0.431 0.023 0.005 2.118 0.425 0.004 0.001
Amount Detected > 0 2.147 1.567 0.023 0.017 2.118 1.546 0.004 0.003
Size Quartile 1 0.062 684.756 0.001 11.221 0.061 673.534 0.000 0.000
Size Quartile 2 0.067 3.936 0.003 0.186 0.064 3.750 0.000 0.000
Size Quartile 3 0.215 1.746 0.008 0.067 0.203 1.648 0.003 0.021
Size Quartile 4 1.802 0.372 0.011 0.002 1.790 0.370 0.002 0.000
B: Second Audit Wave
All Audited Firms 2.235 0.102 0.040 0.002 2.191 0.100 0.003 0.000
Amount Detected > 0 2.235 0.845 0.040 0.015 2.191 0.828 0.003 0.001
Size Quartile 1 0.045 10.205 0.002 0.473 0.042 9.649 0.000 0.000
Size Quartile 2 0.166 3.367 0.009 0.179 0.157 3.188 0.000 0.000
Size Quartile 3 0.217 0.889 0.009 0.036 0.205 0.840 0.003 0.012
Size Quartile 4 1.808 0.083 0.020 0.001 1.786 0.082 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table breaks down the total amount detected by audit (columns 1-2) into its three major components (columns 3-8).
The odd-number columns report the amounts in PKR billions and the even-number columns the amount as a ratio of the aggregate
annual turnover of the corresponding group of firm. Amount Recovered is the amount paid by the taxpayer as a result of audit.
Amount Recoverable, on the other hand, is unpaid amount out of the total detected by audit. This amount is subject to quasi-
judicial determination and appeal processes. Refund Curtailed indicates the amount by which the firm agreed to reduce its refund
claim pending with the department.
173
Table C.2.2: Evasion Rate and Firm Characteristics
Outcome: Tax Evasion Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Firm Size -4.065*** -3.995*** -4.020*** -3.863*** -4.552*** -4.416***
(0.481) (0.450) (0.454) (0.457) (0.484) (0.516)
Share Manufacturers 0.091 0.004
(0.282) (0.281)
Share Retailers 0.142 0.182
(0.176) (0.175)
Share Major City -0.116 -0.694
(0.669) (0.730)
Share Young Firms 0.783* 0.950*
(0.447) (0.489)
Share Textile 0.502*** 0.503***
(0.169) (0.170)
Constant 100.526*** 99.989*** 102.595*** 87.577*** 105.866*** 99.519***
(7.466) (7.483) (12.735) (10.578) (7.575) (13.414)
Observations 818 818 818 818 818 818
Notes: The table breaks down the total amount detected by audit (columns 1-2) into its three major
components (columns 3-8). The odd-number columns report the amounts in PKR billions and the even-
number columns the amount as a ratio of the aggregate annual turnover of the corresponding group of
firm. Amount Recovered is the amount paid by the taxpayer as a result of audit. Amount Recoverable,
on the other hand, is unpaid amount out of the total detected by audit. This amount is subject to quasi-
judicial determination and appeal processes. Refund Curtailed indicates the amount by which the firm
agreed to reduce its refund claim pending with the department.
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Table C.2.3: Selection in Sequencing of Audits
Outcome: Days between assignment and initiation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sales -1.785 -4.301 2.542 2.679
(7.492) (7.489) (2.749) (2.657)
Purchases -0.727 -3.636 -2.583 0.588
(8.569) (8.568) (5.626) (5.433)
Output Tax 9.936 8.030 -2.929 0.718
(30.624) (30.012) (12.057) (11.651)
Input Tax -4.050 1.030 3.229 -2.713
(14.118) (13.982) (11.034) (10.648)
Tax Paid -6.673 -3.513 -1.108 -2.919
(23.011) (22.538) (4.718) (4.554)
Exports -0.550 -0.126 1.836 2.399
(1.560) (1.540) (1.002) (0.974)
Imports -0.201 -0.223 -0.370 -0.264
(1.884) (1.916) (0.643) (0.624)
Refund 1.382 1.662 -1.847 -2.325
(1.395) (1.377) (0.866) (0.840)
Carry Forward 1.734 1.132 -0.143 -0.300
(3.374) (3.355) (0.569) (0.549)
Manufacturer -13.271 -11.003 -1.860 -1.986
(5.331) (5.298) (1.615) (1.581)
Importer -0.785 -0.614 -3.302 0.310
(6.230) (6.190) (1.833) (1.791)
Exporter 1.834 6.001 -1.649 -1.134
(9.390) (9.301) (2.282) (2.295)
Distributor 7.098 9.746 -0.251 -1.645
(9.143) (8.977) (2.469) (2.395)
Wholesaler -5.548 -2.847 -1.848 0.958
(5.391) (5.315) (1.669) (1.624)
Service Provider -7.959 -4.111 0.109 1.141
(5.332) (5.247) (1.661) (1.606)
Constant 46.995 44.436 18.961 17.830
(4.843) (4.768) (1.490) (1.443)
Observations 3,482 3,481 3,612 3,611
Corporation FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tax Office FEs No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table explores selection in audit. We regress the time lag measured in number of days
between the assignment and initiation of audit on baseline firm characteristics. We standardize the first
nine variables in this table by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the variable.
Since audits were taken up by local tax offices, we include the tax office fixed effects in even-numbered
columns. The first two columns report results for the first audit wave and the last two for the second
audit wave. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table C.2.4: Preexisting Trends
First Wave Second Wave
Sales Purchases Output Input Tax Payable Sales Purchases Output Input Tax Payable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
assign × year ∈ [s− 1, s] -0.018 -0.005 -0.039 -0.004 -0.033 -0.016 -0.018 -0.027 -0.030 0.002
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017)
assign × year ∈ [s− 3, s] 0.001 0.021 -0.031 0.021 -0.006 -0.006 -0.014 -0.005 -0.020 0.012
(0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
assign × year ∈ [s− 5, s] -0.004 0.042 -0.019 0.040 0.051 0.028 0.007 0.020 -0.002 0.056
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.033) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017)
Observations 2,324,186 2,025,380 1,672,095 1,681,583 1,154,574 2,628,878 2,290,848 1,934,273 1,945,733 1,312,928
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table explores if the preexisting trends for the five outcomes indicated in the heading of each column were parallel between firms who
were picked for audit in a random ballot and other firms in the eligible sample. We estimate a model similar to (3.10) replacing the assign× afterit
dummy with three dummies shown in the top three rows. The dummy variable assigni denotes that firm i’s was picked for audit in the random
ballot indicated in the heading of the column. The control group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of
the population of VAT filers excluding government departments and firms already under audit. The sample for these regressions include the baseline
periods only, from July 2008 to August 2013 for the first wave and from July 2008 to August 2014 for the second. The dummy variable year ∈ [s−1, s]
indicates that the period is one of the last twelve months included in the regression and so on. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been
clustered at the firm level.
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Table C.2.5: Impacts of Random Audits Assigned in the First Wave
Impacts After One Year Impacts After Three Years
Sales Purchases Output Input Tax Sales Purchases Output Input Tax
Tax Tax Payable Tax Tax Payable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A: ITT Estimates
assign × after -0.009 -0.009 -0.016 -0.017 -0.037 -0.007 -0.021 -0.025 -0.036 -0.015
(0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.026) (0.027) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.030)
Observations 2,802,387 2,456,864 2,061,472 2,089,489 1,393,541 3,809,614 3,315,994 2,857,885 2,895,330 1,890,220
B: LATE Estimates
treat × after -0.013 -0.014 -0.022 -0.024 -0.051 -0.010 -0.030 -0.035 -0.051 -0.021
(0.022) (0.027) (0.029) (0.037) (0.036) (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.031) (0.041)
Observations 2,802,387 2,456,864 2,061,472 2,089,489 1,393,541 3,809,614 3,315,994 2,857,885 2,895,330 1,890,220
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table estimates the impact of audit on firms’ future behavior. In the top panel, the coefficient assign× after shows γ̂ from model
(3.10), where the dummy variable assigni denotes that firm i’s audit was assigned through the first random ballot held on September 13, 2013.
The control group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers excluding
government departments and firms already under audit. The dummy variable aftert indicates that month t falls after the date of the ballot.
The sample includes periods up to October 2014 for the first five columns and periods up to October 2016 for the rest. Panel B shows the
corresponding results from 2sls regressions, where the endogenous variable auditi is instrumented by the initial random assignment. Standard
errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the tax office level.
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Table C.2.6: Audit Impacts – First Stage
Outcome: audit× afterit
Random Draw Held On: September 13, 2013 September 25, 2014 September 14, 2015
Post Sample: One Year Three Years One Year Three Years One Year Three Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
assign × after 0.704 0.703 0.294 0.296 0.133 0.134
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 6,893,186 9,681,146 7,894,004 10721371 8,241,185 10829729
F Statistic 10,353 10,071 4,751 4,658 1,120 1,102
Notes: The table reports the first stage of our 2sls models. We estimate model (3.10) using the dummy treat× afterit
as the outcome variable, where treati takes the value 1 if firm i was audited in the corresponding audit wave indicated in
the heading of each column. The coefficient assign× after shows γ̂ from these regressions. The dummy variable assigni
denotes that firm i’s audit was assigned through the random ballot indicated in the heading of each column. The sample
includes the population of VAT filers excluding government departments and firms already under audit. The dummy
variable aftert indicates that month t falls after the date of the ballot. We report results for two Post Samples: One
Year specifications include twelve aftert periods and Three Years specifications include 36 aftert periods. In each case,
the samples includes all months from July 2008 to the last aftert period. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which
have been clustered at the firm level.
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Table C.2.7: Impacts of Random Audits Assigned in the Third Wave
Impacts After One Year Impacts After Three Years
Sales Purchases Output Input Tax Sales Purchases Output Input Tax
Tax Tax Payable Tax Tax Payable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
assign × after -0.034 -0.024 -0.039 -0.009 0.004 -0.050 -0.040 -0.071 -0.076 -0.093
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Observations 3,007,568 2,590,734 2,256,294 2,265,080 2,758,303 3,910,133 3,341,025 2,879,242 2,930,477 3,577,794
B: LATE Estimates
treat × after -0.261 -0.185 -0.296 -0.063 0.033 -0.376 -0.297 -0.487 -0.527 -0.652
(0.083) (0.102) (0.106) (0.105) (0.108) (0.087) (0.106) (0.110) (0.108) (0.112)
Observations 3,007,568 2,590,734 2,256,294 2,265,080 2,758,303 3,910,133 3,341,025 2,879,242 2,930,477 3,577,794
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table estimates the impact of audit on firms’ future behavior. In the top panel, the coefficient assign× after shows γ̂ from model
(3.10), where the dummy variable assigni denotes that firm i’s audit was assigned through the first random ballot held on September 14, 2015.
The control group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers excluding
government departments and firms already under audit. The dummy variable aftert indicates that month t falls after the date of the ballot.
The sample includes periods up to October 2016 for the first five columns and periods up to October 2018 for the rest. Panel B shows the
corresponding results from 2sls regressions, where the endogenous variable auditi is instrumented by the initial random assignment. Standard
errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the firm level.
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Table C.2.8: Preexisting Trends – Audited vs. Not Audited
First Wave Second Wave
Sales Purchases Output Input Tax Payable Sales Purchases Output Input Tax Payable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
treat × year ∈ [s− 1, s] 0.019 0.038 -0.016 0.022 -0.046 0.001 0.020 0.022 -0.024 -0.007
(0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.026) (0.015) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.028)
treat × year ∈ [s− 3, s] 0.070 0.074 0.006 0.071 0.029 0.003 0.011 0.037 0.029 -0.006
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.015) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.027)
treat × year ∈ [s− 5, s] 0.089 0.066 0.011 0.066 0.098 0.034 0.028 0.054 0.064 0.025
(0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.033) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.028)
Observations 2,324,186 2,025,380 1,672,095 1,681,583 1,154,574 2,628,878 2,290,848 1,934,273 1,945,733 1,312,928
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table explores if the preexisting trends for the five outcomes indicated in the heading of each column were parallel between audited
and unaudited firms. We estimate a model similar to (3.10) replacing the assign × afterit dummy with three dummies shown in the top
three rows. The dummy variable treati denotes that firm i was audited in the wave indicated in the heading of the column. The control
group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists of the population of VAT filers excluding government
departments and firms already under audit. The sample for these regressions include the baseline periods only, from July 2008 to August 2013
for the first wave and from July 2008 to August 2014 for the second. The dummy variable year ∈ [s− 1, s] indicates that the period is one of
the last twelve months included in the regression and so on. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the firm level.
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Table C.2.9: Heterogeneity in Response With Respect To Amount Detected
Sales Purchases Output Input Tax
Tax Tax Payable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: First Wave
assign × after -0.009 -0.016 -0.020 -0.029 0.004
(0.019) (0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.031)
assign × after × trait 0.009 -0.023 -0.022 -0.031 -0.089
(0.040) (0.048) (0.052) (0.054) (0.070)
Observations 3,839,502 3,328,628 2,884,225 2,906,045 1,913,096
B: Second Wave
assign × after -0.014 -0.019 -0.016 -0.009 0.005
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
assign × after × trait 0.040 0.119 0.053 0.038 0.010
(0.031) (0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.048)
Observations 4,390,478 3,791,277 3,262,221 3,313,664 2,151,912
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table explores heterogeneity in the audit effect. We divide firms into two groups.
Firms against whom a positive amount was detected by audit are included in one group
(indicated by the dummy variable traiti); the rest of the firms are included in the baseline
category. We then estimate a triple-difference version of model (3.10). The model includes
interactions of the traiti dummy with the assign×afterit dummy. The assigni dummy takes
the value 1 if the firm’s audit was assigned in the corresponding random computer ballot. The
control group comprises the rest of the firms in the eligible sample. The eligible sample consists
of the population of VAT filers excluding government departments and firms already under
audit. The dummy variable aftert indicates that month t falls after the date of the ballot.
The coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals on the double and triple-interaction terms
from these regressions are plotted. Regressions are run separately for the first and the second
audit waves. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table C.2.10: Heterogeneity in Amount Detected by Share Final Sales
Outcome: Amount Detected (Std. Deviations)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Share Final Sales
2nd Quartile -0.100* -0.099** -0.097* -0.098* -0.105** -0.096**
(0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.048)
3rd Quartile -0.094* -0.091* -0.085* -0.090* -0.098* -0.086*
(0.051) (0.050) (0.047) (0.050) (0.052) (0.046)
4th Quartile -0.101** -0.097* -0.090** -0.085* -0.108* -0.085*
(0.051) (0.049) (0.046) (0.044) (0.056) (0.045)
Observations 6,561 6,561 6,561 6,560 6,548 6,547
B: Share (Final Sales + Purchases from Unregistered Sector)
2nd Quartile -0.085 -0.082 -0.076 -0.081 -0.088 -0.074
(0.052) (0.051) (0.048) (0.051) (0.053) (0.046)
3rd Quartile -0.108** -0.087* -0.094** -0.083* -0.113** -0.074*
(0.052) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.057) (0.042)
4th Quartile -0.113** -0.086** -0.095** -0.086** -0.118** -0.076*
(0.052) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.059) (0.043)
Observations 6,561 6,561 6,561 6,560 6,548 6,547
Size FEs No Yes No No No Yes
Production Stage FEs No No Yes No No Yes
Tax Office FEs No No No Yes No Yes
Industry FEs No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The table examines if the amount detected by audit changes with the share of final
sales reported by a firm at the baseline. The outcome variable here is the amount detected by
audit, normalized by its standard deviation. To maximize power, we pool together the audits
conducted in the first two waves. Final sales are defined as sales where the other party to the
transaction does not possess a national tax number: they are either consumers or informal
firms. We divide firms into four quartiles based on the share of final sales in their turnover
at the baseline. We regress the outcome variable on the three quartile dummies, omitting the
first quartile as the reference group. We successively introduce the controls indicated in the
last four lines. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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